Twenty-Seven Nation Army: why a common European army is a bad idea
For years, the concept of a joint European army has been discussed with surprising regularity, especially when Europe is once more painfully reminded that it cannot guarantee its own security without the United States. Both French President Macron and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel prominently advocated the concept after clashes with Donald Trump on security policy in 2018. Most recently, Manfred Weber, the party leader of the European People's Party in the European Parliament, also supported the idea in the face of Russian aggression. In Germany, the proposal found its place in almost all election programs of major German parties for the 2021 federal election.
The countries of the European Union have 27 armed forces, 27 defense ministries, 27 procurement agencies, and 27 defense-industrial markets. Why not consolidate these defense capabilities into a single twenty-seven nation army?
The idea seems reasonable enough. However, despite recurring proposals, opinion articles, and discussions, no one is taking concrete steps to form a European army. This is not surprising at all, as it is entirely unclear what the European army would be, how it would function, and who would actually participate in it.
Broadly speaking, there are three variations of the idea of a European army.
The first version is one common EU army. This means creating a unified force instead of maintaining 27 individual ones. National military forces would be dissolved or integrated within this joint army. This way, the EU would instantly have access to over a million soldiers and thousands of pieces of equipment. Procurement would be done collectively, and only a few standardized systems would be used. The efficiency gains seem substantial.
However, this variant is the most problematic for a few reasons. Firstly, the question arises of who should participate. The involvement of all 27 EU states seems unlikely, as four EU countries—Austria, Ireland, Malta, and Cyprus—are considered "neutral”. So, we are left with the remaining 23. If these states were to merge their armed forces and overcome language barriers and other practical challenges, the question arises: who decides when and where these forces are deployed? European countries have different traditions in this regard. In Germany, the parliament plays a significant role. In France, on the other hand, the President largely decides on the deployment of French forces. Whether executive or legislative, the EU’s legislative and executive branches are both limited in capabilities and legitimacy. Can the European Parliament make decisions? What happens if there is no consensus?
One could agree on a majority rule: those outvoted would have to go along with the decision. However, the decision to send one's own citizens into a military operation where they could be wounded or killed, and may have to inflict harm themselves, is one of the most fundamental national rights. European nations will not be willing to send young men and women into a war that they might not even support.
One might suggest then that only states who wish to participate would be involved. This would be impractical. The idea of a European army is, after all, about consolidation and efficiency gains—the end of duplications or twenty-seven-fold structures. How can a country extract its soldiers, tanks, ammunition, etc., from the pool of the EU army? Will there suddenly be a shortage of tanks because they come from non-participating countries? If a truly integrated European army is established, national elements cannot exist within it, otherwise the primary purpose it serves would be lost. This type of European army should and could only come into existence when the United States of Europe are founded. Only if a truly unified political system emerged from the EU could military capabilities be consolidated.
The second idea would be to establish a 28th European army, meaning the 27 national armed forces would remain, but there would be an additional army, ideally, contributed to and equipped by all EU countries. With this idea, financing problems arise. All European states struggle to find sufficient funds for their defense budgets as is. Currently only ten European NATO countries reach the desired level of 2% of the gross domestic product for defense, while 18 fall short. There would likely also be a recruitment problem as well, as many European countries face challenges in this regard, too. Similar to the first proposal, the question arises of who has the authority to deploy this army. The European Parliament? The heads of governments? What happens in case of disagreement? It is also worth noting that since 2007, the "EU Battlegroups" have been operational. However, they have never been deployed to date.
The third option is that of enhanced cooperation. This would involve the increased collaboration of more integration-minded EU member states in terms of training, capabilities, operations, and equipment. This approach would not entail creating a new entity, and national armies would not be abolished. This proposal is the least drastic and currently the only feasible option. Enhanced cooperation at the European level, joint procurement, and training are indeed commendable. Europeans must do more for their defense, and cooperation can facilitate that. However, this approach should not bear the name "European Army" since it does not involve the creation of joint armed forces.
The European Union is already taking steps in this direction: there are joint procurement projects, some with direct EU funding. However, the difficulty of this approach is evident in the debacle of the joint German-French-Spanish fighter jet project FCAS. Nevertheless, there is no avoiding increased EU cooperation in defense policy. Especially in light of the potential impact of the 2024 US presidential elections, Europe must mature in its security and defense policy and ensure that it can guarantee its security without relying on the United States. Still, a joint European army is not the way to do that.
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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
