Welcome

Welcome to the official publication of the St Andrews Foreign Affairs Society. Feel free to reach out to the editors at fareview@st-andrews.ac.uk

Negotiating With Terrorists: Somalia’s Double-Edged Sword

Negotiating With Terrorists: Somalia’s Double-Edged Sword

Hunger is often used by terrorists as a tactic of war. Al-Shabaab-- a Jihadist militant group based in central and southern Somalia-- is no exception. 

Since its founding in 2006, Al-Shabaab has continued to exacerbate already dire conditions throughout Somalia, gradually expanding to eventually control over 20% of the country. During the 2011 famine, which saw the death of over 250,000 people, the insurgent group severely restricted the distribution of humanitarian aid to desperate Somalis. According to a UN report, Al-Shabaab charged some aid groups an initial payment of $10,000 for access to the areas under their control, subsequently demanding another registration fee of $10,000 and payments of $6,000 every six months. The militants banned other aid groups entirely, burning food and medicine and killing charity workers.

Al-Shabaab repeating a similar pattern today. 

Somalia is currently on the brink of famine. The UN has estimated that this crisis will spread across the country between October and December. Famine is particularly expected to occur in the Baidoa and Burhakaba districts in south-central Somalia, with conditions persisting until next March. 

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) defines famine as the extreme deprivation of food. Famine is classified as the highest level of food insecurity. In a famine, high levels of acute malnutrition, destitution, starvation, and death are present. For a famine to be declared, an area must have “at least 20% of households facing an extreme lack of food and 30% of children suffering from acute malnutrition, with two people out of every 10,000 dying each day due to starvation.” 

Though the current crisis in Somalia has not yet been declared a famine, the outcome is highly likely.  

In Somalia today, over 7 million people are facing extreme hunger. Over 200,000 of them are at ‘imminent risk of dying.’ Over half a million children in Somalia have severe acute malnutrition. These children are at risk of dying if they do not receive immediate treatment. Under current conditions, most have not. At least 700 children have died in nutrition centres across the country. The drought and famine have also displaced over a million Somalis. These numbers are expected to rise steeply over the coming months.

The driving force behind Somalia’s food crisis is global climate change. Somalia has been categorised as the second most vulnerable country to climate change globally and is presently in its worst drought in forty years. The country has already seen four failed rainy seasons and is expected to see the fifth season fail in the coming months. The successive failed rainy seasons have destroyed crops and killed livestock, threatening people’s livelihoods. 

COVID-19 and the War in Ukraine have also contributed to the rise in food insecurity. Both events have driven up food prices, with the war in Ukraine also disrupting valuable fertiliser, fuel, and grain supplies (of which Somalia imports over 90% from Russia and Ukraine). There has also been a shortage of humanitarian aid as donors have focused on the situation in Europe. 

Though COVID and the War in Ukraine have played a part in worsening the existing food crisis in Somalia, the impact of Al-Shabaab has been far larger. 

The most recent Global Terrorism Index report has found that sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 48 percent of terrorism-related deaths globally. More specifically, the report found that Somalia is the African country most impacted by terrorism. 

Around one million Somalis live in regions controlled by Al-Shabaab. Somalis living in these areas have hardly received aid. 

Agencies face a myriad of obstacles in their process to provide aid to Somalis. Al-Shabaab typically demands that these agencies complete registration forms, sign a pledge, disclose project details, and pay registration fees. Based on the nature and size of the project, they sometimes demand additional fees or taxes. They are also often under heavily monitoring and sometimes prohibited from having direct contact with the beneficiaries. 

Time and time again, Al-Shabaab has blocked food aid distribution by imposing heavy restrictions on access and enacting outright violence. 

In early September, Al-Shabaab militants destroyed food aid after attacking several vehicles in Somalia’s central Hiiraan region. According to the region’s governor, the militants placed a bomb in the vehicle, while people were inside, and blew it up. They killed 20. 

Later that month, the group killed 12 people drilling a water well in the drought-stricken region. In an attack in Gariley, in the southern Gedo region, the militants burned the bodies and drilling equipment of crew working at a drilling site. 

Al-Shabaab actively and repeatedly hinders processes seeking to tackle famine and drought. Yet, some organisations and institutions have felt as if their hands are tied.  

Countries including the United States which have strict counterterrorism laws have been faced with an ethical dilemma: paying a terrorist organisation or threatening the lives of hundreds of thousands of Somalis. 

The U.S. has two counterterrorism laws that prohibit paying al-Shabaab. The first law dictates that sanctions are administered by the Treasury. The second states that providing ‘material support or resources' to terrorist groups is illegal. Humanitarian aid efforts are directly affected by both laws, as Al-Shabaab demands fees and taxes from aid organisations seeking to enter any area under its control.  

The U.S. has claimed that it recognizes Somalia’s humanitarian situation and has insisted that counterterrorism laws are not intended to restrict humanitarian aid efforts. Yet, the nature of the laws inherently does so. The strength of these laws has fostered feelings of ambiguity and reluctance around entering Somalia. By paying the rebels, many agencies are uneasy about potentially being labeled as ‘supporting’ terrorists, both economically through monetary means and politically through legitimising their organisation. Many agencies are not willing to breach counterterrorism laws and risk criminal prosecution at home. 

As Al-Shabaab widely dictates the terms of aid, aid organisations are calling on the U.S. alongside other governments to loosen counterterrorism laws in the face of humanitarian crises. 

There is a consensus among individuals, organisations, institutions, and countries that there must be a scaled-up humanitarian response to prevent the escalation of famine. 

Part of the response should include addressing barriers to aid distribution and implementing long-term solutions. The persisting drought has underscored the need to invest in climate adaptation, such as sustainable water management, enhanced food security, climate-smart agriculture, renewable energy, and resilient infrastructure. 

The response should also seriously consider ways to bring about the cessation of conflict, as a large terrorist presence continues to hinder humanitarian aid efforts and exacerbate current dire conditions. 

As famine in Somalia becomes increasingly likely, actors at all levels will need to navigate how to best support Somalis who need aid without simultaneously supporting Al-Shabaab. 

Image courtesy of Feisal Omar via Reuters ©2011, some rights reserved.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.

Morbid Symptoms at the End of History

Morbid Symptoms at the End of History

The Nord Stream Leaks: A Political, Economic, and Environmental Disaster?

The Nord Stream Leaks: A Political, Economic, and Environmental Disaster?