Sudden frost: Arctic exceptionalism under threat
You’ll probably have heard that the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 means that nothing can be taken for granted in world politics anymore. This claim is usually justified by the invasion’s implications for Europe, NATO, and the global ‘rule-based’ world order. Whether or not it was ever off the agenda, hard security will now undoubtedly shape international policy and predictions for the foreseeable future. While this might be uncomfortable for Europe, it is untrodden territory for one area of the world — the Arctic. Military matters, and the fragmentation which they bring, seem to be making their way into polar politics. A changed Arctic politics, simultaneous with a changing Arctic environment, will have implications reaching far beyond its (decreasingly) icy shores.
Overall, diplomatic relations between Russia, — whose coastline constitutes almost half of the Arctic — the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden have not been known for their harmony. The Arctic, however, has been a notable exception to this. Hard geopolitics has been kept at arm’s length. Over the past 24 years, the Arctic Council (AC) has managed to stick to one of its founding principles laid out in the 1996 Ottawa Declaration — to avoid dealing “with matters related to military security.”
The AC has been a forum characterised by a remarkable degree of cohesion and cooperation, between states who rarely see eye to eye. Even after Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, and its political isolation imposed by the West in retaliation — including all other Arctic Council members — these states have been able to collaborate and reach consensus. Consensus is another guiding principle of the Council; there are no majority votes, meaning that for an agreement to be reached all member states must agree. This ‘Arctic Exceptionalism’ is taken for granted by much of the world, yet it is purposeful and productive.
This is even more remarkable considering the nature of the topics on which the Council cooperates. Arctic states have been able to find common ground on climate change and sustainable development policy, a consequential issue which has often pitted ‘statist’ and economically inclined nations, such as Russia and the US, against more ‘liberal-minded’ ones such as the AC’s Scandinavian members. Territorial disputes have been resolved remarkably smoothly and upheld with little bad faith.
Again, this stands in stark contrast to the member states’ actions on the rest of the world stage. Russia, which is so often intent on preserving its sovereignty above all else, has shown deference to multilateral and bilateral initiatives to avoid clashing with its Arctic neighbours, honouring its commitments to resolve territorial disputes either through the United Nations’ Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) or by bilateral means — as per the Ilulissat Declaration. Despite the wealth of resources and increasing opportunities for economic exploitation, it has been a zone of remarkably little conflict.
Many believe that it is precisely the long-standing principle which has fostered such cooperation, suggesting that this ‘Arctic Exceptionalism’ could be a model to facilitate dialogue and coordination between non-traditional allies on such issues of international importance. By avoiding military matters and necessitating fully consensual agreements, the region is framed. According to one Finnish professor, as proponents “of peaceful interaction”, states are prevented from “wearing geopolitical glasses ”. In the words of one of the Norwegian MPs who nominated the Arctic Council for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022, avoiding security issues facilitates the cooperation necessary for productive dialogue on “preserving the environment and climate, and people’s living conditions in the High North”.
Facilitating cooperation on these issues, the Arctic Council does deal with security matters, just before they become threats. After all, the Center for Climate and Security warned in a 2021 report that Climate Change in the Arctic could “quickly multiply into a host of other severe security risks,” including the opening of new resource competition, accidents and “gray zones” of territorial sovereignty. The expansion and adaptation of existing institutional frameworks, seizing the “unprecedented opportunity for international collaboration”, the authors concluded, was essential to “prevent further escalation” in the region.
This makes the immediate state of Arctic exceptionalism even more troubling. Just days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the five other states of the Arctic Council issued a Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation, stating that they would not participate in the upcoming round of AC meetings due to be held in the Russian city of Arkhangelsk in May and would pause all participation in the Council. They condemned the “unprovoked invasion” as a violation of “the core principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity” which underpin the work of the Council, which is currently chaired by Russia. Now, for the first time, the Arctic Council will have to deal with military matters.
One could downplay the significance of this, arguing that it is simply part of the broader policy of isolation which the West has pursued since February. It could, however, be the beginning of the end for Arctic exceptionalism. Since the suspension of the Council, Canada and the US have announced joint military exercises aimed at testing the defensive capacity of the high north. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg linked the pre-planned military drills of Exercise Cold Response 2022 — held in Norway — to the invasion of Ukraine as part of a “new normal” for Arctic security. This could even be the end of the beginning- as early as 2019, then US Secretary State Mike Pompeo violated Arctic Council protocol by warning China and Russia against “aggressive” actions contrary to US interests in the region, likely prompted by unprecedented Russian troop build-up in the region.
Either way, as the world comes to terms with the new security realities created by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the securitisation of the Arctic adds a new dimension to global politics. If Arctic cooperation survives this frost, it will add huge weight to the argument that Arctic exceptionalism and consensus building should be a model for the joint action needed to tackle the collective action issues faced globally. If, on the other hand, this is more than a blip, and the securitisation of the Arctic continues to take hold, many more areas of potential conflict will have been added to our already fragmented world.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
Image courtesy of POA(Phot) Merrill/MOD via Wikimedia Commons ©2012, some rights reserved.
