Kazakhstan - The confusion helps us uncover more than the calm
More than two months have passed since peaceful demonstrations against rising natural gas prices began in Kazakhstan’s Mangystau region, sparking nationwide disorder. Yet, what happened in the intervening weeks is far from clear. As academics and observers try to piece together disparate reports and conflicting information, politicians and outside forces are competing to control the narrative for their own political ends, with spurious claims and provocative language. Spontaneous, grassroots protest movements are always difficult for outsiders to follow, but the speed of developments – from peaceful protest to state-wide violent clashes, hundreds of deaths, and foreign peacekeeping intervention in five days – rendered real-time observation almost impossible. Further, as the numbers of protests and protestors grew, so too did their diversity. Groups from across the political spectrum put aside their differences and joined; for example, nationalists united with the relatively new liberal movement ‘Oyan, Qazaqstan’. The unpreparedness of journalists and other observers to cover the events, and a general dearth of expertise on Central Asian affairs, continues to exacerbate the confusion. In the face of such turmoil, looking in from the outside can be disheartening and frustrating.
Of course, as the smoke clears – metaphorically and literally – we can start to gain an understanding of the deeper causes and potential consequences of the demonstrations. Nevertheless, the speed, spontaneity, diversity and passion that have, on the one hand, caused so much confusion, can tell us a great deal; they are in themselves a sign of what has changed, and what is to come. These protests represent a shift in politics in Kazakhstan, and in Central Asia more broadly. To see this, however, we must look beyond the geopolitics of the Russian intervention and the political rhetoric of Tokayev and his elites. There has been little progress towards any of the reforms that protesters have sought out, and few repercussions for the abuses committed by the Kazakhstani state during the protests. The outward sense of order which has been restored, however, is not a sign that the status quo will be permanently returning. Whilst Tokayev, who was elected on promises of liberal reform, is backsliding into the “shoot-to-kill” methods and “terrorist” threat to the state rhetoric of his predecessors and regional contemporaries, the protests show that Kazakhstani society is not following the same course. Whilst the protestors were not speaking with one coordinated voice, together they sounded like a pluralist society demanding to be heard.
Kazakhstan was led into independence in 1991 by Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had been Prime Minister since 1984 and was elected as President after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. He resigned in 2019, having led an autocratic regime that rigged elections and committed human rights abuses. The faint legitimacy of this leadership was built by establishing itself as intrinsic to Kazakhstani progression, leading it from the fragility of its Soviet past to new-found economic growth and political stability. By building a state which was both feared, and generating fear around any alternative, Nazarbayev stymied opposition and scrutiny. Not only did this allow his regime to circumvent democracy, but its newfound economic prosperity was, for the most part, concentrated within Nazabayev’s family and a closed circle of allies – a kleptocracy rampant with nepotism and inequality. In 2018, 162 people controlled 52% of Kazakhstan’s wealth.
When Nazarbayev stood down in 2019, he was replaced by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, a long-time member of the political elite and close associate of the ex-President. Despite running on a platform of – all be it restricted – socio-economic liberalisation, very little changed. Not only were the circumstances of his election questionable, but the kleptocratic structures of Kazakhstani politics and economy remained. Nazarbayev remained a key part of the country’s leadership. He continued to lead the ruling party and sit on Kazakhstan’s Security Council. His approval was even needed for every ministerial appointment that Tokayev made, leading many to question who was really in charge of their country. There were token gestures towards a transition of power to the “elected” government, but political oppression continued and the inequality gap widened.
Much as with the protests, however, it is not at the regime to which one should look to see change. Rather, as younger Kazakhs become politically engaged, and the state continues to fail to provide basic public goods, many have started to question the existing situation. The kleptocracy of the Kazakhstani elite affects every stratum of Kazakhstani society; miners are being denied fair remuneration for dangerous work in terrible conditions, political parties lack proper representation and mothers are left without proper support. All, however, can see that their situation is not, in fact, inevitable – it was from the specific socioeconomic situation upheld by Tokayev, Nazarbayev and their interests. Corruption, inequality and inefficiency are holding Kazakhstan back from political and economic development, and the emerging, younger generation appears far more willing to challenge these problems and the regime which facilitates them.
This should not come as a surprise. The personalist regimes that led Central Asian states to independence, and continue to control politics, business and bureaucracies are beginning to face grassroots opposition across the region, and in many cases violent protests. Protests in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have all followed similar trajectories to those we can now see in Kazakhstan. Generally triggered by a single issue, such as electoral fraud or economic woes, they have developed into expressions of opposition to the ruling elite. In states where formal political opposition is actively oppressed, protest movements become catalysts. Demonstrations signify that society’s voices and grievances have legitimacy and require an outlet.
The disparate nature of these protests, the lack of centralisation and the divergent aims and chants heard on the streets of Kazakhstan do, indeed, create confusion. This has hampered the progress of any short-term demands. Hence, Tokayev appears to have clung to power, and order appears to have been restored, with only nominal reforms and the reaffirmed backing of Putin and Xi. Nevertheless, the long-term political implications can, and most likely will, be far more consequential than any regime change would have been. In the face of a changing social contract, where the legitimacy of rampant abuses of power will start to be openly challenged, leaders are beginning to see that business cannot carry on as usual. These protests reflect an increasing sense of agency in society, and a decreasing range of options for the state. The “confusion” of the protests reflects the plurality of Kazakhstani society, and the speed with which the protests have developed reflects a growing desire for these voices to be heard.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
Image courtesy of Esetok via Wikimedia, ©2022, some rights reserved.
