Has German energy policy failed?
As the lights go out at Germany’s last nuclear power plants, has Europe’s largest economy made a costly blunder?
A short drive from Nijmegan, on the banks of the Rhine stands a strange relic of Germany’s nuclear past. A large concrete funnel rises above North Rhine – Westphalia casting long shadows on the block houses below. Once the cooling tower for the nuclear power plant SNR – 300 this site has since been turned into an amusement park, ‘Wunderland Kalkar’. The disused cooling tower now houses a swing ride whilst the other power plant buildings now serve as a hotel. SNR – 300 never went online hampered by protests, bureaucracy and spiralling costs, it became yet another failure in a long line of indecisive and short-sighted energy policy decisions. Today it stands as an ominous monument to Germany’s faltering energy plans.
The story of SNR – 300 and the German nuclear energy programme truly began after 1974 when the global oil shock led western countries to reassess their energy security. Hailed as the fuel of the future since its inception in the 1950’s, nuclear energy was the obvious solution. Producing large quantities of efficient, green energy without significant CO2 by products, it offered sustainable power to countries that had no significant natural resources of their own. France led Europe in investing in this new power source, beginning an unparalleled level of reactor construction, and creating a network of 56 nuclear reactors by the present day. The French example led Germany to begin a rapid program of reactor construction themselves, however, several significant problems prevented the nation from achieving the same success.
From the very early days of Germany’s nuclear energy programme, a strong grassroots movement stood in the way with locals and activists joining forces to oppose the building of new nuclear power plants. Famously in 1975, 28,000 protesters occupied the nuclear power plant under construction at Wyhl halting the project for good. Such was the strength of the anti-nuclear movement that after the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear disaster in the US, 200,000 protesters took to the streets in Hanover and Bonn.
However, it was the 1986 Chernobyl disaster which truly propelled this movement into mainstream politics. After 1986 the conversation on nuclear energy changed fundamentally. Nuclear was no longer the fuel of the future but a dangerous and toxic time bomb. In Germany this translated into concrete policy decisions with the construction of new nuclear power plants slowing and the last one being commissioned in 1989, just three years after Chernobyl. Grassroots activism also gained momentum on the political stage with the German Green party championing the cause in the Bundestag. In 1998 they formed a coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) which propelled them into government. The success of the Greens in the 1998 German federal election effectively marked the beginning of the end of German nuclear energy and a policy was drawn up to abandon nuclear all together within ten years.
In the years following, there was significant opposition to this policy, including from Angela Merkal’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party. However, when she won the 2009 German federal election it was in the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima disaster. Like in 1986, German lawmakers were far too reactionary and acting on public anxieties they committing to phasing out nuclear energy entirely, creating broad political consensus on the issue.
Germany’s war on nuclear energy came with a cost. Facing a significant shortfall Berlin was forced to import 60% of its energy needs. Among these imports was natural gas, which proved of paramount importance to Germany’s thriving manufacturing sector. 32% of these natural gas imports came from Russia creating a dangerous energy dependency. Indeed, business interests were so intertwined that the former chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who once spearheaded the Nordstream pipeline, later took a job with Russian energy company Gazprom. Ignoring the warnings from the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia and later the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the short sightedness of this policy was finally made clear in 2022 with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Germany was forced to choose between economic prosperity and solidarity with Ukraine and its people, its choice of the latter resulted in a painful decoupling from Russia. The resulting fallout from turning off the Russian gas supply put significant strain on the German economy leading to a small recession and high inflationary pressures. The Russian invasion also came with political costs. Berlin was forced into a humiliating U-turn on nuclear energy notably seeing the extension of the lifespan of the remaining nuclear power plants and a delay to the phasing out of nuclear energy.
Fast forward to this year and despite new geopolitical realities, Germany has chosen to resume the shutdown of its last nuclear reactors. Without Russian gas an increasing spotlight has been shone on renewables and their ability to make up the energy shortfall. Germany has some of the most ambitious green energy plans in Europe, with plans to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030. The country plans to close all its coal power plants by 2038, and to produce 65% of its energy from renewables like wind and solar by 2030. In some way, the end of Germany’s reliance on Russian gas has forced the country to increase the role of renewables with notably 46.9% of the nation’s energy needs being met by green sources in 2022. However, renewables have not been enough and without Russian gas, the government has recently had to make a humiliating policy decision on the building of new coal mines. Garzweiler II, an open cast coal mine near Dusseldorf was recently given the go ahead for expanding into what was once the village of Lützerath. Ironically this new expansion has led to the demolition of nearby wind turbines. Indeed, between 2021 and 2022 coal production increased from 31.9% of energy produced to 36.3%. Furthermore, much of this coal production is lignite also known as brown coal, which is far more polluting and can only be accessed through open cast mining. Lignite is second only to renewable energy in Germany’s energy production. It remains highly competitive due to its proximity to power stations and the cheap cost of production. German reliance on coal and lignite has made it a major polluter in Europe accounting for ¼ of the continents CO2 emissions presenting a major humiliation for the Green party currently in power.
Nonetheless, it would be inaccurate to state that German energy policy has been a complete failure. Momentum is clearly on the side of green energy and, at least in theory, the current dominance of fossil fuels in the German system is likely to diminish as renewables become cheaper and more efficient. However, reactionary thinking and a lack of long-term planning has certainly meant Germany has lost years in its fight against climate change. In particular, the abandoning of nuclear energy has not only hobbled Berlin’s ability to meet its green commitments but made it dangerously reliant on fossil fuels at a time when nations across the world are supposed to be taking the risks of climate change seriously. Moreover, without nuclear energy, Germany was forced to compromise its energy security, the ramifications of which are likely to continue to haunt the nation for years to come.
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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
