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Taliban Takeover: Afghanistan’s Turn to China.

Taliban Takeover: Afghanistan’s Turn to China.

The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan has prompted a question that occupies the mind of every international observer­- is the Taliban the new, modern movement which they claim to be, or simply the repressive Taliban of the ‘90s with better PR? Recent events point to the latter. The Taliban’s promises of moderation, inclusion, and leniency have not been backed up with action. They have warned barbers against shaving men’s beards, the Taliban-appointed chancellor of Kabul University has refused to let women study or work there, and no women or former officials were included in the Taliban’s interim government. Most alarmingly, Mullah Nooruddin Turabi, a Taliban prison official, has said that the Taliban would resume executions and amputations as they did in the ‘90s. Although these harsh positions almost certainly mean a humanitarian crisis for the Afghan people, what effect do they have on Afghanistan’s relations with other states? The answer is likely a turn to China.

Western countries appear to be taking a ‘wait-and-see’ approach to interactions with the Taliban. The U.S. has said that it will provide diplomatic recognition and aid if the Taliban demonstrates this moderation which it claims. However, after a month, the Taliban is already breaking these promises. This development is already having a disastrous effect on the Afghan economy and society. Diplomatic recognition provides a government not only legitimacy, but access to foreign aid and frozen assets, a seat at the United Nations, and diplomatic immunity for government representatives abroad. 43% of Afghanistan’s budget in 2020 was from foreign aid. After the takeover, foreign aid has been suspended, spreading fears of an economic collapse and a humanitarian crisis. The immediate threat has been resolved, thanks in large part to the $1.2 billion (£886 million) in emergency pledges coordinated by the UN. The U.S. Department of Treasury also granted licenses to allow aid to keep flowing to Afghanistan.

However, these solutions are likely temporary. The Taliban may go on to restrict the ability of western-backed NGOs to work, limiting the pathways for aid to enter Afghanistan bypassing the Taliban. Or, if the Taliban continues to crack down on Afghan civilians and large sums of money are lost to corruption, countries might fully stop providing aid. The Taliban need this money to govern the country and maintain enough support to stay in power. As such, the Taliban is seeking to expand relations with countries that will provide aid regardless of Afghanistan’s domestic politics.

Three countries that seem keen to build relationships with the Taliban are Russia, Iran, and China. All three states kept their embassies open during the Taliban takeover, suggesting they are open to cooperation. However, the state that has the most to both invest and gain from a relationship with the Taliban is China. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, met with Taliban officials in China in July, providing the group legitimacy long before it captured Kabul. China also promised $31 million (£23 million) in food and health supplies to Afghanistan in early September to prevent a humanitarian crisis.

At first glance, the relationship between the Taliban and China might seem odd. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) treatment of Uighur Muslims is not helping China’s reputation in Islamic countries. However, both the Taliban and China serve to benefit from this relationship. First and foremost, the Taliban needs money and wants recognition. China can provide both, without interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. Unlike other sources of aid, such as the International Monetary Fund or Western countries that demand democratic reforms, China provides seemingly unconditional aid. Beijing has said that it “respects” Afghan’s rights to decide their future. This appeals to the Taliban. Nooruddin Turabi has said they will decide the laws for Afghanistan based on their interpretation of Islam and would not listen to other states.

China could also further legitimise the Taliban by keeping Afghanistan, an observer to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), in this organisation despite the regime change. Furthermore, a relationship with the CCP could mean more infrastructure investment through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). According to the Chinese Public Diplomacy Dashboard, China promised or spent only $810 million (£598 million) in Afghanistan between 2000 and 2017. Chinese investment in infrastructure projects could help increase support for the Taliban by showing their government is more desirable than the Ghani government.

Conversely, China also benefits from a relationship with the Taliban. Firstly, China wishes to continue its repression of the Uighurs without condemnation or the import of terrorism to Xinjiang province. By providing money and supporting the legitimacy of the Taliban regime, China can be more confident that Afghanistan will not be used as a base for terrorism against the CCP. China could also derive economic benefits from a relationship with the Taliban. China may include Afghanistan in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a central part of the BRI, in order to access a new market in Afghanistan and reserves that could help Chinese manufacturing. Lastly, China could use its relationship with the Taliban as a show of its growing influence- and as an opportunity to gain more. Through its relationship with the Taliban, China can demonstrate that it is not interested in interference with other countries’ domestic politics, which could make other authoritarian regimes more likely to work with China.

Although Western countries have just pulled their forces out of Afghanistan, the China-Taliban relationship means that Afghanistan will remain an area of concern. China’s unconditional foreign aid means that the Taliban lack strong incentive to respect human rights or be more moderate as the West wants. China’s possible integration of Afghanistan into the SCO or other Chinese multilateral organisations provides more legitimacy and strength to these Chinese organisations. And lastly, if the Western world is truly turning against China as the key threat, China’s relationship with the Taliban could create a new front for the fight for the Western-led liberal, democratic order.

 Image Courtesy of Department of Defence ©2012, some rights reserved

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