Preparing for The Future, Contrasting Approaches of France and Britain
Following the defence review last month, the British Army is set to be reduced to its smallest capacity since 1714, with just 72,500 regular soldiers by 2025. The focus is turning away from troops and armour towards investments in technology and cyber. Meanwhile, the French armed forces are keeping 60% more soldiers than Britain plans to and 50% more tanks. France is gearing up for the return of a major conflict, preparing for exercise Orion in 2023 which will be on a scale that has not been tested for decades. As neighbours, previously evenly matched on a military scale, how can the two nations now have such different approaches for the future? What are the perceived threats, who are the possible adversaries and is either army fit for 21st century combat?
As we are starting to emerge out of the pandemic - Britain more rapidly than France - the focus is now turning towards the problems of the future. If one thing has been learned from COVID-19, it is the importance of predicting and planning for possible disasters and this is advice that governments are keen to heed at a military level as well. In fact, the French General Thierry Burkhard was drafting his vision for the future of the French Army at the start of last year before the pandemic hit. His 20-page document, published in June 2020 after being delayed by the coronavirus outbreak, details his strategic plan to strengthen the French Army by 2030. The approach of the French Army, preparing for HEM (hypothèse d’engagement majeur : hypothesis of major engagement), is in stark contrast, however, to the ideas put forward by British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace in March this year. Explaining the new paper, titled Defence in a Competitive Age, to the House of Commons, he affirmed, ‘we are making a decisive shift in our approach’. With Britain keen to throw off the shackles of ‘sentimentality,’ cutting numbers and merging divisions, France is instead looking back to old techniques and strategies, expecting a ‘return to symmetrical, state-on-state conflict’ as it prepares for future challenges.
France’s commitment to prepare its army for warfare in the years to come is reflected in its budgets. French President Emmanuel Macron has kept a campaign promise by investing heavily in France’s soldiers. Spending €49.7 billion (£43bn) on its defence budget for 2021, as planned in the 2019 - 2025 military program law, with plans to raise annual spending to €54 bn (£47bn) by 2024, the country envisions major projects to better prepare the 114,000 French soldiers (of whom 77,000 are ground troops) for the future of war as described in Burkhard’s report. The General plans to set up a new technical school to provide non-commissioned officers with the technical education they will need to use the material being delivered under the $12 bn (£10bn) Scorpion modernization program, which is set to equip the French army with new vehicles and tools for data-rich combat in the coming years. Macron and Burkhard are also focused on educating French youth on the importance of defence and in developing the SNU (service national universel : universal national service), which will become obligatory from 2024 for French individuals born in 2008.
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom is set to increase defence spending by £24bn over the next four years but make a number of cuts across its divisions. The size of the army is set to be reduced by 2025 as part of a move towards drones and cyber warfare. Wallace has assured that the reduction from today’s figure of 82,040 fully trained people in the Army to 72,500, in 4 years time, will not require redundancies. Current figures show that only 76,350 soldiers are at ‘full-time trained strength’ (those who have completed both their general, basic training and a second phase of specialised training for a specific role) which is almost 6,000 short of the Army’s target. With more focus on the threat of cyber and technology, Britain is backing its new priorities with a £3bn budget going towards new vehicles, long-range rocket systems, drones, electronic warfare and cyber capabilities. The number of tanks is to be cut from 227 to 148 upgraded ones and the Royal Air Force (RAF) will lose 24 of its older Typhoon jets as well as its fleet of Hercules transport aircraft.
There are, however, some clear similarities in France, Britain and indeed other countries’ priorities. Britain's defence review highlighted China as posing a ‘complex, systemic challenge’. With China’s rapidly developing economy, military modernisation (which is proceeding faster than any other nation) and growing international assertiveness within the Indo-Pacific, Britain, like France, is beginning to pivot its focus away from Europe towards these new challenges. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson is yet to outline exact measures but he is set to travel to India next month and analysts anticipate a new focus on partnerships and trade agreements with south-east Asian countries.
France, meanwhile, has stepped up its involvement as it became increasingly concerned over China’s growing economic influence abroad. China set up its first overseas military base in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa in 2017 and has invested in developing, managing or acquiring strategically located ports in countries surrounding India, including Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. This cuts across not only United States but also European and French interests, notably the interests of Paris in maintaining its fading domination of its former colonial empire in Africa. At the beginning of April, French naval exercises codenamed La Pérouse took place in the Bay of Bengal, alongside Indian, Japanese and Australian warships. With another Indian-French naval war game, the Varuna exercise, scheduled for early next week, these exercises are in line with Burkhard’s strategy document, exemplifying his vision of turning French imperialism towards preparations for large-scale ‘state against state’ wars.
These decisions have been met with uncertainty on both sides. Conservative Chairman of the Commons Defence Select Committee Tobias Ellwood warned that these investments in cyber came at a ‘huge price to our conventional defence posture with dramatic cuts to our troop numbers, tanks, armoured fighting vehicles’. Meanwhile, France may be preparing adequately for engagement in future battles but run the risk of failing to protect themselves from cyberspace threats and espionage that can be used as part of influence and propaganda campaigns, as well as in support of hostile activity in conventional warfare. The UK may be able to foresee a possible threat but not have the means to defend against it, whilst France might have the man-power but may not know to deploy its resources until it is already too late.
