Nuclear Stalemate: North Korea’s Need to Survive
North Korea’s relentless pursuit of nuclear technology can be seen as both a survival strategy and a rising global threat. While the roots of the nation’s ambition may be traced back to the 1950s, by the 1970s, Kim Il Sung was fully committed to the nuclear program. The United States wants to denuclearise North Korea to preserve global security and uphold the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, driven by fear and misperception, economic failure, and an ideology that prioritises self-reliance above all else, the DPRK leadership is unlikely to give in to the US’s vague and empty promises. Washington needs to reevaluate its strategy and work to identify the interests and needs that shape the position of its opponent. By doing so, it could begin to shift negotiations towards the zone of advantage, where both the US and North Korea secure their interests, rather than continuing the trend of American failure to uphold commitments to the DPRK. Until this occurs, stalemate will persist, and lasting peace and security will not be achieved.
The threat of US military power has been central to North Korea’s ambitions regarding nuclear proliferation. Washington's use of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki led North Korea to perceive a nuclear threat during the 1950-1953 Korean War, which consequently drove the nation to develop a nuclear research program with the USSR in 1956. Fear of US nuclear power was enhanced in 1958, with the placement of American nuclear weapons in South Korea, and throughout the 1960s as those in Washington advocated for the use of nuclear weapons very early on in several conflicts. Decades later, the 2003 American invasion and occupation of Iraq further heightened uncertainty due to beliefs that the US would try to initiate a similar regime change in North Korea. Despite fragile attempts at agreements and compromise, the DPRK is not seeing an end to US aggression and so, nuclear proliferation in the dictatorship continues.
However, domestic economic factors were arguably a stronger motivation for the DPRK’s nuclear pursuit in more recent years. Amidst severe economic decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s and following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a major trade partner, nuclear development acted as a means for Kim Jong Il to divert attention from internal problems and encourage a sense of nationalism and unity. Following the DPRK’s 2006 nuclear test, North Korean officials insisted that the ongoing weapons program was a necessary deterrence against Washington, but their argument is flawed. If North Korea has been concerned with American nuclear power since the 1950s, why are they only now running their first nuclear test? Shouldn’t they have produced a nuclear warhead far earlier? For these reasons, when evaluating the North Korean dilemma, the US must consider not only the way American nuclear power jeopardises North Korea’s national security but also the desperate efforts the DPRK leadership is making to recover from a crippling economic crisis.
North Korea’s self-reliance (juche) ideology also plays into its foreign defence policy. Characterised by independence, sovereignty, and military self-defence capabilities, juche makes it difficult for the US to procure a promise of denuclearisation from North Korea. As the DPRK prioritises the juche ideology above all others and believes nuclear proliferation to be so essential to its survival, due to economic factors and the American threat, the US should offer monetary incentives and assurances of security to alleviate these sources of unease and meet North Korea’s needs. It may also be wiser for Washington to prioritise non-proliferation at this stage, as efforts towards total denuclearisation are less likely to succeed. Should the US continue to pursue a policy of 'denuclearisation first, cooperation later’ – ignoring the insecurities North Korea has held since the days of the Korean War as well as the nation’s economic struggles and prevailing ideology – then the two nations will remain in opposition and no lasting agreement will be formed. Only a new approach will end the stalemate.
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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
