Leave to Remain?
In the summer of 2014, the Scottish people were given the opportunity to completely alter the course of their country’s political future as they prepared to vote on whether they wanted to break away from an over three-hundred-year union onto a path of sovereign nationhood. This referendum was coined by former First Minister and leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP) Alex Salmond as a ‘once in a generation opportunity’. This was until they lost, 55% to 45%. Following the Yes Campaign’s defeat, the succeeding First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, was quick to reshape the narrative in 2015 ahead of the upcoming 2016 EU referendum, asserting that a second Independence referendum would be considered if there were tangible changes to the ‘material circumstances’. What greater change in material circumstance is there than withdrawal from arguably the most integrated economic alliance in the world?
Two years later, as Britain bade farewell to its membership in the European Union (EU), a decision that Scottish voters did not support–62% of Scotland voted against Brexit–the question of Scottish independence began to revive. In theory, Brexit could have turned the debate for Scottish independence on its head, giving the SNP a compelling new selling point to advance. Not only would it dramatically reshape the political landscape of the UK, but it provided the SNP with all the evidence they needed to advance the pro-independence rhetoric they relied on highlighting the inherent difference in Scottish and English interests and outlooks, both social and political. More importantly, from this arose the prospect of an independent Scotland that could re-enter the EU on its own. Even after Brexit, though, support for Scottish independence has remained unchanged, with recent polls showing 53% of Scots would vote to remain in the UK.
The Scottish quest for self-determination and sovereignty is built on a foundation of Scottish nationalism, championed primarily by the SNP. The core belief is that Scotland and its interests are not best represented by Westminster; Brexit is not the first instance of the UK following a political path Scotland did not support. One only must look back to the 1980s, when Scotland had to accept a commitment to the neo-liberal economic policies that Margaret Thatcher and her government espoused, such as the ‘Poll Tax’, that was perceived as English-supported. Although this was before devolution, this narrative rang familiar to the ‘Yes’ voting Scots, whose resentment towards Westminster was fuelled by questions surrounding the legitimacy of its authority over Scotland. Some voters saw successive General Election results, and Scotland’s membership in the union–and the shared identity it created–as holding the country back from unlocking its full potential on a global stage.
Although perhaps not to the same extent, much of this emotive pro-independence rhetoric concerning diverging national identities, power centralisation, and control used by the SNP, was not entirely dissimilar to that of the ‘Leave’ campaign in 2016. It is a tactic used often in attempts to appeal to apathetic voters. It’s difficult to forget the famous Leave campaign slogan engrained in public memory and seen on the sides of buses: ‘Let’s take back control’, which echoed similar sentiments of national identity and difference, and opposition to centralised authority–the difference being whether that refers to Westminster or Brussels. This appeal overlooks the fact that since devolution many see power as also having been centralised within Scotland at Holyrood. This oversimplification of two inherently complex issues perfectly encapsulates why the case for Scottish Independence failed to regain sufficient momentum, despite a potential boost from the apparent disarray of the Brexit fallout.
The SNP has either been overly optimistic to assume that the 2016 majority of Remain votes in Scotland would automatically be translated to Yes votes. If nothing else, Brexit has demonstrated the uncompromising complexity of what it means to leave a union, redraw complex and technical regulatory agreements, and have the patience and commitment for the lengthy process it involves. The tangled aftermath of Brexit made apparent the basic error of judgement and lack of fundamental planning from the Leave campaign, coupled with a lack of clarity on key issues such as trading arrangements, the Northern Ireland protocol, and customs procedures.
It would be naive to assume Scottish secession would be any different. At the heart of why the SNP has been unsuccessful in sustaining support for independence after Brexit is a similar lack of clarity and substantive policy on how accession to the EU would, in practise, work beyond the simple slogan of ‘Independence in Europe’. Several key questions remain, such as how a new international hard border with Scotland’s closest and non-EU member neighbours would work, what currency Scotland would adopt (to date, debate within the EU has failed to rally around the Euro as a currency, or how Scotland would regain access into the single market. This has created a disconnect and sense of trepidation between the Scottish public and the SNP’s independence aspirations. This rift is further deepened by the quagmire of Brexit, which has also shaken the public’s confidence in government’s ability to effectively carry out momentous decisions.
It is also worth noting that the apprehensions of the wider public have firm foundations. England is Scotland’s longest standing, and biggest, trading partner; Scotland’s trade with the rest of the UK is around four times that of its trade with the EU. The creation of a new hard border between Scotland and its would-be ex-UK counterparts would substantially increase costs of this trade; according to the Centre for Economic Performance, leaving the UK would be to be two to three times more costly for the Scottish economy than Brexit. Furthermore, the process of accession would not be without its own complications, especially now that the EU has a renewed focus on eastward accession, in the Balkans, as well as Ukraine and Moldova. It is not an immediate nor straight-forward process; one only has to look at the eight countries currently in negotiations to gain EU membership, each of which will take several years.
Beyond the practical hurdles an independent Scotland would have to overcome for accession to the EU to become reality, Scottish voting patterns aligning with the ‘status quo’ in both referendums are emblematic of a potential reluctance to make radical changes to the national direction. Even with more substantive policy from the SNP, it would require significant and sustained effort to shift these attitudes, which speak to a more deeply rooted opposition to independence.
There was an assumption that an independent Scotland would remain in the EU with relative ease had the vote gone a different way in 2014. Another assumption was that a pro-independence majority would grow after most of Scotland voted against Brexit in 2016. Almost four years on from the UK’s departure from the EU, neither assumption has lasted. As hard as it was for Britain to feel at home in the EU, the idea of an independent Scotland going into it alone still appears to be less comfortable. Scotland is further than many may assume from the point where one departure leads to another.
Image courtesy of Calum Hutchinson via Wikimedia, ©2006. Some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
