Erdogan: The Man Without a Plan?
“The minarets are our bayonets, the domes our helmets, the mosques our barracks and the faithful our army.”
The words had scarcely left the lips of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan before the forty-year old mayor of Istanbul found himself embroiled in immediate political backlash. Convicted by the Turkish High Court of inciting violence and religious hatred, Erdoğan was sentenced to ten months in federal prison in 1999, removed from office, and banned from participating in all future parliamentary elections. These words were more than a mere abridgement of Ziya Gokap’s famous poem: they spelled out clear religious preference and division- seemingly political suicide in a republic grounded in the principles of Kemalism. Nevertheless, two decades and eleven leadership contests later, Recep Erdoğan has yet to lose an election. In his eighteen years in office, the enigmatic populist has managed to stay abreast of major political shifts within the Republic of Turkey, resisting political bans, escaping imprisonment, and quelling a military coup in 2016.
On July 10, 2020, Erdoğan was again embroiled in a cloud of international controversy and religious division. In what some have deemed a moment of insanity, the 66 year old president has pressed the high court to remove formal protections surrounding the religious usage of the Hagia Sophia, transforming the religiously neutral site back into a mosque. Outcry against this decision in the international arena has been deafening, with many arguing the groundbreaking ruling symbolises a death of religious pluralism in Turkey and reignites dormant conflicts. Accused of stoking religious divisions, Erdoğan’s decision is, to say the least, unanticipated. However, the controversial ruling leaves many to wonder why Erdoğan has chosen this particular moment to act. Was the president motivated by religious fervour, or has Hagia Sophia been offered as a “hail Mary” (pun intended) to buy the time and political support so desperately needed by the AKP?
First, one must consider the implications of Covid-19 upon Erdoğan’s already tenuous position. The present health crisis sent economic shockwaves throughout Turkey, a threat the standing government was ill-prepared to handle. By April, the already floundering lira had depreciated by 14% against the US dollar, forcing already overleveraged financial groups to seek financial aid in increasingly hostile foreign markets. Even Ankara’s proffered stimulus package paints a grim picture of Turkey’s post-pandemic finances: the “anemic” offering constituting only 1.5% of the nation’s GDP (compared to Germany’s 4.9%). As Erdoğan observed through his party’s notable loss in the 2019 Istanbul regional elections following the Turkish currency crisis, the key to his political success is rooted in a dual support of fervour and finances alike. Critically, the president is no longer able to offer a stable economy or to be financially competitive in the majority of European markets.
As Erdoğan has recently observed through his party’s notable loss in the 2019 Istanbul regional elections, the key to his political success is rooted in a dual support of fervour and finances alike. His Justice and Development Party (the AKP) suffered a major blow following the Turkish debt currency of 2018, demonstrating that religious factionalism alone is not enough to strengthen the president’s stronghold upon the party. Only through an alliance with the far right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) was Erdoğan’s able to purchase the votes necessary to maintain his executive presidency. With this in mind, the impending economic recession forecast by the Covid-19 pandemic has placed an ever growing cloud over Erdoğan’s chances of reelection in 2023. Erdoğan has responded to this challenge with three primary strategies.
The first (and perhaps most apparent) tactic has been the president’s unexpected “favours'' to Turkey’s nationalist and religious majority, the primary backing for Erdoğan’s AKP-MHP alliance. The transformation of Hagia Sophia into a site of worship can be placed into this category, as Islamist nationalist groups have long pressed for the reversal of the cabinet’s 1934 protection of the site (intended to safeguard religious dualism and equality in Turkey). The transformation of Hagia Sophia may be a small boon, but is nevertheless a highly symbolic one. By publicly rejecting international convention and catering to the wishes of the religious majority, Erdoğan has overturned a strictly Kemalistic policy of religious equality. In doing so, he has sought to purchase the support of the far right, at least for the time being.
Despite the “Blue Homeland” policies central to his early presidency, following the dismissal of Rear Adm. Gürdeniz in 2016, Erdoğan has also made significant headway in fostering positive relationships with non-EU powers, namely the United Kingdom and the United States. This is not to suggest that Erdoğan has wholly eliminated the ideals associated with “Blue Homeland”, but the aging leader has actively suppressed Gürdeniz’s characteristic vitriol towards western powers. Notably, in early April, the Turkish government opted to send multiple shipments of surgical masks, N95 masks, hazmat suits and disinfectants to the US and UK despite reported shortages in Ankara’s own hospitals. With Britain actively pursuing favourable trade agreements following a less-than-graceful exit from the EU, and the United States floundering on the international stage, friendly overtures from the Republic of Turkey have been met with surprising warmth. In short, by fostering positive relationships outside of the EU, Turkey has emphasised its role as an independent power in the middle east, perhaps reviving the potential for foreign financial backing despite its weakened economy.
Finally, Erdoğan has actively stood his ground in Libya despite international outcry. In recent months, Turkey has increasingly militarized its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Sea with seemingly little fear of rebuke from NATO and the UN. Last November, following a controversial demarcation of maritime zones of influence, Turkey waded headlong in Libya’s civil war, funding Turkish military forces to contest the rebellion of General Haftar. Though many assumed that the onset of Covid-19 would reduce Turkish expenditure upon this ill-advised venture, the president has instead poured fuel onto the fire: offering thousands of Syrian militia fighters cash and Turkish citizenship to join the conflict. While this aggression might seem thankless (and even pointless) in light of Turkey’s ever-growing debt-crisis, intervention in Libya offers a means to challenge Turkey’s two greatest rivals, Egypt and the UAE, who have lent verbal support to General Haftar. Support of Libya’s GNA is also financially lucrative to Turkey, who have signed an extensive exploration deal with the present political regime which establishes a Turkish claim to Libya’s Eastern Mediterranean oil reserves. The invalidation of this deal would prove economically catastrophic if Turkey lost its foothold in Libya.
Thus, while many have accused the enigmatic figure of religious zealotry, it is perhaps more accurate to argue that Erdoğan has rooted himself in controversy to weather the impending storm. His solidity as a fixture of Turkish politics seems almost resultant of his active pursuit of international condemnation. In othering himself, Erdoğan has cleared away potential usurpers. His position, as always, appears tenuous: his military ventures failing, his finances collapsing, and his faith publicly dissected. Nevertheless, the aging president has yet to cede his place on the world’s stage.
Banner image courtesy of Arid Vagen via Wikimedia, © 2013, some rights reserved.
