Ready, Aim, Fire: New Nuclear Security Implications in East Asia
Who is sparking tensions in East Asia today? Although it’s not a surprise that North Korea holds a nuclear arsenal, recent developments suggest new strategic outlooks for the Korean peninsula and greater East Asia region. In September, the North Korean government outlined a new nuclear use law that enables pre-emptive attacks. This enshrines the right of first-use nuclear strikes should the country detect an imminent attack of large or nuclear scale as well as any kind aimed at its leadership and organisation over its nuclear forces. According to Leader Kim Jong-Un, the aim of the law is not only for protection, but also to consolidate North Korea’s status as a nuclear power, barring any negotiations for denuclearisation. Following this, North Korea has continued its nuclear testing, having fired a missile over Japan in October. So how does this threat posed by the new law mark a renewed nuclear agenda impact in East Asia?
The most affected is certainly South Korea, where, after the Korean War ended, scars remain that embitter the North-South relationship. Moreover, China and the US have been historically allied with North and South Korea respectively after the Cold War. North Korea harbours great mistrust for the US, viewing their interference in the region as imperialistic. The increased threat perception from Pyongyang’s nuclear policy leads South Korea to turn to the US. However, attempts from the US to influence the East Asia order provoke North Korea. Military support from the US is not free either, as South Korea is subject to pay defence expenses and share financial burdens of troop deployments. The economic cost can be vary depending on the US shifting stance on isolationism, which was strongly prevalent during former President Trump’s office. This economic cost makes South Korea reliant on a fair-weather friend. Additionally, foreign military exercises in China’s ‘neighbourhood’ are perceived to undermine its status as the dominant regional power, while the nuclear umbrella as a US operated missile defence system can be seen as a way to monitor and counter Chinese missiles. Thus, the Chinese government is increasingly willing to rebuke South Korea on security issues in East Asia, especially regarding its activity with the US. Therefore, this new law fuels the South Korean security dilemma, where it requires close ties with the US, but in doing so, widens the diplomatic divide with North Korea and inadvertently China, placing South Korea in a geopolitical deadlock.
This leads to implications for China as the dominant regional power and supporter of North Korea. Although China has shared history with the regime, its own strategic interests aim for denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. The regime’s new nuclear laws push South Korea and Japan closer towards the Western alliance, hindering China’s pursuit of a Sino-centric bloc. Since former President Hu Jintao’s time in office, China has been directly confronting US influence challenging their allies in the region, displayed by tensions such as the dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands and demarcation of China’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), which overlapped the ADIZ of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. From this, it is shown that China’s resources are sub-optimised with enforcing territorial claims, countering foreign influence, and taking retaliatory actions against opposition allies. Additionally, increased reliance on the US, particularly its maritime presence, strengthens the US foothold in East Asia and bears consequence for China. Control over the East Sea via the Senkaku Islands is integral to China’s maritime strategy for active defence and deterrence of US surveillance on maritime operations and securing important shipping lanes to the Pacific Ocean. Successful occupation could also set precedent reducing backlash towards other territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the question of Taiwan. Consequently, China is in a weaker position when North Korea pursues the status of a nuclear state. So, while not under threat from the nuclear policy, China suffers a loss of strategic geopolitical security, straying further from the realisation of a Sino-centric bloc.
North Korea’s nuclear policy influenced their Japanese neighbours, too. The Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula is a still a vivid memory for North Korea. Hence, North Korea’s nuclear threat applies to Japan as well. As another US-aligned country in East Asia, Japan shares the same security dilemma that South Korea has. However, Japan’s security issues are distinct because of its direct challenge to China over the Senkaku Islands. Its relationship with China is further strained because Japan is perceived to invite foreign interference, such as joint US military exercises, to contest a domestic issue. The close regional proximity of these exercises causes diplomatic collateral damage with North Korea, who view these activities as hostile and imperialistic. The largest military exercise entitled "Resolute Dragon" occurred in 2021 and involved the pre-emptive use of defensive artillery rocket systems in range of North Korea; after this, it is not a stretch for the Pyongyang to have security concerns. Therefore, the new nuclear policy hinders Japanese security, who will likely host more military exercises with the US around the Senkaku Islands, triggering China and North Korea’s security dilemma, leading to continued maritime tensions and nuclear arms testing.
While there are security concerns for the region, the ideals of North Korea’s nuclear regime can provide insights that suggest a less pessimistic outlook. As stated by Leader Kim Jong-Un, “as long as... imperialism remains and manoeuvres of the United States and its followers against our republic are not terminated, our work to strengthen nuclear force will not cease". This viewpoint draws influences from North Korean Juche ideology underpinning a fundamental belief that other states will never accept the country as completely independent; it stems from deeply rooted memories of past subjugation under Chinese and Japanese rulers, and the exploitation of the Korean Peninsula for a proxy war. Therefore, Pyongyang’s ideologically entrenched paranoia incites the pursuit of military superiority through nuclear means, viewing it as a necessary path towards self-determination. In this perspective, North Korea’s policy is far less aggressive and leaves room for positive change. This policy also includes subtext that bars the sharing of nuclear technology aiming to prevent nuclear proliferation and misuse, signalling an attempt to be a ‘responsible’ nuclear state.
The defensive use of a pre-emptive strike law is not illogical, extreme or exclusive to North Korea. It emerged from deterrence understandings; by stating the consequence for targeting areas of security vulnerability, the pre-emptive nuclear threat would displace attacks. NATO applies this logic, albeit with strategic ambiguity, considering nuclear weapons to defend its ‘vital interests’. Arguably, North Korea acts responsibly again by removing this ambiguity and explicitly stating its vital interests (i.e. its nuclear capabilities). This idea of a North Korean defensive nuclear policy is solidified given South Korea’s earlier adoption of the US ‘Kill Chain’ strategy. The strategy is an offensive manoeuvre that upon ‘suspecting’ an imminent attack, would pre-emptively strike North Korea’s nuclear infrastructure and command chain. With only the vague criteria of suspicion, ambiguity and risk of miscalculation arise, this exemplifies North Korea’s Juche ideology. This leaves a paranoid Pyongyang little choice but to legislate pre-emptive strike laws to ensure regime survival. Therefore, North Korea’s nuclear policy can be interpreted differently, where decision-making is portrayed as responsible and reactive, placing North Korea as the defender rather than aggressor.
Image courtesy of Mark Fahey via Wikimedia, ©2011, some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
