Nuclear weapons in Turkey: The ultimate bargaining chip
Recent comments by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan renewed concerns about Turkey’s nuclear ambitions and questioned the country’s relationship with the United States and Western Europe. For the last 20 years Turkey has sought greater integration with both the European Union and NATO, yet the past few years have tested that relationship. In the meantime, Erdogan has steadily accumulated and centralized power while simultaneously antagonizing Europe by pivoting toward Moscow. Most recently, Turkey launched an offensive operation in northwest Syria despite condemnation from the United States. In this light, Erdogan’s comments regarding a Turkish nuclear program further call into question Turkey’s relationship with liberal, western democracies.
Nuclear weapons are not new in Turkey, the United States has kept nuclear missiles and conventional nuclear weapons in the country since the Cold War. During the Cuban Missile Crisis these were famously used as a bargaining chip to diffuse the thirteen-day standoff. Since then, the weapons have been stored at Incirlik Air Base, which is owned by Turkey, yet heavily used by the United States. The present nuclear sharing agreement has been cited as one reason why Turkey should not pursue a nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, Turkey is a signatory to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Although it is not binding, the NPT makes the pursuit of a nuclear weapons program a politically difficult decision. Should Turkey violate the treaty, it would join the likes of North Korea and Iran whose nuclear programs have violated the NPT which resulted in punishing international sanctions.
Turkey’s position toward nuclear weapons is further complicated for two reason: Erdogan has become an increasingly autocratic leader; and the rogue Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan’s sprawling nuclear black market has been tied to Turkey. A Carnegie Endowment for International Peace article links Turkey as a point of entry for Mr. Khan’s dealings. Turkish companies tied to Khan’s networks acted as importers and exporters for centrifuge components, yet the extent of the Turkish state’s involvement and knowledge of his network is unclear. Thus, without knowing the illicit network’s totality there is plenty of room for speculation. Should Turkey have been involved with Mr. Khan’s nuclear network, then centrifuges for producing weapons-grade uranium could very well exist in Turkey.
What is known is that Turkey has sought, and continues to receive, Russian assistance in developing its civil nuclear power program. At Akkuyu, on the south coast, a 4.8 gigawatt plant is being built by the Russian firm Atomstroyexport. Aside from three research reactors, the Akkuyu plant will be the first nuclear power reactor in the country. By using Atomstroyexport, the foreign arm of Rosatom, the Akkuyu plant has highlighted President Erdogan’s willingness to seek partners other than traditional allies. While the four reactors located at Akkuyu are supposed to go live beginning in 2023, the contracts for two other power stations at Sinop and Igneada have been awarded to a Franco-Japanese joint venture and the State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation of China respectively.
Turkey’s development of a civil nuclear power program plots it on a not-dissimilar path to Iran, which has been accused of developing nuclear weapons program behind the façade of a civilian power program[PW1] . The 2015 Agreement regarding Iran’s nuclear program brought Iran under the watch of the IAEA but following the United States’ withdrawal the future compliance is not assured. In Iran, Mr. Khan provided the nuclear expertise, designs, and connections to allow Iran to establish and nurture its now burgeoning nuclear program. Given what is known about Mr. Khan’s networks the presences of centrifuges in Turkey would not be an earth-shattering revelation, but it could easily trigger a diplomatic crisis.
Ignoring possible connections to Mr. Khan and his nuclear black market, President Erdogan has repeatedly tested the EU and America’s patience. Following the 2016 failed coup, civil liberties have been curtailed as suspected dissidents have been detained and Erdogan’s power has been consolidated. In the past months he has deployed Turkish troops to fight American-backed Kurdish militias in Syria despite warnings from both the United States and the EU; deported suspected foreign-born terrorists to their countries of origin; and openly courted the often-professed enemy of NATO— Russia. Fifteen years ago, Turkey seemed destined to join the EU, but for the past three years negotiations have stalled, and Erdogan has begun to look for other partnerships. He has found an ally in Russia both economically and militarily. In exchange for Russian expertise at the Akkuyu nuclear plant, Erdogan has bought Russian-made S-400 anti-aircraft missiles. The missiles were designed to target the United States’ F-35 which, in short, means a NATO member has access to a weapon designed to shoot down NATO aircraft. These actions have not gone unnoticed and the US has removed Turkey from the F-35 development program.
In light of recent events Erdogan’s recent statements regarding a Turkish-developed nuclear weapon seem to be aimed at antagonizing the West rather than developing nuclear warheads overnight. Depending on who Turkey pivots toward, Erdogan’s policies seek to play the West and Russia off one another in order to see which one will provide him with the most economically and politically appealing ally.
