Turkish EU Membership: Possible Reality, or Political Pipe Dream?
Turkey’s politics over the last century have been complex; from the Republic’s formation in 1923 after the breakdown of the former Ottoman Empire, to Cold War involvement, to modern territorial disputes. Now, Turkey hopes to join the European Union; its acession has become an increasingly controversial subject, but the feasibility remains uncertain.
Turkey remains an ideal geopolitical ally; its natural resources and its role as a bridge between Asia and Europe have helped maintain its relevance in the international system. Turkey’s borders with Greece, Iran, Syria, and former Soviet states like Georgia and Azerbaijan have provided the nation with the chance to impact some of the most prominent geopolitical conflicts of the last century. Additionally, Turkey merges Eastern culture with an increasingly ‘Westernised’ policy initiated by Former President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's secularisation of government upon founding the Republic. Despite Turkey's close relations with superpowers like the US and the Soviet Union, and its maintenance of these relationships since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has failed to achieve its main foreign policy goal to increase its prominence on the global stage: joining the European Union.
Joining the EU presents a myriad of advantages for Turkey. EU membership would provide Turkey with economic advantages through new trade deals and participation in the European Economic Community (EEC). While the Middle East already has some means of cooperation between states, it still does not have as much capacity to help Turkey with its domestic economic issues as the EEC does. Additionally, EU membership would facilitate better relations with the West and may add to its resources to act as a regional influence in the Middle East.
In the last 20 years, Turkey has undergone various political changes in an effort to align itself with EU policy. This has included a ‘Westernisation’ of policy to align more with the EU, a practise that was largely abandoned when EU accession negotiations were halted. One of the primary outcomes of this was the Istanbul Convention, a treaty written by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government to implement support for sexual assault victims by creating an EU-wide crisis hotline and implementing harsher measures to detect and prevent the issue. This is especially important in Turkey where in some areas, female genital mutilation and honour killings are still practised. The AKP’s lenience on these practises on the grounds of tradition has granted them more support from conservatives in rural regions. However, when EU accession talks lost momentum, Erdogan withdrew Turkey from the Istanbul Treaty after it had been implemented in the EU.
Turkey’s relationship is further complicated by the refugee agreements made in the wake of the Arab Springs and Syrian Civil War, where Turkey shoulders the majority of the burden of accommodating refugees. This has put a strain on the already challenged economy, but the reward of EU membership has been broadly viewed as proportionate to any cost. The diminished possibility of membership has since fueled resentment for Western states and the EU’s existing members both in the general public and with policy approaches, where Turkey instead has prioritised its ties with Russia and China in an attempt to find alternative means of support.
Several factors have inhibited Turkey's ability to join the EU thus far. Turkey’s efforts to prevent Sweden and Finland from joining NATO sparked significant controversy and strained relations with EU member states. These efforts may have been to maintain NATO’s exclusivity, so that Turkey can maintain membership of an organisation that provides it a greater political platform. Its lasting tensions with other member states such as Greece and Cyprus has also inhibited its chances of membership. Prioritisation of Russian ties in spite of NATO participation has also decreased the amount of trust between Turkey and Western states, who are maintaining arms deals and diplomatic ties.
Turkish political commentators often cite the religious difference between Turkey and most of the EU countries, and the ensuing cultural divide, as another significant barrier to EU acession. While Turkey prides itself on secular government and a more ‘lenient’ form of Islamic rule, religion still remains a prominent part of the cultural and social identity and has provided the grounds for Turkey’s alliances with other Middle Eastern states. Turkey faces the challenge of balancing Westernised policy with an Eastern cultural identity, preventing it from fully immersing itself in the affairs of either region.
While the possibility of Turkish EU membership has been greatly diminished, it still remains a possibility. It will take genuine efforts by the Turkish government to liberalise policy and aid freedom of speech as well as re-evaluating their Russian alliance in light of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war.
Image courtesy of Mostafameraji via Wikimedia, ©2020. Some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
