How has Russia's Approach to the War in Ukraine Undermined its Grand Strategy?
Russia, in its pursuit of imperial ambitions, has undermined its grand strategy by invading a sovereign state and allocating a disproportionate amount of resources to the war in Ukraine. This approach has not only strained its global standing but also deepened its dependence on China, limiting its strategic autonomy. Furthermore, Russia's focus on immediate military objectives has come at the expense of its broader geopolitical influence, particularly in the Middle East, where its leverage has diminished.
A historically illustrative example of this contradiction is the Schlieffen Plan, in which Germany’s breach of Belgian neutrality triggered a global war by bringing the British Empire into the conflict. Similarly, Russia’s military actions, while seemingly advancing its short-term objectives, may ultimately jeopardize its long-term security and influence. These contradictions highlight how Russia’s war strategy is increasingly at odds with its grand strategy, raising questions about the sustainability of its global ambitions.
This article does not aim to define Russia's strategy in Ukraine but rather to examine the implications of the Russian war in Ukraine. Despite the ubiquitous debate surrounding Russia's strategy, I will focus on the perspective that Russia seeks to prevent Ukraine from becoming an economically, politically, and militarily viable state. Now, I want to define two key concepts around which this article will revolve: strategy and grand strategy. Strategy is a theory of victory that explains how military force is used to achieve political objectives in war. It involves decisions on where to deploy forces, how much violence to use, and how military action translates into political outcomes. Grand strategy is a theory of security that integrates military, diplomatic, and economic instruments to ensure long-term national security. It determines what forces to build, where to deploy them, and when to use them, aiming to create lasting stability rather than merely winning individual wars.
Russia’s grand strategy has historically aimed at maintaining strategic autonomy and balancing between major global players to maximize its influence. A key component of this approach has been its ability to leverage access to both the European and Chinese markets, ensuring economic resilience and diplomatic flexibility. However, the invasion of Ukraine has disrupted this balance, forcing Russia into a dependent position on China, which now holds significant leverage over its economy.
Before 2022, Russia enjoyed two primary economic pillars:
Europe – the dominant market for Russian energy exports, providing high revenues and stable trade relations.
China – a growing economic partner, offering alternative trade routes but requiring careful negotiation to avoid over-reliance.
By severing ties with Europe, Russia has lost its ability to balance both sides, making it highly vulnerable to Chinese economic pressure. This shift contradicts Russia’s grand strategic goal of maintaining economic sovereignty and strategic independence.
A key example of this imbalance is the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline negotiations. Russia, eager to replace lost European gas exports, sought to secure a lucrative energy deal with China via a pipeline through Mongolia. However, China, recognizing Russia’s weak bargaining position, delayed negotiations and demanded steep price reductions. Unlike European customers, who once competed for Russian gas, China now faces no rival bidders, allowing it to dictate terms to Moscow.
This asymmetry in economic dependence is a direct consequence of Russia’s war-driven strategic choices. While Kremlin may have sought to strengthen its geopolitical standing through military action in Ukraine, it has instead undermined its grand strategy by reducing its economic flexibility and increasing its reliance on a single, more powerful trade partner. This raises critical questions about whether Russia’s military gains can compensate for the long-term geopolitical disadvantages it has imposed on itself—a dilemma that echoes past strategic miscalculations in history.
The fall of Bashar al-Assad would represent yet another failure of Russia’s grand strategy, which has been severely undermined by its military campaign in Ukraine. Russia's intervention in Syria in 2015 was initially seen as a logical strategic move following the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas. It was perceived as an expeditionary imperial campaign—a demonstration that, despite historically being a land-based empire, Russia could now compete with the United States, Britain, and France in power projection beyond its borders. This move was meant to reinforce Russia’s status as a great power capable of global influence.
To support the Assad regime, Russia invested an estimated $1.5–3 billion per year in its Syrian campaign. However, the resource drain caused by its war strategy in Ukraine has forced Moscow to scale back its operations in Syria, exposing contradictions in its grand strategy. In the lead-up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia redeployed forces from Syria and significantly reduced air sorties—a clear indication of its shifting military priorities.
As a result, Russia, which once sought to maintain its strategic foothold in the Middle East, has been forced into a hasty and disorderly retreat. It first withdrew forces from its naval base in Syria and later engaged in chaotic negotiations with local rebel groups to allow them to remain in certain areas. This reversal not only weakens Russia’s influence in the region but also illustrates how its short-term military strategy in Ukraine has directly undermined its broader grand strategy of global power projection.
The most illustrative historical example of the contradiction between strategy and grand strategy is the Schlieffen Plan. The Plan was designed as a strategic solution to Germany’s two-front war dilemma against France in the west and Russia in the east. It prioritized an overwhelming assault on France, bypassing heavily fortified French defenses by marching through Belgium, before turning to face the slower-mobilizing Russian forces. The military objective was clear: achieve a quick victory in the west to avoid a prolonged two-front war.
However, while the Schlieffen Plan was a sound military strategy, it failed to account for the broader implications on Germany’s grand strategy—its long-term security and diplomatic positioning. The violation of Belgian neutrality triggered Britain’s entry into the war, a factor that Germany had severely underestimated. With British involvement, the war escalated beyond the European continent, trasnforming into a global conflict that ultimately exhausted German resources.
Russia’s war in Ukraine serves as a compelling case study of how a military strategy can undermine long-term grand strategy — a pattern seen throughout history. While the invasion was intended to solidify Russia’s influence and weaken Ukraine as an independent state, its unintended consequences have instead weakened Russia’s geopolitical position. The loss of economic ties with Europe, growing dependence on China, and diminishing influence in the Middle East demonstrate how military success does not necessarily translate into long-term security or strategic advantage.
The historical parallel of Germany’s Schlieffen Plan further illustrates this contradiction. Germany pursued a swift military victory in World War I but failed to anticipate how its actions would trigger Britain’s entry into the war, escalating a European conflict into a prolonged global struggle that ultimately led to Germany’s defeat. Similarly, Russia’s aggressive strategy in Ukraine, while initially appearing to reinforce its regional power, has instead exposed structural weaknesses that may erode its global influence over time.
By prioritizing short-term military gains, Russia has compromised its grand strategic objectives, particularly its ability to project power and maintain autonomy in its global partnerships. Just as Germany’s failure to integrate military and diplomatic considerations into its war planning led to its downfall, Russia’s current trajectory suggests that its pursuit of immediate battlefield victories may come at the cost of its long-term security and great-power status. This raises a fundamental question: Can a state truly “win” a war if the costs of victory weaken its future strategic position?
The case of Russia’s war in Ukraine reinforces a critical lesson in grand strategy—military strength alone does not guarantee long-lasting security. Instead, the ability to align military, economic, and diplomatic resources toward a coherent long-term vision is what ultimately defines success. As history has shown, failing to recognize this distinction can drive the most formidable powers toward strategic overreach and eventual decline.
Image courtesy of Anatolii Stepanov via AFP/Getty Images, ©2023. Some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
