The Digital Role of China in Europe
Photo by Mimi Garcia on Unsplash, ©2017, some rights reserved.
The COVID-19 pandemic set numerous challenges to current world leaders putting the economy and ‘life as usual’ on hold whilst facing a series of uncertainties for the short- and long-term future. As the pandemic unfolded, technology has been essential in ensuring the member states of the EU, as the rest of the world, have continued to function. Setting-up COVID Track and Trace apps, moving financial services online, digitalising judicial systems and optimising data sharing corridors are just a few of the ways technology has proved invaluable in these trying times. This period has also highlighted the lack of technological advancement in Europe which undermines its global leadership and creates the urgency of enforced development. As a result, the EU invested in a six-year plan for Europe’s digital advancement providing a budget of 7.6 billion euros. The programme aims to enhance the areas of supercomputing, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, digital skills and education.
In the meantime, exaggerated by the economic struggles caused by the pandemic, the rising consumer demands and competitive free markets opened Europe’s blue door for foreign players. Much like in the Union, Chinese technological innovation has increased significantly to the extent that the government reshaped the economy by putting digitalisation first. Big technology companies like Huawei, Ali Baba and Tencent expandedquickly combined with high investments in research and development of artificial intelligence, robotics, computing, and space technology among others. This development does not come as a surprise as China has been proactively working towards becoming a digital world leader even before the pandemic. For instance, in his speech in 2017, President Xi called on the international community to “..pursue innovation-driven development and intensify cooperation in frontier areas such as digital economy, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology and quantum computing, and advance the development of big data, cloud computing and smart cities so as to turn them into a digital silk road of the 21st century.” Following its geopolitical ambitions, China began to work on the digital equivalent to the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, Digital Silk Road, presenting the external form of the digitalisation of China’s economy.
The current economic situation presents an intriguing case to test the free European market and Chinese opening to marketisation and foreign investments. Recent events, such as Huawei’s rapid expansion, suggest that China is actively seeking to break into the European market. The company has, for example, been trying to boost its image in Eastern and Central Europe by buying ‘good reporting’ of its activities from local media and PR outlets. The EU has not failed to recognise the threat that Chinese digital expansion imposes on Europe’s digital leadership. So, although no official ban has been introduced, the EU has tried to greatly restrict tech company activities. For example, the Union invested in monitoring rules and cybersecurity measures for 5G as part of its defence strategy. More specifically, the Union is concerned about the intrusive strategy of China’s government which includes overtaking European technologies and becoming dependent on Chinese vendors like Huawei and ZTE.
China’s digital role in Europe is also causing concerns about privacy and digital governance. Considering the destabilised political stance on digital governance in the West, China’s digital rise has contributed to intensifying these divisions. Human rights are being threatened by the false narratives of striking a balance between security and privacy. So, where state control is framed as needed to ensure people’s security, privacy is deemed as a threat to national security. On this background, mass surveillance practices are being justified legitimising the violation of our fundamental human rights to free expression, autonomy, and self-determination. Thus, it is quite problematic having European states collaborating with Chinese companies notorious for developing facial recognition technology in China, where the tech is being used to surveil the Uighur Muslim minority. This begs the question of whether China’s digital expansion does not also imply the promotion of an authoritarian digital state.
Europe appears to be divided between taking advantage of the high-tech developments Chinese partners offer and the fear of losing market advantage in the digital sector. Economic recovery programmes are seen to cause inward-orientated economic planning for both Europe and China, hence, making progress on striking an agreement between the two parties highly unlikely. While the question of China’s role in Europe is framed primarily as an economic matter, a human-centric approach to on-going affairs underlines the importance of creating adequate safeguards for human rights. In particular, ensuring that states and corporations are not illegitimately using people’s data and disregarding their agency.
