Finding a Place in the World: What a ‘Global Britain’ Looks Like
In 1962, the former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson famously declared that ‘Great Britain has lost an empire but not yet found a role.’ Were we to replace ‘an empire’ with ‘the EU,’ this statement would be an equally accurate depiction of the UK in 2021. Much of the dialogue surrounding Brexit revolved around the idea of a ‘Global Britain’ which would be liberated from the chains of Europe to pursue a wider and more independent foreign policy. Yet, this notion of ‘Global Britain’ has been deliberately vague, with a lack of specifics detailing what exactly a state with dwindling hard power is going to achieve now that it is separated from the largest trading bloc in the Western World. Over the last two weeks, however, the release of the Integrated Review, followed by the MOD’s Defence Command Paper, has finally shed light on what we can expect from the next 10 years of British foreign policy.
Published a year later than it was originally due, the Integrated Review (IR) promotes a vision of British foreign policy based on openness, modernization, multilateralism, and human rights. There are a few key takeaways to be had from the review. Firstly, as a result of Chinese hard power, the UK will engage in a tilt towards the Indo-Pacific, a move which will be welcomed by allies who are increasingly concerned with the growing assertiveness of China. Secondly, the UK will prove itself to be a worthy player on the international stage through an increase of its defence budget by £24 billion (14%) over the next four years and a raise on the cap on the nuclear warhead stockpile from 225 to 260. Thirdly, in echoing the Russia Report released in 2020, it identifies Russia as the ‘most acute direct threat to the UK,’ and will subsequently continue to work with NATO in Estonia to counter this threat. Finally, due to the economic impact of Covid-19, the overseas aid budget will be dropped from 0.7% to 0.5% of gross national income.
Whilst the IR is commendably bold for the most part, it contains some concerning elements. In its approach to China, the IR takes a pragmatic approach; it acknowledges the differences in values, yet argues that these differences must be overcome in favour of positive trade links and progress on environmental issues. However, it is unclear how exactly the UK will square its desire to maintain a strong economic relationship with its commitment to human rights abroad, for just this week the UK committed to sanctioning China over abuses in the Xinjiang region against the Uighur Muslims. It seems that a policy which both seeks to increase relations at the same time as standing up to China for their human rights abuses may simply not be possible, for at some point one of the two commitments is going to have to give way to the other. It is therefore unsurprising that the IR has faced a significant backlash from those who believe that a more hawkish approach is needed towards China.
The decision to increase the cap on the number of nuclear warheads stockpiled is also alarming. To some extent, it is a policy that makes sense. Whilst the UK is in no position to ever challenge the nuclear capabilities of a state like Russia, committing to an increase in nuclear stockpiles acts more as a sign of intention than anything. Through upping the size of its arsenal, the UK will be able to resolve its longstanding image crisis by proving that it can still maintain itself as a major power in the international system, and that it deserves to retain its permanent veto on the United Nations Security Council. At the same time, however, the decision completely undermines the commitment made in 2010 to reduce the number of nuclear warheads and is a total slap in the face to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Furthermore, given that the increase will have a minimal impact on the military capabilities of the UK relative to more powerful states, it seems hard to justify spending more on the nuclear arsenal.
In fact, it is the problem of funding which is the biggest concern to be drawn from the IR, and is a concern which was only heightened through the Defence Command Paper (DCP). Peppered throughout the IR is the notion that the UK will be a truly global player, participating in international efforts worldwide. These commitments are justified on the basis of the increase in defence spending, which is supposed to enhance the breadth of our military capability. The problem, however, is not only that much of this spending is going to firstly need to be used to pay for the £17 billion worth of overspending in the MOD, but also that the rest is going to be focused on modernizing the UK’s current military force, retiring old equipment and replacing it with new technology better suited to the warfare of the modern era. In order to fully fund this technological upgrade, the size of full-time active personnel in the army is being reduced from 82,000 to 72,500, and cuts have had to be made to the size of the overseas aid budget.
There is thus an inherent contradiction within the IR. On the one hand, it promotes expanding the depth of British involvement abroad. On the other, it is cutting the size of the army to smaller than it has been for centuries, undermining the Conservatives’ promise made in 2019. As such, there is a very serious probability that the UK could end up spreading itself too thin, lacking the capability it needs to enact many of the IR’s goals. Whilst technology is important, and the focus on modernization of military forces is admirable, raw manpower is an essential part of the success of any military. Coupled with the slicing of the international aid budget, therefore, it is likely that allies will begin to doubt what the UK can really bring to the table, and whether it has the fiscal strength to support its ambitions.
The IR’s conception of Global Britain is an exciting and daring one. It projects a vision of Britain as a truly global power that can act as a force for good in the world, and for that it should be commended. If it lives up to its goals, it is a remarkably positive outlook for the future. However, we should be weary. The post-war period taught the UK many things, and perhaps the greatest lesson learnt is that Britain is no longer the substantial military power it once was. The withdrawal from the east of Suez in the 1960s highlighted how Britain has historically struggled to align its foreign policy objectives with its financial resources. In the 2020s, it is crucial that Britain does not make the same mistake of overstretching beyond its capabilities just to prove to others that it is still worthy of the title ‘Great.’
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