The Reliability of German Defence Under Scholz: Would Anyone Bet on the Bundeswehr?
“A joke” was how Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko referred to Germany’s provision of 5,000 helmets to the Ukrainian frontline. In what is conversely no laughing matter, he berated German pacifism as being relatively useless for those who face a Russian onslaught: “What kind of support will Germany send next, pillows?”
The Ukraine crisis presents an extraordinary first test for Chancellor Olaf Scholz as he leads the Bundestag after 16 years with Merkel at the helm. Scholz has inherited the Bundeswehr (Germany’s federal armed forces) as they were expanded for the first time since WWII. As NATO’s unity wavers, the new chancellor is under pressure to respond to historical claims that an unreliable Germany has exploited American generosity for decades.
In the 2016 White Paper that instigated this unique military expansion, Merkel conceded more must be done to reinforce defensive commitments that have disappointed in the past. But how did Germany end up facing so much scrutiny from its closest allies? What is to be expected of Scholz and his coalition to rectify tensions? And what explains the pacifism which has angered the sitting ducks at the Ukrainian border?
In 1955, Western allies withdrew any lingering resentment towards Germany and, in the name of bolstering an incipient NATO, the Bundeswehr was founded. As the arms race developed, so did the ranks of the Bundeswehr as more than half a million West German soldiers formed a buffer zone between the West and the Soviets. Of course, no hot war broke out and this situation remained until German reunification in 1990, which introduced a cap of 370,000 soldiers. This began a gradual shrinking of the German military until the aforementioned expansion in 2016 - prior to which the Bundeswehr stood at a much smaller 185,000. Acknowledging this steep reduction of soldiers is important, but it does not fully explain the distrust among military allies.
Coming largely from US incumbents, most criticism has fixated on Germany’s defence spending which routinely misses the 2% of GDP proposed by NATO. It is important to note that it is far from the only “free-rider”, in fact the vast majority of member states fail to reach 2%. However, as the largest European economy and the second-largest in NATO, Germany’s deficiency has always been difficult to ignore. Years of ambiguity and political agitation eventually led to Merkel’s 2016 White Paper. This outlined ambitious plans for increasing defence spending, but the policy has since been adjusted to a more “realistic” 2% of GDP by 2031.
Yet, it was only a couple of years before any newfound respect from their allies was in tatters. In 2018 the Bundestag published a damning report on the state of German defence. Led by SDP politician Hans-Peter Bartels, the report found that not a single one of Germany’s six submarines or large transport planes was deemed fit for use. Bartels also concluded that, of the other tanks, aircrafts, and ships in their ranks, less than half were available for training at any one time. This logistical mayhem even led to the use of civilian transport for soldiers in Afghanistan.
The Bundeswehr is also experiencing personnel shortages with many officer positions being marked as vacant. This report offered a blatant confirmation of its allies’ greatest concern: Germany is falling far behind expected standards and its readiness to defend the West is in substantial doubt.
Its material fitness may be unreliable, but what about Germany’s willingness to engage in conflict? Germany is predominantly a nation of pacifists. Furthermore, many would argue that decades of non-intervention facilitated the success of its post-war economy. As a result, pollsters consistently churn out data that demonstrates a significantly low level of concern for war in Europe relative to the likes of climate change or cybercrime. With Germany’s coalition-reliant system, the more pacifistic left-wing (the SDP and the Greens) have historically had the final say on military action after prior approval from the right.
Therefore, the idea of ‘humanitarian intervention’ has become the common security doctrine of the Bundestag and is still upheld to this day alongside the “longstanding policy” of not exporting arms to conflict zones. Overall, Germany is no blind follower of its allies and has been very selective with its limited foreign deployment. It assisted the Americans in Afghanistan but rejected the invasion of Iraq with former Chancellor Schröder stating that “we must decide for ourselves what is to be done”.
The new chancellor and his cabinet seem to have no intention of straying from this very restrained military history. Scholz is often considered to be a rather placid pragmatist, but in his student days he reportedly referred to an "aggressive-imperialist NATO". Hence, he should cater to his alliances as much as is necessary to keep them, but enthusiasm for military action is not to be expected. Furthermore, his cabinet features a Green Party Minister for Foreign Affairs and an SDP Defence Minister with virtually no experience of security policy. Both are likely to observe party tradition and oppose the deployment of the Bundeswehr.
However, the now complete Nordstream 2 pipeline poses a serious threat to coalition stability. Despite construction ending in 2021, it is yet to be opened and Bundestag negotiations have now been delayed until later this year. This is particularly contentious because major SDP politicians support it, parroting the “long-term security of gas supplies to Europe”, whereas the Greens are, unsurprisingly, vehemently protesting its use.
This rift presents a challenge for German security because it will either further Germany’s already high dependence on Russian resources while frustrating European partners, or if Nordstream 2 is defeated in the Bundestag, it may antagonise an already riled-up Kremlin.
Scholz’ cabinet was quick to point out that Merkel also refused arms exports to Ukraine in the past. However, as pressure is building between Russia and the West, the chancellor’s reluctance to support the military defence of Ukraine with little more than helmets and the apocryphal pillows may push Germany further into a political no man’s land. This tradition of German pacifism was expected of Scholz, but it is nonetheless a gamble with both a dysfunctional military and disgruntled allies.
Image courtesy of NATO via Flickr, ©2018, some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
