Allied but not Aligned: French strategic autonomy following AUKUS

Oct 5

Oct 5 Allied but not Aligned: French strategic autonomy following AUKUS

“France is in the Pacific, not much of her is there, but she is there”, these words written by General Charles de Gaulle in 1956 have never been more relevant. On the 15th of September the signing of the AUKUS agreement heralded a reformed alliance of Anglo spheric nations to combat China in the Pacific. The agreement however, humiliated, and angered France, western Europe’s chief military power alongside Britain. The scrapping of a prior Franco Australian agreement with no concern given to France led to outrage in France with the French Foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian calling it a “stab in the back”. AUKUS and French reaction to it underlines a familiar concept in French foreign policy of the last 70 years that of being allied but not aligned, the consequences of fervent French adherence to this policy would shape European and global foreign policy.

The AUKUS agreement, despite sowing the seeds of a strengthened US alliance in the South Pacific and invigorating Boris Johnsons tilt to Asia following the UK’s strategic review, uprooted Franco Australian relations. France and Australia had agreed a 60-billion-dollar deal for submarines in 2016 this was viewed as a triumph of French diplomacy and a boon for French ship maker NAVAL. However, following the announcement of the deal, it took almost 3 years till 2019 for the agreement to be signed. The delays over specification and the Australian navy’s desired changes to French Submarines were the reason for this. In this vein a review by former US secretary of navy Donald winter doubted if the deal was “in the national interest”. Despite these hiccups the Australian Government had repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to the partnership . The French spokesperson for the armed forces even said that. “On the same day as the AUKUS announcement, the Australians wrote to France to say they were satisfied with the submarine’s achievable performance and with the progress of the project”. This perceived volte-face of the Australians led to France recalling its ambassadors to Australia and the U.S. However, the French ambassador in London remained as according to French sources the UK was merely a “5th wheel in the agreement.”

French feelings were soothed in a phone call between Emmanuel Macron and Joe Biden reaffirming Franco-American partnerships in the Sahel and a quasi-apology for the abrupt announcement of the agreement. France’s ambassadors may have returned following this mild reconciliation friction between France and the wider western order has deep historical roots. In 2003 Jacques Chirac would refuse to Join America and its coalition against Saddam Hussain saying “war is always the proof of failure”. Chirac then and Macron in his rhetoric this week both fall back to the old Gaullist policy of Strategic autonomy. This notion that France although an ally of the west within the struggle of the cold war still differed a followed its own French foreign policy in order to protect its best interests not those of NATO. This Gaullist strategy also placed a particular emphasis on an idea which resonates still with current President Macron that of Europe.

French allusions to strategic autonomy are based on this premise of France being at the heart of European organisation in the defensive sphere in a manner akin to what has already been achieved in the economic sphere and to a lesser extent politically. The sight of three English speaking countries publicly humiliating France, only emboldened those in Paris who think that it is best served leading a far more independent European military. America’s prioritisation of a great Eurasian theatre at the expense of transatlantic ties from the bygone age of the cold war threatens europes geopolitical agency.

The theoretical idea of this European military unity remains far from reality. To France’s detriment the northern and eastern periphery of the European Union still looks across the Atlantic for defence from Russia. This is not helped by Macron’s desire to “win Russia round”, which strikes fear into eastern European capitals. Given this outlook it is difficult to see any revolutionary European defence structure in the short and medium term. President Biden himself offered a glimpse of France’s strategic opportunities saying that he recognised “ the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence, that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to NATO.” Although this was hidden at the end of a diplomatic readout for journalists it demonstrates a vision of a European defensive structure with significant French involvement being complementary to the wider structure of NATO.

In accepting and even promoting this autonomous European defensive identity the Biden administration was admitting that it had erred in how AUKUS was presented. As confrontation with China increases France and Germany’s milder opposition to China has been a bone of contention for U.S policymakers. The China-EU investment agreement signed before Biden’s inauguration certainly irritated members of the incoming administration. France is an important military partner for the United States especially in the Sahel and its role in the Indo-Pacific should not be underestimated. The strategic moment now of increased polarization necessitates that France and Europe as a whole works with the United States so despite the ill feeling caused by AUKUS the Biden administration should work towards repairing relation with France.

AUKUS heralded a renewed era of alliances but in doing so exposed an older Gallic manner. The French ideal of being strategically autonomous “allied but not aligned” is incompatible with the current landscape of European defence. The French may sneer at Britain as a “vassal “of the U.S but it cannot itself realise its strategic ambitions be they in the Sahel or in the Pacific without the might of the U.S military machine. Gestures in the Past few weeks following AUKUS have been positive but a renewed U.S commitment to Europe and an appreciation of France’s role as a U.S partner is needed in times of such tension. France, meanwhile, must understand Eastern European sentiment towards Russia and seek to channel this into greater European military cooperation whilst remembering how integral the U.S is to its wider interests.