Beyond the Yoshida Doctrine: How Japan plans to tame the Chinese Wolf
China’s spectacular rise to a regional and global superpower has raised several geo-strategic questions for surrounding countries. For Japan, the shift from pacifistic restraint under the Yoshida Doctrine, to the interventionalist spirit of the Official Security Assistance framework (OSA) of the National Security Strategy (NSS) has been their answer.
Led by Xi Jinping’s ‘Wolf Warrior’ diplomacy, tensions in the Indo-Pacific have been on the rise in recent years. As a result, the region is seeing unprecedented levels of defence spending. China, this year, has increased defence spending by 7.2% to a total of $219.5 billion despite severe economic malaise. Under Xi Jinping alone, Chinese defence spending has increased by a factor of 2.3. Additionally, Indonesia has pledged a 20% increase in military spending this year, and Australia has committed US$7.25 billion to building the largest navy fleet since World War II.
Perhaps the most significant development has come from Japan.
Starting from former Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, who set out the country’s regional aims within the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ strategy (FOIP), current Prime Minister, Fumio Kishida, has developed the OSA framework, as part of his ‘values-based’ diplomacy. First introduced in April 2023, the OSA allows Japan to offer investment, supplies, and equipment to developing ‘like-minded countries’ towards the aim of improving security cooperation among East Asian countries, countering the growing Chinese influence. While Japan has been an active regional actor through its Official Development Assistance (ODA) framework, the OSA differs because it allows Japan to provide defensive military materiel to other countries outside the limited requisites of economic or social development.
Plainly, Prime Minister Kishida represents the most interventionist Japanese premier of the post-World War II era.
Through the OSA, Japan has invested significant amounts to provide countries such as Bangladesh, Malaysia, Fiji, and the Philippines additional security capabilities. In the case of the Philippines, Japan invested $4 million towards enhancing the Philippine navy, from which the two countries produced the Reciprocal Access Agreement Deal (RAA), which ‘will facilitate the procedures and set guidelines when Philippine forces visit Japan for training and joint exercises, and vice versa’. Of particular significance is the case of Malaysia as a recipient of the OSA. Malaysia is an important diplomatic partner of Japan, situated on the maritime transportation route connecting the Indian Ocean and East Asia. Drawing upon Malaysian grievances of Chinese vessels entering its exclusive economic zones, Malaysia has elevated its diplomatic relations with Japan to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’. Such agreements and partnerships allow for increased military cooperation, communication, and research & development, unveiling Japan’s intentions to bolster deterrence against growing Chinese power in East Asia; as well as to maintain the US-led international order.
Prime Minister Kishida’s OSA is set to become a significant influence in the balance of powers in the region, with Japan signing security cooperation deals with at least 4 countries in January alone: Australia, Germany, the United Arab Emirates and the United States. Some commentators view the pace of Japanese security efforts as the result of the uncertainty surrounding the re-election of President Joe Biden later this year. The presidency of Donald Trump has been described as having ‘managed to not only weaken American influence in Southeast Asia, but also damage regional confidence in its leadership’. Considering the possibility of a re-elected Trump, Prime Minister Kishida is likely situating Japan as the principle ‘Western’ influence in the region.
The Japanese objective is clear: to mobilise ‘like-minded countries’ in favour of enforcing the status quo; with Chinese behaviour around the Taiwan Strait; North Korean missile activity; and international uncertainty in the wake of the war in Ukraine, all causing concern in East Asia.
Yet, there is the possibility that increasing resistance against China will only encourage an aggressive response, heightening instability. Certainly, this has been the case in the past. In 2014, President Obama challenged Chinese claims to the Senkaku islands, announcing that they came under the US-Japan defence treaty. As a result, China increased the number of its ships and aircraft in the region. Following the Pelosi visit to Taiwan in August 2022, China launched an unprecedented military demonstration, firing missiles over Taiwan for the first time, conducting air operations within Taiwanese ADIZ, and simulating the blockade of Taiwan’s main ports. It remains a distinct possibility that increased Japanese involvement in the region will induce an emphatic Chinese reaction.
The security situation within the Indo-Pacific continues to evolve: with renewed Japanese ‘realism diplomacy’ tensions are unlikely to soften in the short term. Kishida hopes to marshal a Western alliance such that Xi Jinping sees no violent military method for achieving Chinese near-abroad policy goals. As Beijing flexes its muscles and asserts its dominance in the region, Tokyo finds itself at the forefront of a strategic struggle for stability and security; how it manages this struggle will define the future political and security landscape of East Asia.
Image courtesy of Taro2968332 via Wikimedia, ©2022. Some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
