From Assistance to Subsistence: The Localisation Strategy, Resilience, and the Fight Against Violent Extremism

On the edges of a dusty airstrip surrounded by concertina wire, a section from the Forces Armées Nigeriennes (Nigerien Armed Forces) huddle around the square outline of a large room, drawn onto the hard earth floor with white engineer tape. The Nigeriens are observed by a multinational cohort from the United States, Canada, and European Union. Approaching the ‘room’ in groups of two, the Nigeriens practice making entry, with each man moving to opposite corners to ensure full coverage of the space. Though simplistic, this sequence forms part of US Africa Command’s premier multinational exercises – Flintlock. 

Since 2005, Exercise Flintlock has brought together special operations forces and law enforcement agencies from North America, Europe, and North-western Africa in one of the Sahel region’s largest annual displays of security cooperation. Aimed at strengthening the capacity of key partner nations to confront violent extremism, the 2023 iteration of Flintlock involved upwards of 1,300 servicemembers from approximately 30 states. The history of Western special operations involvement in the Sahel, however, extends far beyond Exercise Flintlock. The French-led Task Force Takuba in Mali, for instance, saw special operators and enablers from 15 European states advise, assist, and accompany the local Unités Légères de Reconnaissance et d’Intervention (Light Reconnaissance and Intervention Units) against local al-Qaeda and IS affiliates. In neighbouring Niger, 12-man detachments from the US Army’s Special Forces have partnered with host-nation forces since the early 2000s, providing instruction ranging from air operations to sensitive site exploitation and engaging with key civilian leaders. But the most unique contribution comes from a state with a comparatively limited military presence; Belgium.

Beginning in late 2017, a small team from the Belgian Special Forces Group (SF Gp) deployed to Niger on a military assistance mission in support of the Nigerien Special Operations Command (NER SOCOM). Military assistance is one of the SF Gp’s primary operational taskings and encompasses a broad range of activities, ranging from capacity building of local security forces to engagement with local leaders, that ‘support and influence’ critical friendly assets. In early 2018, amidst escalating insurgent activity, NER SOCOM was tasked by national authorities to rapidly build up 12 battalions in the space of three to five years; the small Belgian element now found itself playing a central role in the largest special operations force generation project in the region. 

The SF Gp’s limited presence on the ground in Niger in addition to a prohibition on the provision of equipment to NER SOCOM forces meant the Belgian contingent was forced to adopt an unconventional approach to military assistance. Developed by a small cadre within the SF Gp, this approach became known as the Localisation Strategy, one centred on a non-intrusive, self-sustaining model for strengthening host-nation resilience. The model’s overarching framework is, in turn, operationalised through the Enhance, Channel, Assist, and Refine (ECARe) cycle.

The initial phase of the ECARe cycle emphasises the need to channel partner potential, with the ultimate goal of ‘working [oneself] out of a job’ driving decisions regarding the training and equipping of host-nation forces. This requires SF Gp personnel to leverage resources, both human and material, which are native to the environment and whose supply can, therefore, be assured regardless of external support. One of the first observations made by the Belgian element, for instance, was that Nigerien forces possessed disparate medical kits provided by various Western partner nations over the years, with many local troops hesitant to open them out of fear of never receiving a replacement. The SF Gp, therefore, worked with artisan markets to develop an indigenous Life Saving Kit, complete with locally-produced gauze and tourniquets; as the quality of fabric and stitching of the kits improved, this manufacturing capability was expanded to produce and repair body armour, holsters, and other elements of a mission-essential kit. Though sophisticated assets such as night-vision optics remain beyond the current purview of local production, outsourcing equipment manufacturing and maintenance to local entities has two effects. The national populace is economically engaged and, thus, invested at a personal level in supporting government efforts to combat violent extremist organisations. Most of all, the complications of requiring contractor assistance are avoided, ensuring that host-nation forces can continue to meet basic logistical needs in the event of a rapid drawdown of foreign support.

In addition to ensuring sustainability when equipping a host-nation force, the ECARe cycle encompasses measures to ensure that the training provided is reflective of the tactical and operational realities faced by Nigerien troops. The training and mentoring of Nigerien personnel had traditionally been dominated by an intensive American footprint with additional support from the special operations forces of other Western states such as Canada and Germany. This extensive international presence, however, only complicated the force generation effort, with each advisory element employing varying programmes of instruction with different sets of tactics, techniques, and procedures. Upon arrival in Niamey, the ten-man Belgian SF Gp component took a leading role in devising a standardised programme of instruction of 23 modules to form the basis of an initial qualification course for Nigerien personnel; all instructional materials were designed to be self-taught, with accompanying pictures, diagrams, and videos made only with local personnel, terrain features, and equipment. Most of all, the Belgian curriculum has sought to move beyond the tactical realm to include courses with a broader focus on planning and doctrine. In collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross, for example, the SF Gp devised and implemented a module on asymmetric conflict to better prepare Nigerien officers and non-commissioned personnel to confront the operational and legal challenges of the fight against violent extremist organisations.

The Localisation Strategy, thus, offers a clear framework for a limited, albeit persistent, engagement with host-nation military and civilian organisations. Beyond channelling local potential and providing assistance in the domains of equipment provision and training, the ECARe cycle also takes steps to ensure a high degree of continuity in the military assistance effort. Following their initial qualification course, Nigerien forces are accompanied on real-world operations by Belgian Advise, Assist, Enable, and Evaluate teams, allowing for real-time feedback to assess whether skills taught in the programme of instruction are, indeed, reflective of realities on the ground. These teams, as with the rest of the Belgian presence in Niger, operate on three-to-four-month cycles, with SF Gp personnel accumulating multiple rotations to the same area of operations and forging a deep network of relations with local military and civilian contacts. Military assistance missions are, ultimately, far more than a mere transactional relationship between actors. The mutual trust and respect needed to ensure their success are built on a foundation of deep personal ties that take years, if not decades, to form. As one American Special Forces officer remarked, it is this level of rapport, fostered through continued engagement, that allows special operators to have a ‘deeper influence than any first-time adviser with a standard training plan; they [can] discuss topics that [matter], such as corruption, professionalism, or ethics – not just tactics and marksmanship’. 

The success of the United States and its allies in training and developing host-nation special operations units capable of achieving victory at the tactical level is undeniable. When the Islamic State’s 2014 Nineveh offensive resulted in the collapse of one-third of the Iraqi security forces tasked with its defence, it was the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force that held and spearheaded the relentless campaigns of urban fighting to retake major cities such as Mosul and Tikrit. Similarly, as the Taliban began capturing Afghan provincial capitals in 2021, the Afghan National Army’s Special Operations Command continued fighting for more than a month, with numerous units proceeding to Panjshir to join a nascent local resistance to Taliban rule. Both instances demonstrate the ability of specially selected and trained advisors, such as US Army Special Forces, to develop effective foreign military forces capable of winning tactical engagements. Though specific conditions, such as consistent deployments to the same area as well as language and cultural skills, must be met, the notion that the United States and its allies are incapable of executing successful advisory missions is a gross generalisation. Instead, the shortfalls exhibited in the resource-intensive models of military assistance seen in Iraq and Afghanistan lie above the tactical level. It is precisely these flaws that the Localisation Strategy is suited to remedy. 

The ultimate downfall of international advisory missions in Iraq and Afghanistan lay in attempts by the US and its allies to build militaries in their own image. The resulting forces were capable of winning tactical engagements but lacked the necessary logistical and educational infrastructure to translate these individual successes into strategic victory, with an American advisor remarking ‘we got really good at preparing platoons and companies to conduct raids and operate checkpoints, but little worked behind them.’ The Localisation Strategy adopts another approach entirely. Rather than attempting to establish the vital supporting mechanisms behind a professional security force, such as combat logistics and training institutes, and passing them off for the host nation to maintain, local involvement and direction are integrated from the very beginning of the Localisation Strategy. Equipment needs ranging from body armour to tourniquets are handled domestically, drastically simplifying the ability for frontline forces to acquire and maintain the basic kit needed for combat operations. Training and education are similarly designed with autonomy in mind, relying solely on host-nation personnel and equipment to ensure that instruction reflects tactical realities on the ground, while also fostering cooperation with local civilian organisations to provide education in domains beyond basic soldiering. Finally, the creation of deep advisor-advisee relationships is facilitated by the repeated pairing of Belgian personnel with the same Nigerien units, allowing SF Gp operators to develop the trust and rapport vital to confronting the pressing military, and non-military, issues facing the host nation. 

In effect, the Localisation Strategy forces resilience to develop autonomously in the ways most adapted to the local political, economic, social, and military environment. And at a time when the American and European advisory presence in Africa has come under increasing scrutiny from local governments, perhaps this doctrine of discrete, persistent engagement is precisely what is needed.

Image courtesy of US Africa Command via Flickr, ©2018, some rights reserved.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.