The Lachin Corridor: Protest, High Politics and Humanitarian Crisis
Since 12th December 2022, the Lachin Corridor, the only route between Armenia and the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh (surrounded by Azerbaijan), has been blocked by Azerbaijani “eco-activists”. This is despite global calls for an end to the blockade, and warnings about an impending crisis if this does not happen. The fact that nothing has changed highlights an uncomfortable reality- that this is no insulated incident, but instead is shaped by international, national, and local forces. It is already having consequences at each of those levels—not least for those marooned in Nagorno-Karabakh, who are now reliant on aid and face increasingly desperate shortages. The reality, however, is that any end to the blockade will also require change and compromise at each of these levels. This has not been forthcoming; whilst it remains absent, neither a short-term resolution nor long term stability are within reach.
On 12th December, a group of Azerbaijani activists, claiming to be protesting illegal mining in Karabakh and the use of the Corridor to transport minerals into Armenia, moved to block the road connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. This was the latest in a series of blockades and standoffs along this artery, which since the end of the Second Karabakh War in November 2020 has become of strategic significance. At the end of the war, Armenia lost control of swathes of territory surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. Without the Lachin Corridor, Armenians living in the breakaway republic would now be cut off from Armenia, upon which much of their economy and society relies, and leaving the breakaway republic “marooned” within Azerbaijan.
The ceasefire agreed between Armenia and Azerbaijan placed the corridor under the protection of Russian peacekeepers, whose vague mandate and position is now being challenged. The exact circumstances surrounding this latest blockade remain unclear. The “eco-activists” are, at the very least, remaining with the support by the Azerbaijani government (with convincing evidence suggesting that their protests have more to do with nationalism than ecology). Supplies of natural gas to Karabakh were also cut off on December 13, although they wererestored three days later. The Armenian government has explicitly claimed that Azerbaijan is behind the protests and other attempts to isolate the region, to try to force the territory back under Azerbaijani control. Azerbaijan, for its part, claims that it is the Russian peacekeepers and the Armenians who are restricting access along the route, and that the protestors have legitimate ecological grievances which should be given a platform.
The origins of these events, however, can be traced back even further than the 2020 conflict. Indeed, the series of separatist exclaves and ethnic tensions between the two states have their roots in the collapse of the USSR in 1991. During this tumult, Nagorno-Karabakh claimed its independence as an ethnically Armenian territory within the internationally recognised boundaries of Azerbaijan. In 2020, Azerbaijan moved to retake much of the territory it had lost in the first war of 1994 and emerged victorious. Although Armenia was forced to cede territory it had previously controlled, Nagorno-Karabakh’s position was left unchanged. To many in Azerbaijan, this autonomy continuously undermines Azerbaijani sovereignty, and regaining control over the region is a matter of pride as well as politics. Although Azerbaijan undoubtedly holds a military advantage over Armenia, Russia’s role in the region has acted as a balance to Azerbaijan’s ambitions.
In recent months, however, Russia has appeared to be both less willing and less able to enforce the agreement. This has left many on the Armenian side disenchanted with their neighbour to the north, who until recently had been a traditional ally of Yerevan. The two states, however, had already seen a worsening of relations, with Armenian PM Pahinyan refusing to sign a CSTO declaration on defence aid and more recently refusing to hold joint military exercises with Russia, both presented as a response to Russia’s failure to come to Armenia’s aid during its recent conflict with Azerbaijan. Russia may also feel more comfortable dealing with Baku, an autocratic regime, over a more democratic and unpredictable Yerevan. The fact that the blockade is taking place at such an opportune moment, where Azerbaijan is likely to face less resistance, means that these protests could easily represent the first stage in a new campaign against the self-declared republic; whether it is playing an active or passive role in these protests, there can be no doubt that they work to Baku’s advantage.
Not only has the ground for the clash been laid by international politics, but it continues to be influenced by those developments. The EU, UN, US and Russia have all separately called on parties to respect the ceasefire agreement, alleviate the humanitarian concerns, and negotiate for a more sustainable agreement. More concrete action, however, has faced its own political blockade. Negotiations to pass a UNSC resolution calling on Azerbaijan to allow free movement on the corridor broke down due to wranglings between Armenia, Russia and France. Many of those who Armenia might expect to come to its aid more forcefully have been reticent to put too much pressure on Azerbaijan. This includes the EU, due to its recent energy agreement with Baku, and Russia, seeking to maintain relations with Baku’s ally Turkey as it faces increasing global isolation. With little international pressure to forgo its military advantage and negotiate with Armenia, many fear that the stalling negotiations could point towards a third war between the two sides.
Whilst this political tug of war continues, many of those affected by the blockade feel forgotten. Over 1,000 people are reported to be stranded in Armenia, unable to return home due to the blockade. In Nagorno-Karabakh itself, fuel, medicine and basic goods are running low and the local authorities have imposed rationing. Those living in the breakaway republic fear that Baku is attempting to “squeeze them out” to force them to lay down their claims to self-governance. For locals, however, they have nowhere else to go- it is not a choice they feel able to make without putting their nationhood and safety on the line. In the medium term, stability can only be created by productive talks and settlements between Armenia and Azerbaijan, involving the local communities whose lives are shaped by these borders. Longer term, it will take ethnic and national reconciliation to create a sustainable peace and build trust, so that these conflicts are no longer necessary to resolve disputes and define identities. But for any of this to take place, the blockade on the Lachin Corridor must end, and this can only be done with the acquiescence of Azerbaijan. International pressure must constrain Baku’s options and make the negotiating table the only way forward—but with an international community distracted by war elsewhere, and unwilling to compromise on other priorities, we might wonder how likely anything other than stalemate or escalation will be.
Image Courtesy of Andreas Kontokanis via Flickr, © 2008 some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
