The German Zeitenwende is failing

‘We are witnessing a “Zeitenwende” [turning point/watershed moment] …. The world after is no longer the same as the world before. At its core, it's about the question of whether power can break the law ... or if we have the strength to set limits for warmongers like Putin’, said Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) shortly after the start of the war in Ukraine. He promised, ‘What is needed to secure peace in Europe will be done’.

The German Zeitenwende (i.e., a fundamental turning point in German foreign and security policy) is a massive task. It involves the comprehensive reorganization of everything from energy supply to education policy to considering how to deal with fake news and propaganda. The defense sector is crucial for the success of this turning point, not only because the government has set such high goals — ‘what is needed […] will be done’—or because the expectations from Germany's partners have consequently increased, but mainly because the threat does not end with the war in Ukraine. The war is merely the beginning of a new security order where the importance of military power is rising.

So far, Germany is mainly patching gaps in the Bundeswehr (the German armed forces), but the sheer magnitude of what is necessary to achieve Zeitenwende has not been fully accounted for. A sustainable Zeitenwende would require Germany to embed this change within its goals, structures, and resources. But so far, the adjustments seem not to be permanent, risking quick transience. This is mainly because the awareness of the necessity of this transformation is not very pronounced.

Special funds will soon be exhausted

Decisions can be made regarding goals, structures, and resources if there is political will. There are indeed goals: in September 2022, the Chancellor stated that the Bundeswehr must become ‘the best-equipped armed force in Europe'. That would take about two decades.

The federal government is still taking a short-term approach, just as it did before the war: the promise to spend two percent on defense can only be kept for two to three years. This is made possible by the famous special fund of 100 billion euros. However, Germany's regular defense budget has not increased. When the money from the special fund is exhausted, Germany will be even further from the two percent goal than it is today. By 2025, the two percent of the gross domestic product will likely be higher in absolute numbers. So, the goal of becoming the ‘best-equipped armed force in Europe’ is not financially supported.

There are consequences already today. With uncertain funding, the Bundeswehr cannot plan for a comprehensive and long-lasting reorganization. Complex defense projects alone take twelve to fifteen years from commissioning to delivery. Of course, the goal of defense is not just to spend money. But without money, the goals will not be achieved.

Necessary changes have low priority?

Structures are similar. After little happened in the first year, Federal Defense Minister Boris Pistorius (SPD) initiated reforms. He reinstated a planning staff and is working on optimizing the planning and procurement system to overcome diffusion of responsibility and achieve faster results. Many issues are still open, such as adapting the Bundeswehr's structure.

However, the most important and difficult area for a permanent embedding of the Zeitenwende is neglected: the change in mentality or, as Pistorius put it, the willingness to change. It is about recognizing that the security policy situation has fundamentally changed, that there is a military threat to Germany, that other countries deliberately challenge the liberal world order desired by Germany, and that Germany's contribution to Europe's defense is crucial.

Need for a concerted European effort

Many signs indicate that after a revolutionary moment of change shortly after the Russian attack, the German system has fallen back into a preservation rhythm. A bit of change, but without hurtful consequences. More money, but not in the long term. Many hope that everything will turn out fine again. This is also because Ukraine is superbly defending itself and Europe, and thus the sense of threat is diminishing.

But this also means that Europe is a free rider. Ukraine is currently defending the continent's security with the United States as its greatest supporter. Moreover, the German government links its military support for Ukraine to that of the United States. Berlin has tied the delivery of German battle tanks to American commitments. Now it is refusing to deliver Taurus missiles. Instead of the much-vaunted European sovereignty as aimed for in the coalition agreement, this is again an outsourcing of strategy and effort to the United States.

This kind of mental outsourcing and tarrying allows Germany to avoid defense policy issues but hampers the necessary mental reorientation. Of course, a country does not change in 18 months. It takes a generation to anchor new thinking. But after 18 months, observers should see whether Germany has reached a turning point, where the new course is so ingrained that it can be maintained. It doesn't seem like that is the case right now.

Image courtesy of NATO via Flickr, ©2021. Some rights reserved.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.