Moldova: The Country Left Out of the Ukraine Conversation
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the fate of other European countries that were formerly in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc has been called into question. Putin has previously called the breakup of the USSR “the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century,” and many fear that Ukraine is only the first step in his efforts to reconstitute Russia’s former sphere of influence. This conversation has largely focused on the Baltics, and broader conversations about the invasion’s effects on Europe have focused on Poland, which has already taken in 1.6 million Ukrainian refugees. One country that has been mostly left out of the conversation is Moldova.
Moldova is a small country in Eastern Europe, bordered to the north, east, and south by Ukraine. Personally, I previously lived in Moldova for seven months and my report has been influenced by this experience. In February I had the chance to speak to citizens, on the eve of the Russia-Ukraine invasion. I was there when Moldova closed its airspace and when Ukrainian refugees first started arriving in the country. Although many Moldovans with whom I spoke were worried for Ukraine and their family and friends who lived there, most were not concerned that Russia would invade Moldova. Surely, however, an invasion of Moldova would be a natural next step if Putin is truly trying to reconstitute the former Soviet Union?
Moldova and Ukraine are closely connected – according to the 2014 census, 6.6% of the Moldovan population identified as ethnically Ukrainian (only 4.1% identified as ethnically Russian). Odessa, the southern Ukrainian city on the Black Sea, is only 35 miles from the Moldovan border, and cross-border tourism is common. Moldova is also one of the poorest countries in Europe, and approximately 27% of the Moldovan workforce works abroad – including in Ukraine.
Moldova also shares many political similarities with Ukraine, as it is also a country historically caught between pro-Russian and pro-Western sentiment. Moldova’s official language is Moldovan/Romanian, natively spoken by 80.2% of the population, but many Moldovans also speak Russian. Moldova applied to join the European Union (EU) on March 3, and has displayed EU flags alongside Moldovan flags outside government buildings (and occasionally, in front of the Russian Embassy) since 2014. Conversely, Moldova has also been an observer to the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union since 2018. Moldova’s current president, Maia Sandu, is pro-West, but her predecessor, Igor Dodon, sought closer ties with Russia. Moldova has not always exhibited pro-West sentiment, but this outlook has strengthened over recent years, in similarity with pro-West trends in Ukraine prior to Russia’s invasion.
Crucially, another similarity between Moldova and Ukraine is that neither is a member of NATO. Even after Russia’s invasion and NATO’s lack of military intervention, Moldova did not request to join NATO. Although the Ukrainian military and population have resisted Russian advances without NATO military support, Moldova lacks the same capabilities. Only 0.4% of Moldova’s GDP is spent on defence, its army consists of only 8,000 soldiers, and it has not received the same $3 billion USD (£2.3 billion GBP) in military assistance from the U.S. since 2014 that Ukraine has. If Russia decided to invade Moldova next, it is unlikely Moldova could mount the same resistance Ukraine has.
A Russian invasion of Moldova is entirely possible. Moldova has already been subject to Russian pressure as a result of its pro-West policies. In October 2021, Gazprom, the Russian state-owned energy company, raised prices of natural gas from $250 USD (£191 GBP) to $790 USD (£605 GBP) per 1,000 cubic metres of gas, in what the EU described as a “weponisation of the gas supply.” For a small, poor country, this was catastrophic.
Moldova has not experienced military attacks since Ukraine’s invasion, but that could soon change. Along much of the Eastern border with Ukraine, there is a small, pro-Russian breakaway state called Transnistria. Following a war in 1992, Transnistria became a de facto state, with its own president (Vadim Krasnoselsky), its own telecommunications system (Moldovan SIM cards don’t work in Transnistria), its own currency (the Transnistrian Ruble, which can only be exchanged within Transnistria), and even its own border control (but only on the Transnistrian side, and you get a small receipt for proof of entry, rather than a passport stamp). There are approximately 1,500 Russian troops stationed in Transnistria, some on the border to serve as peacekeepers and some to guard the 20,000 tonnes of weapons held in Transnistria.
Transnistria is not officially recognized by Russia (or any country), but it is supported politically, economically, and militarily by Russia, and the population is largely pro-Russian. In 2006, a referendum on whether to join Russia was held in Transnistria, and 97.2% of voters supported such a move – although the percentage should be taken with a grain of salt because Transnistria has a history of questionable election results. In 2014, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Transnistria formally requested to be annexed by Russia as well. This didn’t happen at the time, but it might if Russian troops continue to gain territory in Ukraine. In fact, Belarus’ President, Alexander Lukashenko, was seen with a map showing invasion plans, which included Transnistria.
Despite these concerns, Transnistrians with whom I spoke seemed dubious that Russia would try to annex the breakaway region because of Russia’s historical policy of non-recognition of Transnistria. They maintained this position even after Russia officially recognized the Luhansk and Donetsk Peoples’ Republics in Ukraine leading up to the invasion. The Transnistrians echoed the sentiment previously expressed by Moldova’s former President in 2014, that an annexation would be “counterproductive” and “would not improve Russia’s authority in the international arena.” But, the situation is changing rapidly, and because Moldova is not a member of NATO, an invasion, even just of Transnistria, is entirely possible.
Regardless of its military implications, the invasion of Ukraine has consequences for Moldova. Moldova has already taken in 105,000 Ukrainian refugees. In addition to government-run centres, many Moldovans have opened their homes to Ukrainian refugees and shown tremendous generosity and hospitality. Nonetheless, the influx of refugees has created such a significant strain for Moldova, which already struggles with emigration because of limited economic opportunities, that Germany has begun to take refugees from Moldova.
Another consequence comes in the form of Russian propaganda and disinformation. Russian state news has presented entirely different, and incorrect, coverage of the war. Many Moldovans watch Russian news and believe the propaganda. One Moldovan who I am familiar with from my time in the country is an example. She believed that Putin was not attacking civilians and was only working to “de-nazify” Ukraine – but she is not alone. In a country that is already divided between pro-West and pro-Russia sentiment, it is incredibly dangerous to create another division based on who believes what about the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Moldova is a small, poor country that few in the West would consider as important to their states’ national interest. Nevertheless, it is important to include Moldova in the narrative about the consequences of the war in Ukraine – Moldova is more vulnerable to attack or annexation from Russia than the Baltics are, and it has taken in more refugees as a share of its population than Poland. Ignoring Moldova and its current challenges only creates more opportunity for the effects of the war in Ukraine to harm Moldova politically, economically, militarily, and socially.
Image courtesy of Photobank MD, © 2020, some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
