Expect a General Election sooner rather than later

Boris Johnson has replaced Theresa May at number ten resulting in a dramatic new Brexit policy. It is no longer ‘Brexit means Brexit’ but now ‘do or die’. Yet whilst the new Prime Minister’s Brexit policy has comfortably delivered him to the top job-securing a comfortable majority over his rival Jeremy Hunt in the final ballot of Conservative party members-it has dramatically escalated the prospects of an early general election. The Prime Minister’s own deadline of October 31st has left him with little time to negotiate an alternative arrangement to that of his predecessor, and should he fail to meet his objective his own rhetoric will almost certainly leave him with no option but to call a general election.

After defeating the now-exiled Hunt, Johnson was quick to outline his plan as PM promising to ‘deliver Brexit, unite the country, defeat Jeremy Corbyn and energise the country’. On the back of this ‘DUDE’ campaign, bursting with optimism and self-confidence, Johnson pushed aside the competition that stood in his way. As part of his campaign he has repeatedly stated, with intention, that the UK is leaving on the 31st October come what may, including the possibility of a no-deal outcome. However, as Theresa May damagingly discovered with her efforts to keep the option of a no-deal on table, Parliament is viciously opposed to such a scenario. With such Commons hostility to no deal showing no signs of dissipating, Johnson’s approach has been to so far refuse to rule out the prorogation of Parliament, whereby he could suspend the sitting of Parliament in order to prevent it once again blocking no-deal. Nonetheless, this plan appears unlikely to succeed as in anticipation of the prime minister potentially following through on his threat Parliament has already begun taking significant steps to prevent prorogation occurring in this way. The most notable of these occurred on the 18th July when Parliament voted into law an amendment to the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill which prevents prorogation between 9th October and 18th December except in the case that a Northern Irish executive is reformed (an unlikely prospect given the current impasse between Northern Ireland’s two main political parties the DUP and Sinn Fein). In addition, whilst Theresa May was still in office, the Speaker permitted Parliament to take control of the Parliamentary timetable to prevent the continued delay of the initial vote on the withdrawal agreement, despite this being in direct opposition to the government’s efforts. In doing so Bercow demonstrated that, at least whilst he is Speaker of the House, the ultimate power in Parliament falls not with the government but with MPs. Therefore with the exception of the unlikely event that Boris Johnson is able to gather cross party consensus for a no-deal exit on the 31st October the option of no deal is improbable and is only kept alive by the possibility that the EU may refuse to offer a further extension.

Despite his readiness for no-deal it remains that Boris Johnson’s stated preference is to leave the EU with a negotiated arrangement at the end of October. Nevertheless, he has insisted that this must take the form of a new deal, describing Mrs May’s deal as ‘unacceptable to this Parliament and this country’. However, negotiating a new deal that will gain Commons approval at this juncture may prove difficult. This is not as a result of the limited time available but instead a direct consequence of the practical inability for his government to force a no-deal scenario as a result of the actions of Parliament. Given the PM’s prospects of securing backing for a no-deal outcome are infinitesimally small, coupled with his government’s inability to extract the UK from the EU without Parliament’s consent, the EU can be confident in the knowledge that Mr Johnson’s rhetoric of ‘do or die’ represents little more than language designed to convince the electorate of his Brexiteer credentials. Therefore, with his negotiating tactic effectively defunct the EU will, having already stated that the Withdrawal Agreement is not up for renegotiation, refuse to offer Mr Johnson any improved terms to May’s deal such as an amendment to the controversial Northern Ireland backstop. Consequently, despite his enthusiasm and energy, unless the PM reverses his position on his predecessor’s deal the possibility of a negotiated departure from the EU is also extremely improbable, leaving him without a self-initiated satisfactory way to exit the EU on the 31st October.

This leaves the new Prime Minister with several options, the first of which would be to continue negotiations beyond the 31st October in the hope of convincing the EU that a new mutually beneficial arrangement could be agreed. However, such an approach would not only be severely damaging to the Prime Minister’s reputation, as he would be seen to be regressing on his campaign promises to leave on the 31st October come what may, but the further negotiations would continue to be plagued by the same inability to credibly utilise no deal as a negotiation tool, making his prospects of success extremely limited. His second possible path would be to propose a second referendum, yet this policy would be extremely controversial as it would again involve him adopting a vastly different position to that which he advocated whilst campaigning. It would also be unclear as to what he would serve to gain through a repeat of the Leave-Remain referendum of 2016, as even if it returned another Leave vote it would fail to break the impasse as to what type of exit from the EU the UK should pursue. Equally if a referendum on the terms of the UK’s departure were held (e.g a no-deal vs May’s deal) as a means of demonstrating a majority for a no-deal outcome, Parliament would likely resist the legislation required to implement such a vote in order to both try and avoid no-deal and frustrate the new government. Therefore, given the risks that Boris Johnson would likely be exposed to in any of the above options he would likely result to his final and only remaining option: that of an early general election.

Despite stating his desire to complete Brexit before the next election, faced with paralysis in his efforts to exit the EU the PM could justifiably call an election in order to break the Brexit deadlock imposed on him by Parliament. The prospect of proving his popularity and securing a mandate for his Brexit policy with the wider electorate as opposed to the 0.35% of the nation that the Conservative membership represented would make one consider him unlikely to back away from such a challenge. In addition, with the slimmest of majorities coupled with Labour’s ongoing internal confrontation over allegations of anti-Semitism, the Prime Minister might sense an opportunity to seize the advantage and with it control of the Brexit process domestically. Some might argue that Boris Johnson is already preparing for such an eventuality given that his Cabinet selection, the most severe shake-up since 1962, is dominated by harder leaning Brexiteers within the Conservative party. This is most notably demonstrated by his promotion of the high profile Brexiteer and former head of the European Research Group Jacob Rees-Mogg to the position of the Leader of the House of Commons. With his cabinet Johnson would be able to promote a harder type of Brexit, or even no deal itself, as part of his manifesto pledges in an election. This in turn should require the elected Conservative MPs of any subsequent Commons to be less resistant and more cooperative to a harder Brexit, even if they personally had softer preferences, as they would have been elected on Johnson’s manifesto. Were this coupled with an increased majority, his position in future negotiations with the EU would be much improved as he could credibly threaten no-deal, increasing the likelihood that he could obtain an improved agreement. Furthermore, presuming the current leadership of the other main parties were still in place, Johnson would likely hope to absorb the support of those who voted for the Brexit party in the EU elections in May, whilst the Lib Dems would campaign on their pledge to stop Brexit-with the Labour party falling somewhere in between with their advocacy of a second referendum. This scenario could arguably present Johnson with an unprecedented opportunity to capitalise on his Brexiteer credentials which have fuelled his rapid ascent to No.10. Whilst the outcome of an election cannot be certain (as Theresa May abruptly discovered in 2017) Boris Johnson, once faced with a parliamentary paralysis threatening his campaign pledges upon which his premiership is based, may well conclude that it is a necessary risk.

Therefore, despite Boris Johnson’s steadfast commitment to leave the EU by the 31st October it is appearing increasingly likely that a general election will arrive first. By effectively eliminating the option of prorogation Parliament has made negligible the prospects of no-deal, whilst simultaneously eliminating Johnson’s prospects of securing an improved one. At the same time Boris Johnson’s campaign pledges and promises upon which his leadership is based have most likely excluded him from pursuing a policy of continued negotiations and/or another referendum. Therefore, whilst British politics will continue to be characterised by instability and unpredictability it appears that with the appointment of the new Prime Minister, we have moved closer to a general election rather than Brexit itself.

This piece was first published in August 2019