Peddling Diplomacy: The Unseen Engagement of Pacific Island States

Oct 12

Oct 12 Peddling Diplomacy: The Unseen Engagement of Pacific Island States

International diplomacy is not an easy task, especially when complicated by domestic hardships, values, and priorities, but it remains one of the most crucial ways to exert influence and interests, and Pacific island states are no strangers to this. Mixed in the international quandaries of recognising unrecognised states, this vastly overlooked Oceanic region in the world brings democratic flip-flopping, allegations of bribery, and conflicting interests onto the world stage. Countries like Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu, are being used as pawns by larger states - embroiled in territorial contention - and through the island states’ capabilities of designating or withdrawing statehood recognition, said small nations are able to wield extensive political capital which brings significant international ramifications. Due to foreign investments and monetary incentives, allegations of foreign corruption are not infrequent regarding the foreign affairs of Pacific island nations and unrecognised states.

The countries in the Pacific are by no means economic superpowers; most of them are infrastructurally underdeveloped and in need of foreign aid to tackle domestic issues. This happenstance, however, puts them in a uniquely advantageous position: as money is an absolute necessity for them, they use their foreign relations in a manner as to obtain the crucial financial assets for domestic usage. Essentially, by delicately and strategically playing the role of a political pawn, the Pacific island nations have peddled democracy to their favor, eager to reap the financial rewards of cooperating with whichever state grants them the largest monetary contribution.

Until the 2016 election of the current president Taneti Maamau in Kiribati, the island nation of just over 100,000 had recognised Taiwan, resulting in an absence of I-Kiribati-Chinese relations for almost 20 years. However, as China increased its role in recent various island dredging projects within the Pacific region in an effort to combat climate change and present itself as a powerful financier in the region, the pressure to cooperate with China increased. To do this, sparked by Taiwanese rejection of a Kiribati financial request, Kiribati withdrew its recognition of Taiwan in 2019, acutely damaging Taiwan’s international efforts for recognition, whilst ensuring I-Kiribati-Chinese diplomatic ties. President Maamau’s recent re-election in June 2020 solidified his role as leader, and thus China’s role in the country. Though his pro-China stance brings a diplomatic blow to Taiwan in its efforts to achieve international statehood recognition, the economic win for the I-Kiribati was too appealing to ignore, the island nation eager to work with China in its endeavors to combat rising sea levels. In response to the Pacific state’s increasingly friendship relationship with the Eastern power, there were instances of domestic rife, shown by minor pro-Taiwanese protests in the country’s capital of Tarawa, however, the economic development and future prosperity tied to the shift in bilateral cooperation proved too important for Maamau’s government. Kiribati was recognised as a powerful pawn by China, and Maamau recognised this and used it to his people’s advantage.

The diplomatic contention of the Pacific area is not confined to the political agitation between China and Taiwan. The tensions involving Abkhazia, the de facto breakaway state commonly internationally recognised as a Georgian autonomous territory, has also seeped into the Pacific. Nauru and Tuvalu, in 2009 and 2011 respectively, both recognised the state as independent, but in 2014, the latter withdrew recognition. This flip flopping seems cryptic until you begin to look at who is funding the previously Georgian territory. Abkhazia, vehemently denied statehood recognition by Georgia, is funded and supported by Russia to the extent that it can effectively be considered Russian occupied territory. This contention causes Georgia and Russia to be at odds together, both eager to offer any country an incentive to switch their diplomatic position to align with their own.

With this lucrative incentive, neither state is above bribery. Allegations of corruption marked both Nauru and Tuvalu’s diplomatic ties in the Caucasus: with up to $50 million USD of Russian money being funneled into Nauru in return for recognition of Abkhazia’s independence, and hundreds of thousands in USD of Georgian money into Tuvalu in order to rescind recognition of the aspiring state. This complex web affects all countries involved: for example, the Tuvaluan withdrawal bruised Russia’s international power by undermining its influence amongst the Pacific states, showing how Russia’s international relations could be deeply impacted by a nation of less than 15,000 people.

Great powers using smaller states to effectuate their own politics is not a new concept, as historical proxy wars clearly prove. However, once the process of sovereignty is considered, the power a smaller state can have relative to larger states is largely underappreciated. With states on the brink of climate disaster and impoverished populations eager to take any monetary incentive for domestic financial development, the easily changeable diplomatic atmosphere in the Pacific does not come as a surprise.

It must not be forgotten that the overarching theme in all these cases is money, more specifically the money of powerful states that is needed by economically underdeveloped states. In Kiribati, withdrawing recognition of Taiwan led to greater economic potential through deals with China. In the case of Nauru, the government had financial incentive from Russia to recognise Abkhazia, and with Tuvalu, there was instead financial incentive from Georgia to withdraw recognition. The actual diplomatic affairs and recognition status of Abkhazia and Taiwan is most likely of little concern to the everyday I-Kiribati or Tuvaluan, but the power the monetary incentive offers to the economic development of each country makes the deals worthwhile. The countries in the Pacific are impoverished; none of the three included in this article have a GDP per capita higher than 10,000$ USD, and all of them face the insurmountable front of climate change. Any chance to help their country out, even bribes regarding states that otherwise would not invest, must be used.

Buying and selling diplomacy using smaller states as pawns shows a prioritisation of individual interests from the all states involved. Russia, Georgia, China, Tuvalu, Nauru, and Kiribati all focus on their own domestic concerns, searching for advantages in any international deal they manage. The implications of this are startling: diplomatic contentions in the Caucasus or East Asia have deep impacts thousands of miles away, through the sheer power of money and bribery. These jumbled and shifting forms of foreign relations look unprincipled at first glance, but with further inspection prove that money truly flaunts its ubiquity in diplomacy.