Gasping for Air in the Maritime Space: The Island Chain Containment Strategy in East Asia
Lately, it seems that maritime politics have fallen out of public perception and imagination. With our heads fixed on the clouds and what’s beyond, it is easy to forget the important role that the oceans play in our ordinary lives. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and development, 80 percent of global trade is estimated to be transported by sea. In 2016, more than 64 percent of China’s maritime trade transited in just the South China Sea (SCS) lanes. The recent racketing up of dual-purpose naval capabilities and shifting political winds within the SCS and greater East Asian region may signify the weakening of the United States’ containment strategy, entailing new geopolitical implications.
Historical trends of Western hegemony and US encroachment in China are continuing to play out in the Pacific Ocean, posing questions for the future of naval operations between the two countries. The naval frontier of the US in East Asia, known as the ‘Island Chain Strategy’, is a geopolitical manoeuvre crafted to constrain the Sino sphere of influence and deter Chinese maritime ambitions. It was planned in the 1940’s to counteract perceived expansions of communism, however given the contemporary political ‘peacetime’, it’s continued existence should be re-examined with greater scrutiny. The ‘securitisation’ of the seas and oceans presents a real concern for miscalculation, tension, and conflict, in addition to harming economic development.
In 2021, Japan-US diplomatic talks resulted in the affirmation Article 5 of the joint security treaty that obligates the US to respond to an attack on Japanese territory, including the contested Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. Coupled with the ninth consecutive rise in military spending announced by Former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, it is no surprise that Japan-China relations are increasingly abrasive. The United States’ official recognition of the territory is counterproductive to achieving regional stability and arguably strengthens China’s claim of US infringements on sovereignty, providing a rationale for more aggressive posturing. The neutral, ambiguous ownership of the Senkaku islands is an uncomfortable but essential element to appeasing all parties and de-escalating tensions. Taiwan is also a claimant to the Senkaku or Diaoyu islands, tracing its arguments back to their shared history with China. The US is taking a larger than anticipated risk by formalising security lines, provoking China and potentially alienating its ally Taiwan, another vital country that forms the ‘Island Chain Strategy’.
The US has recently expanded its security framework with Vietnam, India, and the Philippines, citing ‘anti-narcotics’ and ‘anti-terrorism’ as reasons for interventionism in East Asia. While it is true that East and Southeast Asia are within the ‘Golden triangle’ of the synthetic drug trade, setting a record high in 2021, the maritime practice, stationed marines, and naval and aircraft-carrying ships give suspect to these claims. The US’s ability to act as a deterrent to drugs-trafficking in the region is replaceable with more long-lasting and Eastern-oriented solutions. Leveraging the joint efforts and resources of organisations such as ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, could not only showcase effective political leadership from the East but also reinforce the importance of regional-based peacekeeping, an objective that China is willing and able to spearhead.
An alternative insight into Washington’s insistence on retaining a foothold in East Asia is the supply chain of advanced chip-making facilities located within its regional allies of Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. This supply chain plays a clear role in the decisiveness of the trade war, and is indicative of the US government’s fair-weather, market-based attitudes towards its East Asian partners. Therefore, the possibility for US withdrawal is unlikely because of their own strategic interests in East Asia.
Although the US carries out regular naval power projection to ‘protect’ its regional allies and fulfil its obligations within the Taiwan Relations Act, the possibility of a full-scale assault is unlikely given the current geopolitical climate. President Putin’s war on Ukraine has in many ways paralleled the situation between China and Taiwan, giving the Chinese government a possible glimpse into the future should it attempt forceful reunification. In 2022, President Xi Jinping outlined his objectives for global peace, including a firm opposition to ‘hegemonic infringement on sovereignty’ and the need to ‘uphold sovereign independence and equality’. The global reception of invasion of Ukraine has made clear that states are not willing or easily bent to Putin’s narrative of a special military operation to reclaim ‘lost’ territory.
The Chinese government, despite its rhetoric to reserve the right to use force against Taiwan, is not likely to do so in the near future regardless of US entanglement. A prolonged conflict like the one in Ukraine would be the outcome if there was an invasion, effectively strangling most of the Chinese maritime trade through the SCS. Additionally, even without prompt US intervention, any occupation would likely result in a pyrrhic victory given Taiwan’s unique defensive geography and the lessons learned about the lack of offensive capabilities of rising powers such as Russia and China. Once any military scenario succeeds, the monumental task of recovering political and economic stability in a war-torn, hostile population lies ahead. Diplomatic repercussions, especially within the Asian ‘neighbourhood’, would shut down another major Chinese objective to create a regional economic and security architecture. Hence, the costs incurred regardless of a military victory in Taiwan would far exceed any gains in domestic political clout.
Reflecting on the Indo-Pacific strategy and the US’s Island Chain Containment reveals it is not a new strategy and is not exclusively employed by Washington. The Chinese and Indian government have taken up similar strategies known as the ‘String of Pearls’ and ‘Necklace of Diamonds’, respectively, to restrict each other’s maritime access, sea lines of communication, and oil and trade routes. These other containment strategies highlight a cynical outlook for the continued use of coercive ‘Island Chain’ strategies perpetuating a zero-sum game. This warrants concern as it encourages a maritime arms race, the bolstering of strategic sea-lane chokeholds and undermines room for peaceful negotiations, regional security, and progress in addressing global threats to humanity. Regarding recent developments in East Asia, the realisation of an Asian-centric regional security architecture is unlikely to be achieved if the US maritime presence continues in the same manner. However, it should be said that there is still room for optimism.
Avoiding a new ‘Cold War’ in East Asia is a common objective shared by Washington and Beijing. There is strong political will and incentive to pivot away from international regimes built on paranoia, especially due to the mounting challenges such as climate change and pandemics that demands central power cooperation. Countries within East Asia are also fatigued from having to pick between the two powers and are becoming outwardly salient toward offensive or adversarial discourse. Areas for cooperation include peaceful, stable statecraft between the two Koreas and the resolution of the Indian-Pakistani dispute over the question of Kashmir. These challenges provide the political forum for a framework of regional security. The impressions that Washington creates in the balance between respect for Asian sovereignty, its competition with China, and its mediatory and security missions are likely to dictate any progress for regional stability.
Image courtesy of DoD via Wikimedia, ©2001, some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
