Tiger Economy, Zebra Democracy: The Case of Botswana

Oct 23

Oct 23 Tiger Economy, Zebra Democracy: The Case of Botswana

From the 1990s on, observers have looked on Taiwan, South Korea and arguably Singapore as the ‘meddling kids’ foiling Huntington’s plot to convince us that non-Western cultures and democracy inevitably ‘clash’. Indeed, the impressive economic growth of these economies throughout the last decades of the 20th century is widely believed to have resulted from the democratisation of state institutions. Recent developments have redirected the spotlight back on Taiwan and South Korea, which have shone in their competent handling of the ongoing pandemic. On the other hand, many Western democracies have had their responses to the pandemic undermined by governmental incompetence and partisanship, both of which are fed by distrust in government in a vicious cycle. As European and Western leaders are facing a credibility crisis on the international stage, we should perhaps be looking to emulate the strengths of non-Western democracies not just in Asia, but also in Africa. Botswana has been termed “the African miracle”, as one of the only African states to have forged an operating democracy from the fires of colonialism. So, what lessons can be drawn from this ‘zebra democracy’?

The EIU’s democracy index assesses the levels of democracy attained around the globe based on the five categories of the electoral process and pluralism, the functioning of government, political participation, democratic political culture and civil liberties. In 2019, it placed Belgium, Italy and Taiwan below Botswana, among the top scorers in the ‘flawed democracy’ bracket. The US, a fellow flawed democracy, only ranked four places ahead of Botswana. Botswana is Africa’s longest continuous multiparty democracy, having held regular elections from independence in 1966. It boasted the world’s fastest growing income per person in the 35 years prior to 2002. Moreover, the country has not been riddled with the ethnic strife seen elsewhere in Africa, most notoriously in the conflagration between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. These successes can, at least in part, be attributed to sound economic and political policy, and thus can be emulated by other aspiring or faltering democracies.

Revenues from Botswana’s booming diamond industry have been invested in education, healthcare and infrastructure, further stimulating economic growth, not least by boosting the confidence of foreign investors. Botswana’s military spending has traditionally been minimal, freeing up funds for development while ensuring that power contests are confined to elections and not extended to struggles between the government and military establishment. The cattle industry is heavily subsidised in an effort to ward off ‘Dutch disease’ or over-reliance on diamond exports. This effort has been further aided environmental initiatives that safeguard Botswana’s tourism industry. Anti-corruption measures, which have seen Botswana feature as the best performing African country in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2019, ensure that wealth created in these sectors isn’t squandered. A system of community councils called ‘Klogta’ fuse a traditional chieftaincy system with modern government. There is much that Botswana’s neighbours, as well as more mature democracies whose environmental and military policies continue to threaten political stability in the region, could try at home.

Yet not only is much of Botswana’s democratic status serendipitous, but it is also built on a negative peace. Botswana’s unique colonial context, diamond deposits and ethnic homogeneity are all favourable to democracy, dashing hopes that the ‘African miracle’ can be replicated. When the British established the Bechuanaland protectorate, the precursor to the Republic of Botswana, in 1885, the area was believed to be bereft of natural resources, thus Britain implemented a less invasive system of colonial control than had been adopted elsewhere in Africa, interfering little with indigenous political institutions. Additionally, Botswana’s diamonds were only discovered in 1967, after it had been granted independence. Botswana’s newfound mineral wealth fuelled economic growth, while the timing of the discovery meant that the country was not obliged to award Britain mineral concessions as a condition of independence. Admittedly, astute policies have translated this resource into prosperity; Zimbabwean diamonds have not had the same treatment. Arbitrary post-colonial borders moreover saw Botswana dominated by one ethnic group, the Tswana, who comprise 79% of its population, explaining the lack of ethnic conflict, or rather lack of voice for other ethnic groups.

The hackneyed but often not heeded ‘majority rule’ critique of democracy is manifest in Botswana, where hunter-gatherer minority groups such as the San have engaged in land rights disputes with the government and are under-represented in parliament. Uncontested Tswana pre-eminence has led to one-party rule by the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) for the entirety of Botswana’s democratic lifespan. This has been helped by pronounced political apathy among the population, as the stubborn status quo frames change as impossible. Simultaneously, majority rule is cannot an accurate descriptor for Botswanan politics, which have left approximately half of the population living on under $2 a day in an upper-middle income economy. Freedom of speech has also been curtailed in recent years, as it has become increasingly difficult for foreign journalists and scholars to obtain visas. Kenneth Good, an Australian professor, was summarily deported from Botswana in 2005, his criticism of Botswana’s government deemed a threat to national security. Constitutionally speaking, checks and balances to presidential power are wanting – COVID 19 allowed the incumbent Masisi to invoke emergency powers and rule by decree for six months. So long as the international community continues to praise Botswana as a ‘miracle’, its BDP leaders will continue to win election after election on the back of this acclaim, while remaining as complacent about political and economic reform as docile zebras. It is a telling sign that change in ‘democratic’ Botswana will come not from Botswanans but external pressure.

Nonetheless, there is reason to be optimistic. A broad opposition coalition has been formed to contest the 2024 elections, backed by former president Ian Khama, and looks set to push the BDP to tackle the issues outlined above if it wishes to retain power, if not oust the party altogether. Rising stars like Mauritius indicate that democracy doesn’t have to be an exception in the region. Tiger and zebra democracies thus serve as a cap to the pessimism of those who see democracy’s demise in nationalism or the alternative, authoritarian model of economic growth offered to developing countries by China’s ascendancy. Western democracies, then, should strive not to let the side down.