The United States Needs a New Taiwan Strategy
Less than a month ago, Chinese President Xi Jinping told troops to prepare for war with the United States. Though this statement was more likely diplomatic posturing than a real threat, it shines a light on the brinkmanship game Beijing and Washington are playing. Xi – fresh off securing Hong Kong – has now turned his sights to Taiwan, a point of contention in US-Chinese relations since the Communist Party (CCP) took power. The US responded to the growing potential of a hostile take-over of the island by authorising an arms sale to the Taiwanese government. This action is what promoted Xi’s call to arms. And while war has not broken out yet over the island, it is a growing flashpoint. This must be avoided at all costs – the US needs a new Taiwan strategy.
Taiwan has a long, complicated history marked by colonialism and geopolitical disputes. At the end of the Chinese Civil War, the defeated Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, fled to the island. There, they set up a government and declared themselves the Republic of China (ROC). The UN recognized this newly-established government as the rightful Chinese government up until 1971 – after this, it became de facto independent, though de jure controlled by the now internationally-recognized People’s Republic of China (PRC). The international recognition of the ROC left its mark on the PRC – the idea of an independent Taiwan, recognized globally, is perceived by the CCP as undercutting its sovereignty. This unease regarding Taiwan has driven the US and others, who have vested interests in the continuation of a de facto Taiwanese state, to take the position of ‘strategic ambiguity’. The point of this policy is to rhetorically accept Taiwan as part of China but keep it effectively outside of the PRC’s reach. The policy entails cutting off formal relations with Taiwan and excluding it from the international community (e.g. no UN membership).
Though successful for some time, this policy has lost its relevance. The PRC is becoming bolder, with the aforementioned success in Hong Kong paired with a generally effective COVID-19 response adding to the nation’s confidence. While strategic ambiguity has the benefit of not overtly upsetting the PRC, it does not deter them from action. Furthermore, the US, while not officially obligated to defend Taiwan in the case of invasion, would more likely than not come to their aid as strategic ambiguity’s goal is the preservation of Taiwanese de facto independence. Most importantly, the tacit understanding by Taiwan that the US will come to its aid if faced with a PRC invasion, combined with other socio-political factors, has discouraged it from having an effective military. What we’re left with is a hypothetical situation where the PRC, unconvinced the US will commit to Taiwan’s defence, invades the island; the US, trapped in a tough position, decides to aid the Taiwanese; and Taiwan, knowing the US will intervene, lets the Americans do all the fighting. In other words, the situation goes from a defence of Taiwan to a full-blown great power war.
This must be avoided at all costs. Even without nuclear weapons, the conflict’s death toll would be astronomical. At the same time, abandoning Taiwan is not a prudent or moral solution. Taiwan is certainly geopolitically important, but it also deserves the right to self-determination. It is a rare functioning democracy in a world of rising authoritarianism and illiberalism. Thus, a future Taiwan strategy has to be geared towards avoiding war with the PRC while also protecting Taiwan’s right to choose their own government. This strategy should take the form of a dual-pronged approach. First, the US should abandon strategic ambiguity and publicly commit to defending Taiwan from an invasion. Second, below the surface it should condition this support on Taiwan developing its own capacity for self-defence and deterrence.
The first prong of the strategy is necessary as a way to deter PRC aggression towards Taiwan. In a position of strategic ambiguity, the PRC may interpret US commitment to the island as weak. This perception could lead to an invasion of Taiwan, which as previously mentioned could then spark all-out war between the US and the PRC. A clear and public commitment from the US to Taiwan’s defence will ensure the PRC is well aware of what it would be triggering with an invasion, thus deterring one. Furthermore, it would lessen the brinksmanship issue that led to Xi’s prepare-for-war statement. A position of ambiguity means the US selling arms to Taiwan creates a classic security dilemma. Though the weapons are for defence, without a clear understanding of that the PRC may interpret future sales as aggression and respond in kind. Publicly announcing the purpose of these sales alleviates this issue.
The strategy comes with risks, of course, and must be implemented carefully. The issue of sovereignty remains a complicated one for the PRC, and the US must make it evident that it is not recognising Taiwan as “separate” from the PRC. This is possible to do while also committing to Taiwan’s defence – as Richard Haass and David Sacks write, ‘normalization with China [is premised] on “the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.”’ This ‘strategic clarity’ must be articulated as such – Taiwan is part of China, but its governance must be decided fairly and peacefully. Lastly, the US should not do this alone. It has allies both in the region and around the world who have vested interests in Taiwanese de facto independence, and having a multilateral coalition publicly promoting strategic clarity will strengthen the position.
The second prong of this new strategy is a private conditioning of defence on Taiwanese capacity-building. Taiwan’s military is undisciplined, undermanned, and overall lacks capacity to defend itself from a Chinese invasion. This does not have to be the case – while the PRC’s military is extremely powerful, Taiwan is a challenging country to invade due to its mountainous geography. Thus, to make sure the US and its allies are not the only factors deterring the PRC from invading the island, outside support must be conditioned on Taiwan having an effective military. The US can and should help with modernization, which will be easy to do with strategic clarity and show the Taiwanese that it is committed to their defence. But importantly, this policy should not be publicized. It should be an understanding between Taiwan and the US rather than an official policy. This is because conditioning support publicly could be perceived as US frustration with Taiwan, which would undermine deterrence efforts. That said, it certainly would be in the interest of both Taiwan and the US to modernize Taiwan’s military.
None of this should be interpreted as a US-China Cold War-style proxy war. Taiwan is not just a contested issue between the world’s two biggest powers, it is also an island with millions of inhabitants that who human rights and self-determination. Though this policy is strategically valuable for the US, the defence of Taiwan serves a greater normative purpose. This is part of the reason why multilateral support is so important – the question here is not the US vs. the PRC, but liberal internationalist values vs. a potential illegal invasion.
Image courtesy of Kevin Harber via Flickr, © 2010, some rights reserved
