The Berlin Conference: How the Architects of Libya’s Civil War offer little to promote Peace
In January, the governments of 12 countries and representatives of international organisations gathered in Berlin, at the invitation of Chancellor Angela Merkel, in the latest attempt to restore peace to Libya and usher in an end to the instability and conflict which erupted after the 2011 overthrow of the Gadaffi regime. In attendance were all of the principal actors in the conflict. The governments of Turkey, the United Arab Emitates, Russia, the United States and United Kingdom were joined by representatives from the United Nations, African Union and League of Arab States, making the conference one of the largest to date focusing specifically on developing a consensus on the peacebuilding process in Libya.
The conclusions of the conference focused on three areas of policy action: an immediate ceasefire, enforcement of an international arms embargo, and a return to political process via the creation of ‘a single, unified, inclusive and effective Libyan government’. Despite the ambitious target of unifying fragmented and opposing militias which have engaged in vicious conflict for almost a decade, international reception to the conference was cautiously positive. Chancellor Merkel hailed the agreement as a ‘comprehensive plan forward’ while Charles Michel, the President of the European Council, vowed to mobilise the EU’s means to implement the outcomes of the conference. This political will, however, is complicated a number of vested interests which have the potential not only to compromise the peacebuilding process in Libya, but actively contribute to a continuation of conflict.
The origins of the Libyan Civil War can be traced to the overthrow of the Gadaffi regime in the Arab Spring of 2011. While domestic discontent with this repressive and authoritarian regime motivated unrest, Libya was the only country during the Arab Spring to be the subject of direct military intervention by foreign powers. Just two days after UN authorisation, the United States and NATO countries established a no-fly zone over Libya, engaging in targeted bombing of Gadaffi’s forces throughout the country. With Gadaffi’s death seven months later, this was widely interpreted as a model humanitarian intervention, with former President Obama stating that the international community had averted a genocide and ‘eliminated’ Libya as a potential source of terrorism. What followed is one of the largest ongoing civil wars in the world today.
Like the wars in Syria and Yemen, external intervention has been a consistent feature of the Libyan conflict. When Khalifa Haftar founded the Libyan National Army (LNA) to challenge the UN- backed government of Fayez Saraj, he quickly won the support of Russian President Vladimir Putin, perceiving him as a potential strongman and acceptable replacement for Gadaffi who Russia had previously supported. Indeed, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, two countries which have not historically shared numerous interests with Russia, also supported Haftar’s LNA. This support was largely motivated by Saraj’s links to the Muslim Brotherhood, a political party considered subversive by much of the Middle East, and one violently removed from power in Egypt by a military coup. Due to these interests, Russia has contributed 1000 mercenaries to support the Haftar while the UAE provided military drones, all of which have helped facilitate some of the considerable advances of the LNA towards Tripoli.
On the other side of the conflict, Saraj’s internationally recognised government has found strong backing from Turkey. This alliance, deeply unpopular with many Middle Eastern states, is based not only on Turkish President Erdogan’s relatively positive stance towards the Muslim Brotherhood, but also on its financial interests in the region. Last November, Erdogan and Saraj agreed on a modification of the sea borders of their respective countries, allowing Turkey ownership of Mediterranean gas fields once claimed by Libya. Of course, this agreement would be compromised by the failure of Saraj’s government. This economic motivation, coupled with Turkey’s desire to play a more prominent role in regional affairs, has seen Turkey contribute directly to Saraj’s military offensive, helping him to retake important territories like the city of Gharyan from the LNA.
With Russia, Turkey and the UAE attending the Berlin conference, it is notable that virtually none of the sectarian or economic issues that have facilitated the conflict were addressed. The call for demobilisation and disarmament of all groups and militias in the country may be honourable in intent, but it is unlikely that either Saraj’s government or the LNA will make substantial moves to disarm if they perceive the other as a threat, or an obstruction to their own hold on power. Moreover, even if a single and unified Libyan government could be formed, its unity would immediately be challenged by the same opposing international forces that have characterised the war until now. Its handling of the thorny issue of the Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, would be sure to be the subject of contestation by Middle Eastern powers. In addition, any policy change regarding its sea borders with Turkey would undoubtedly stoke Turkish animosity, or even aggression. With international players so willing to pursue interventionist policies to defend their own interests throughout the conflict, there is little to suggest they will radically depart from these policies in the future.
It is ironic that the governments that have directly contributed most to prolonging the Libyan Civil War now seem intent on appearing moderate peacemakers in the region. This divergence between diplomatic facades and vested interests may go some way into explaining the lack of real solutions in the Berlin Conference agreement. However, with so many international actors and conflicting interests at play in Libya, it is easy to overlook the human cost of the conflict. It is estimated that since 2011, some 15,000 people have been killed and 350,000 Libyans have been internally displaced, with a further 270,000 fleeing the country altogether. In this power vacuum, Libya has become a transit hub for illegal migration, resulting in widespread human rights abuses and even the growth of an underground slave trade. The international community must take more responsibility for this situation. Without addressing the insidious power politics underlying this conflict, no agreement can constitute a ‘comprehensive plan’, much less pave the way for lasting peace in Libya.
Cover Image Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Libya
