Cracks in the Foundations of Former Soviet States
Once spanning more than fifteen per cent of Earth’s landmass, the Soviet Union (USSR) hosted a myriad of different cultures and ethnicities within its borders. Following its collapse, the widespread emergence of independent states gave birth to an entirely new socio-political environment which greatly altered the dynamic of Eurasian politics. However, it is in the emergence of these states that one must query: how has such a vastly differing array of political and economic environments emerged from such a homogenised foundation such as the USSR? How have the ‘starting positions’ of these states created such profound and long-lasting implications for them?
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 directly resulted in the birth of 15 new states, each with a range of cultures, ethnic identities and history. Yet it was largely in these ‘foundational years’ of independence from the USSR that these new states would encounter fundamental issues in their economic and political structures which, if not addressed, could create long-lasting implications for the country. Thus, two progressions were required for a country to advance beyond the restraints of ‘Soviet statehood’: clear administrative reformation which distances the country from the Soviet structural hierarchy, and an establishment of a reliable economic model which recognises the country — and its industry — as independent of a collective system and capable of performing on its own to an extent.
Moving out of the ‘USSR mentality’ was difficult for many former Soviet states and proved to play a key role in influencing each country’s future both domestically and internationally. It is in these ‘foundation years’ of former soviet states in which we are able to ascertain a great deal about how their current systems were formed. If asked ‘What is Europe’s poorest country?’, many would struggle to answer correctly due to the country’s lack of status in any major political, social or economic domain. Based on annual GDP per capita, the Republic of Moldova is currently the poorest country in Europe. Nestled between Ukraine and Romania, the country once had played an active role in the USSR’s agricultural sector. However, after becoming independent following the dissolution of the USSR, the country struggled greatly in both establishing an economic model not heavily reliant upon agriculture and implementing and maintaining an effective organisational structure. This failure to establish a reliable economic model, in tandem with extensive and continuous political corruption has greatly inhibited the country’s capability for development and condemned it to some of the highest poverty levels in Eastern Europe.
Former states such as Belarus serve also to show how the lack of administrative reform can limit and even inhibit opportunities of economic, social and political growth. The maintained rule of state president Aleksandr Lukashenko as the country’s first and only president since its establishment, through illegitimate elections, has resulted in a social order where much innovation and development is inhibited by the rigid socio-political conditions implemented by the regime. Lukashenko, being notoriously anti-west, or more accurately, anti-non-Belarusian, has maintained a secularised and Belarus-Russian centric approach to domestic and foreign policy. An approach whose impact has been mirrored in the Belarusian economy, which by measure of GDP per capita, much like Moldova, remains incredibly low (in the bottom 10 in Europe) in comparison to its European counterparts.
It is in the early stages of Belarusian independence that one can ascertain when the crucial decisions were made that ultimately created lasting ramifications for the country. Elected in 1994 after the formation of a new Belarusian constitution, Aleksandr Lukashenko is and has been Belarus’ first and only president. Lukashenko was a devout Soviet loyalist during the time of the USSR and upon his election vowed to keep the country as ‘Sovietised’ as possible. This rhetoric meant that all the subsequent economic and political developments thereafter were influenced by the ‘Soviet model’ despite having proven to be largely ineffective. Thus, the contemporary setting in which Belarus finds itself can largely be traced back to the restrictive and outdated model that Lukashenko carried with him from Soviet rule into modern Belarus. This failure to innovate and adapt has consequently stagnated the rate of economic growth which has stalled since 2012, illustrating how the immediate decisions of these states after leaving the USSR would prove to be definitive factors in determining much of their future.
However, despite the struggling political and economic situations of several former Soviet states, there are also some success stories which emphasise the importance of the ‘transition period’ as a process of foundational improvement for the future. A shining example can be found in the Republic of Estonia which enjoys a much higher GDP per capita than many of its former Soviet counterparts, maintains a publicly and internationally more highly-trusted democratic political system and boasts some of the most developed social legislations in former Soviet states. Viewed by the World Bank as a high-income country, one must ask, how did Estonia manage to establish both a political and economic system which supersedes its former Soviet counterparts in so many domains?
The answer can largely be found in the country’s concerted effort in establishing more reliable economic and political models, independent of those of the USSR, from the start of its independence. After gaining independence, the newly independent Estonian government made widespread efforts to perform an economic and political shift away from socialism and towards capitalism. The country found that a separation of state and business meant that the impacts of corruption amongst government officials - which was commonplace in much of the USSR - was far less impactful upon the post-Soviet-Estonian economy as business was further privatised after the dissolution of the USSR. Beyond this, a desire to distance the structure of the Republic from the Soviet model and to integrate with the forms of ‘Western’ law and legislation meant a huge cultural shift in the country occurred, upon which more liberal views were incorporated into many facets of its socio-political order.
Contrasting the foundations of these former Soviet states provides a comprehensive basis upon which one can begin to understand the reasoning behind the diaspora of varying political, economic and social environments which exist within former members of the USSR. Countries such as Moldova and Belarus serve as clear examples of how a failure to establish new systems distinct from their Soviet models has proven to be a key determinant in determining the country’s ability to develop and innovate on both an economic and socio-political level. This theory is only further supported by the success of other countries such as Estonia who have taken definitive action to distance themselves from their Soviet structures. Through the implementation of new economic and administrative models, Estonia is living proof of how the foundational years of many former Soviet states upon claiming their independence, was a crucial period during which many states would take definitive actions to either propel themselves forwards or in the instances of Moldova and Belarus, stagnate themselves in their inability or refusal to adapt.