Critiquing Government Responses to Terrorism.
The recent terror incidents in France, perpetrated against a schoolteacher and churchgoers, have reawakened the public to the continuing threat of terrorism- a threat to which governments are obligated to respond. Part and parcel of responding to terrorism is knowing what terrorism in fact really is. Though broadly understood as the use of violence or intimidation for political aims, an exact definition continues to be elusive. Indeed, a criminal justice perspective would deem it first and foremost a crime; governments across the world interpret terrorist violence as a political threat to the state; victim populations condemn the strategy as a barbaric weapon of the weak and its perpetrators would defend their actions as the practice of freedom fighters. It seems, then, that the oft-quoted cliché that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ is apt amid such confusion. The question then follows: how can governments effectively respond to this threat?
One avenue is to pursue terrorists through investigation and prosecution, and so the onus of response rests on the framework of the existing criminal justice system. Such a response is appropriate as terroristic violence more often than not involves acts that violate prevailing criminal codes, such as murder, bombing and kidnapping, among many others. However, a response that criminalizes terrorism bears significant drawbacks. Beyond the idea that it is by its very nature reactionary, it is also heavily reliant on policing and intelligence services which, during times of crises and emergencies, are prone to acting outside the parameters of the law. When emotion is running high, as is the case following terrorist incidents, police forces may feel compelled ‘do something’, departing from regular policing measures and the mandate of minimum force. Such actions include conducting searches without warrants, false arrest, racial and ethnic profiling and, in many cases, increased militarization. Regrettably, to neglect due process not only hampers the credibility of the prosecution and conviction of suspected terrorists, but also stigmatizes those sympathetic to terrorist causes. The role of intelligence services- though vital in the first line of defence- in preventing and responding to terrorism can also be precarious. Robust intelligence programmes subject even the law-abiding citizen to information gathering, creating significant dilemmas for the state in regard to the civil liberties and freedoms of its citizens. For the state, these means may justify the ends of potentially foiling terror attacks, but the fact of the matter remains: where is the line between protecting citizens and encroaching on civil liberties drawn? Furthermore, in what seems antithetical to the criminal justice responses, intelligence agencies including the CIA and MI6 have been involved in extraordinary rendition operations and torture of suspected terrorists. Such actions not only violate international legal conventions, but also constitute ‘terror from above’, stimulating further alienation and radicalisation of sympathetic individuals.
An alternative response, and one that questions the appropriateness of the criminal justice response, is that of military intervention. This policy of action- undoubtedly ushered in by the sheer scale of the 9/11 attacks- appears to adhere to the maxim that the ends justify the means. Indeed, if terrorism appropriates seemingly limitless and random violence, should governments too not employ unprecedented means against the very real threat to its national security? Many would argue that to replicate and adopt the methods of terrorism would render governments no better than terrorists themselves. Beyond this point, however, are numerous others that make a military response hugely problematic. The first point of issue is that in declaring war, governments have recognized the political intention of terrorism and may actually bequeath a degree of legitimacy on terrorists and their objectives. Second is the problem related to the ‘return address’ concept, for to respond to terrorism inherently requires the state know the identity of its perpetrators. Given that terrorism, facilitated by global revolutions in communications and technologies, is increasingly taking on a networked character, the question of who, and by extension where, to attack has become a salient one. A third issue is that such a senseless overreaction plays directly into the hands of terrorists, whose violence is often aimed at provocation. Recent history has shown that the deployment of overwhelming military force against a numerically insignificant opponent has had disastrous consequences, both in terms of crude numbers and the battle of ideas. Far from the objective of destroying weapons of mass destruction and eradicating terrorism in the Middle East, the invasion of Iraq functioned to intensify anti-American sentiment in the region. Harsh preexisting sanctions against Iraq coupled with the neglect of the Palestinian plight contributed to the idea of ‘Islam under siege’ in the Arab world and therefore misguided military intervention served only to add fuel to the proverbial fire- itself exploited as propaganda for terrorist organisations. Military intervention was also devastating to the US’s reputation as a bearer of human rights and to the objective of counterterrorism. The invasion of both Afghanistan and Iraq has arguably indoctrinated a new and more dangerous generation of terrorists including ISIS, itself the new nemesis of global counterterrorist forces. A military response to terrorism, it seems, is miserably counterproductive.
There is enormous difficulty in responding to terrorism, with governments seemingly locked in a losing battle. The case of Osama bin Laden demonstrates this effectively: to have put him on trial would have granted him a global platform for propaganda but being killed at the hands of military forces undoubtedly made him a martyr. As such, the question may arise as to whether states should respond to terrorism at all. Given that terrorism generally fails to enact political change and that the threat is statisticallyspeaking very low, a dispassionate assessment might find that an appropriate reaction is to ignore terrorism. While there could be potential merit in this approach, in an arena of rational politics it is simply unrealistic. Indeed, the same reprehension afforded to states in cases of overreaction apply in cases of underreaction. By consequence, it would seem the counterterrorism has to be multi-pronged and essentially balanced, employing conventional responses in a proportional and measured approach.
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