1956: A Tale of Two Choices — FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW

Feb 23

Feb 23 1956: A Tale of Two Choices

Christmas Eve, usually a time for joyous celebrations and family in the West, is remembered quite differently in Afghanistan, not necessarily due to different religious or cultural sentiments, but instead for its place in history. At 23:00 on Christmas Eve, 1979, the Soviet Union began to airlift troops into Bagram Airfield, not far from Kabul, and continued non-stop for two days. By the morning of the 27th, armoured divisions (primarily tanks) crossed the Amu Darya into Afghanistan itself, and by 19:00, Soviet troops stormed Tajberg Palace and executed Afghan President Hafizullah Amin for “crimes against the state.” Superficially, the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan appears perplexing — the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, at the time, was a nominally socialist state under the leadership of hardline communists who had publicly pledged support for close ties with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, a combination of civil unrest (or as J. Bruce Amstutz and William Malley argue, a flat-out civil war) and Amin’s meetings with the United States convinced the USSR’s top brass to invade a nominal ally. Despite this seemingly strange scenario, 1979 was not the first time the Soviet Union decided to militarily intervene in its satellite states. In addition to Afghanistan in 1979, it also deployed troops during the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. The Soviet Union’s history of direct military intervention in its satellite states shows that it only did so when it felt that a satellite state was falling out of its orbit and all other options to maintain Soviet influence had been exhausted. Comparisons between the 1956 Soviet responses to the Poznan strikes in Poland and the Hungarian Revolution demonstrates this principle.

The denunciation of Stalinism by Khrushchev in February of 1956 during the “Secret Speech” and the sudden death of Polish Stalinist leader Bolesław Bierut from a heart attack a few weeks later led to a softening of Poland’s totalitarianism and resulted in the release of political prisoners. The softening of restrictions and dissatisfactory living conditions among Polish workers resulted in a mass strike beginning in the city of Poznán in June 1956 put down by the Polish military. Soviet leaders initially feared that the Poznán strikes would lead to the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, however, they were dissuaded from using their own military forces after it became clear that the Polish troops had suppressed the initial unrest.

Though the initial unrest had been suppressed by Polish troops, it had not completely disappeared, and by fall, Moscow became concerned again. Władysław Gomułka, a former political prisoner, slowly gained influence despite opposition from Moscow. The Soviet Union was concerned that Poland under Gomułka would act more independently on the international stage than what the Soviets were comfortable with, a fear that was only compounded when Gomułka demanded that the Soviets remove the KGB and Soviet advisors from Polish territory. On 19 October, during a meeting of the Polish United Workers’ Party, Soviet troops in Poland started marching to Warsaw, and top Soviet officials, including Krushchev, flew into Warsaw. Following intense discussions between Gomułka and the Soviet officials throughout the night, Gomułka was able to convince the Soviet Union that he had no intention of pulling Poland out of the Warsaw pact, and the Soviet Union halted its military advance before any Soviet troops engaged in conflict.

Soviet attempts to de-Stalinise in Hungary began before Khrushchev’s speech: the USSR began pressuring Hungary’s Stalinist leader Mátyás Rákosi to share power with the more moderate Imre Nagy in 1953, following protests in East Berlin. Nagy’s “New Course,” was initially welcomed by the Soviet Union until Malenkov was decisively replaced as de facto leader by Khrushchev in February 1955: Nagy followed him out of power two months later, though Nagy’s influence with Hungarian moderates continued. The quick changes in Hungarian policy led to increasing social dissatisfaction, and Rákosi’s ability to suppress unrest with force was stymied by Nagy’s previous reforms. Despite Moscow’s repeated offer to send assistance to quell the unrest and growing concern, Hungarian officials denied that the situation was growing out of their control. Rákosi’s position deteriorated by June when criticism of Rákosi’s own role in Hungarian Stalinism had been publicised. It weakened further in July when Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” had been broadcast in Hungary by Radio Free Europe. Protestors were emboldened by actions that had occurred in Poznán just weeks before, and Rákosi was likewise emboldened by the Polish military’s forceful suppression, however, Moscow removed Rákosi on the 9th of July.

Rákosi’s ouster did little to curb the discord. Rákosi’s successor, Erno Gero, a hardliner Rákosi backed to replace him, was unable to control the situation. After continued unrest, on the 23rd of October, possibly inspired by Gomułka’s successful reform movement not far away, nearly ten thousand students marched under the banner of 16 demands, including the reinstatement of Nagy and removal of Soviet troops from Hungary. Hungarian State Security Units (AVH) shot at the protestors, however units from the Hungarian regular troops had defected to the protestors. That evening, Hungarian officials requested Soviet military assistance to help put down the protests, and the USSR obliged. Nagy’s reinstatement on the 24th of October did not sufficiently ameliorate the protestors’ concerns, and if anything, hardened the Soviet Union’s position. Nagy’s announcements that he would permit multiparty democracy and withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact agitated Khrushchev, and the Soviets sent twelve thousand troops to Hungary to quash the revolution for once and for all.

The “Secret Speech” and the process of de-Stalinization across Eastern Europe had similar effects in both Poland and Hungary, however the responses from each local government dictated whether the Soviet would employ a military solution, and thus the comparison provides the playbook for Soviet military intervention in its proxy states. There were two significant differences between Poland and Hungary. First was the Polish military’s efficacy in putting down the initial protests in Poznán, which allayed Soviet concerns that the situation was growing out of hand. Hungarian forces’ violent crackdown did not do the same, and Hungarian troop defections to the protestors’ side did not inspire confidence within the Soviet Union apropos of Hungary’s ability to stabilise the situation. The second difference between the situations was Gomułka’s ability to convince Khrushchev that Poland would not leave the Soviet orbit, whereas Nagy’s liberalisation, requests for Soviet troop withdrawals from Hungary, and threats to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact convinced Khrushchev that the Soviet Union would lose its foothold in the country. Thus, these situations showed that the Soviet Union intervened militarily in its proxies when the following two conditions occurred: when it believed that there was a credible threat to Soviet influence in the country, and when it believed that local authorities could not bring the situation under control. It is also important to note that intervention occurred as a measure of last resort. With Gomułka, the Soviets addressed the situation diplomatically, and in Hungary, the Soviets advised Rákosi and Gero for months before sending in troops to Budapest.

The history matters when attempting to understand current geopolitical situations. Many a foolhardy comparison has been made by reporters and commentators comparing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the USSR’s interventions in Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary since the Russia’s invasion almost two years ago. The domestic situation in Ukraine in February 2022 was unrecognisably different from the situations in Afghanistan, and the unrest that developed in Czechoslovakia or Hungary in 1968 and 1956 respectively had demonstrably different roots from unrest in Ukraine. Moscow’s relationship with Kyiv in 2022 was different from its relationship with Kabul in 1979, Prague in 1968, or Budapest in 1956. If anything, Russia’s annexation of Crimea nearly 10 years ago is a more reasonable comparison to 1979 than 2022. An authoritarian state led by an ex-KGB agent situated in the Kremlin using the same national anthem as his authoritarian predecessors makes for an amazingly easy comparison to a state that hasn’t existed for over three decades, but it is an overly simplistic comparison, one that is unjustified. A comparison of Khrushchev’s decisions in Poland and Hungary in 1956 demonstrates a certain level of nuance in the USSR’s military interventions and motivations. It would be advisable for commentators to understand why the USSR’s interventions took place and to understand how Putin’s invasion in 2022 has been demonstrably different from his Soviet predecessors’ before attempting to make such comparisons.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.