QUAD and India: From a “Weak Link” to a Strenghtened Partnership
The most recent Quad Leaders’ Summit took place on 21st September, 2024 at American President Joe Biden’s Delaware hometown of Wilmington. This meeting facilitated the publication of the Wilmington Declaration, a document that proposed for an Indo-Pacific region characterised by respect for international law and order, fostering people-to-people relationships and multipolarity in the region. Though the document did not explicitly mention China, it made it quite obvious that the four countries a part of this summit have serious concerns about China’s assertiveness in the region. China has expressed its concern on this grouping and has even termed it an Asian NATO – that the organisation aims to contain China in Asia.
It is the sixth such meeting between the leaders of Australia, India, Japan and the United States. The Quad first surfaced in 2004 in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami. The idea was further encouraged by then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his ‘Confluence of Seas’ speech at India’s parliament in 2007. It lost track until 2017 when Japan and the US articulated their idea of a free Indo-Pacific region. The first Quad leaders’ summit took place virtually in 2021 with India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Japan’s Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison and America’s President Biden. The next Quad Leader’s Summit is planned to be hosted by New Delhi next year.
India has been called the “weak link” in the Quad due to its reluctance to condemn Russia over its invasion in Ukraine. It is also the only member that is not a formal ally of the US. Indian foreign policy is well-known for its “strategic autonomy” principle and has witnessed a transition from non-alignment to multi-alignment. India’s partnership with Russia has been well established since the Cold War and hurting this partnership is not in India’s favour, provided that Russia is India’s largest arms supplier. Yet the Quad must not obsess over this – Japan continues its import of gas from Russia’s Sakhalin-2 project till 2025; the US has imported Russian oil even after Ukraine’s invasion and in even larger quantities from Venezuela (a key Russian ally).
India’s growing warmth towards the Quad must be viewed in rise of recent developments in its relationship with China despite India’s caution with alliances in the past. India’s stance towards China has drastically changed ever since the 2017 Doklam border standoff as well as the 2020 border dispute, when China invaded India by crossing the Line of Actual Control. To make matters more alarming, it is noticeable how China, through the Belt and Road initiative, has encircled India with infrastructural investments in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and The Maldives.
These events show a sense of urgency from India’s end to join like-minded partners in establishing a region it is significant to. All Quad members have previously clashed with China – Japan faces maritime border issues with China over the Senkaku Islands, Australia having faced trade sanctions from China (while simultaneously voicing against Chinese aggression in the South China Sea) and the US being embroiled in a trade war ever since the Trump administration. Cooperation between these countries is taken seriously by Chinese experts, who are convinced the Quad aims to put a full stop to Chinese expansion in the Indo-Pacific. India cozying up to the Quad is a matter of concern to China given the long borders that the two countries share, and the emerging nature India has on the world stage currently.
India has consistently argued for the Quad to be anything but a military alliance. This is consistent with India’s foreign policy objectives and most importantly, India does not want to irk valuable trade partners such as Russia and Iran. A Quad military alliance might push Russia towards China, which would not be in India’s favour given their geographic location and the already growing convergence of Russia and China in Central Asia. Moreover, India and China are part of two growing multilateral organisations – BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The BRICS is of particular interest to India since its expansion to four new countries. A military alliance with the US would allow for questioning of India’s stance on multi-alignment and might portray China as a more favourable partner. The nature of India’s “strategic autonomy” invites itself to somewhat divergent multilateral groups; the fruits or implications of which are yet to be seen.
The militarisation of the Quad would panic many regional organisations, most notably the ASEAN. The ASEAN fears that a military alliance built to counter China would have drastic impact on Southeast Asia, given that many ASEAN countries have long-standing disputes with China and more importantly rely on China for trade. At the same time, it recognises India’s relevance, and an anti-China bloc would put ASEAN is unknown territory.
Instead of a military alliance, India wants to capitalise on its non-traditional security strengths through the Quad. It wishes to limit Chinese dominance through the broad but critical engagement avenues of the Quad including climate change, pandemics, sustainable infrastructure, maritime domain awareness as well as space. The focus on non-traditional aspects of security is timely and essential given the multiple developmental challenges facing the Indo-Pacific. It allows India to compete with China and avoid direct confrontation. Most countries in the Indo-Pacific region face urgent developmental challenges for which they may not have the capital to address. Climate change resilience is another critical area many countries could potentially struggle with.
India and the Quad, through their parameters, could foster investment for research and development as well as building infrastructural capabilities. People to people exchanges are a unique component that bridges gaps between the access to education and critical technologies. The Quad Fellowship is a notable example. Hence, the Quad’s non-military nature gives flexibility to engage with partners such as South Korea and the ASEAN. Countries are more likely to engage on infrastructural and development lines rather than traditional military structures vis-à-vis Chinese military prowess.
This focus also underlines India’s aspirations to lead the global South, directly competing with Chinese ambitions. The eagerness to lead the global South is derived from India’s desire of a multi-polar world, of which India wants to be one of the leaders. Indian apprehension of the Quad becoming a military alliance is directly linked to this desire, as militarising it would make it another obvious Western alliance system aimed at containing its opponents. Such a reality does not exist in Indian foreign policy that has voiced its opposition for Western dominated international institutions.
As the Quad completes two decades, the growing shift from reluctance to engagement with the organisation highlights India’s growing inclination to become a relevant and noticeable actor on the global stage. The coming years are significant as far as India’s role is concerned in the Quad. It will host the 2025 Quad Leaders’ Summit along with a range of Quad related exercises that include the first Maritime Initiative for Training (MAITRI) workshop and the Quad Regional Ports and Transportation Conference. A Quad conference hosted by India on pandemic preparedness highlights India’s role in vaccine diplomacy through its Vaccine Maitri initiative in the Indo-Pacific, which with its pharmaceutical advancements reaches out to many developing countries. Lastly, Indian institutions’ contributions towards an Open Radio Access Network show how the “weak link” narrative is disappearing. For the Quad to focus on the Indo-Pacific, India is integral. If the US, Japan and Australia cover vast parts of the Pacific, India is key for manoeuvrability in the Indian Ocean region.
Image Courtesy of Kevin Lemarque via Reuters, ©2024. Some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
