Tragedies of the Mali War and the Need to Rethink Peacekeeping in Complex Conflict Situations
On Sunday, the 23rd of February, three Malian government soldiers were killed in a suspected militant attack at a military outpost in the northern village of Bambara Maoude. This incident contributes to one of the bloodiest periods in Mali since the civil war begun in 2012. Just one week earlier, at least 31 people were massacred by militants in the village of Ogossagou, with a further 150 killed in the very same village the month before.
The main actors in the Mali War are the internationally recognised Malian government, and the MNLA, a separatist group fighting for the formation of a separate state called Azawad in the north of the country. Like many separatist movements around the world, the MNLA is largely motivated by ethnic factors. It has been estimated that up to 99% of MNLA fighters belong to the Tuareg ethnic group, whose members have desired their own state since the first Tuareg rebellion in 1963. However, the conflict is complicated by a number of regional armed groups, each with their own agendas. Minority groups such as the Songhai, Fulani and Arabs have formed their own militias, participating in conflict in the name of self-protection. Furthermore, Islamist groups Al-Qaeda, MUJEO and Ansar al-Dine are also engaged in military activities in the region, with the objective of creating a hard-line Islamic state. The numerous overlapping yet divergent ethnic, national and religious reasons behind the Mali War make it one of the most complex ongoing conflicts in the world today. Indeed, it was perhaps these multiple competing and unresolved claims to representation that doomed the short-lived 2015 peace accords from the start, as the country descended into conflict only months after its signing.
Although the Mali War may not have featured as an election-winning foreign policy issue for major states, the international community has been a consistent presence, and powerful force, since the war begun. France and the UN have both played prominent roles, pursuing different approaches to bring an end to the conflict. At a time in which peacekeeping operations are at a crossroads, with increasing debate on their effectiveness and the nature of their mandates, comparing French and UN actions in Mali offers a valuable insight on the capabilities of international actors to successfully address multifaceted conflicts, which could have profound implications for the future of peacekeeping in the international system.
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established in April 2013 to support political processes and bolster security in the country. MINUSMA’s mandate was further extended in June that year to include protecting civilians, supporting police forces, re-establishing state authority and promoting human rights. This extensive mandate, combined with the sheer scale and complexity of the conflict, has seen MINUSMA become not only the largest ongoing UN peacekeeping operations undertaken, but also its deadliest, with 208 recorded casualties of UN forces to date.
Despite the scale of the operation and the loss of life it has entailed, the recent violence in Mali highlights the shortcomings of MINUSMA. Following a visit to the country in February, the UN’s Independent Expert on the human rights situation in Mali, Alioune Tine, stated that security and judicial failures have facilitated outbreaks of violence, with the UN’s armed forces failing to provide adequate security for Malian civilians. Moreover, he criticised the decision to withdraw forces from the village of Ogossagou, leaving it highly vulnerable and allowing the recent massacre to take place. This critique highlighted the humanitarian dangers of withdrawing peacekeeping forces from the region, and the simultaneous necessity of the UN’s continued presence. Considering the vast cost of MINUSMA, however (currently approved at over $1.2 billion), in addition to its evident failures to end the conflict thus far, promoting an unlimited time period for its operations may not be a sustainable or popular option for the UN to follow. It seems, therefore, that the very limited success of MINUSMA’s ‘big-budget, big-mandate’ approach underlines the weaknesses of the UN’s capacity to keep the peace in complex conflict situations, perhaps necessitating a reassessment of how peacekeeping should be conducted in itself.
An altogether different approach to peacekeeping in Mali has been undertaken by France, the former colonial administrator of the country. At the beginning of 2013, France embarked on Operation Serval, a military initiative to halt the advance of Tuareg and Islamist militias towards the south of the country. Operation Serval was always more aggressive than MINUSMA, focusing on key military objectives rather than the broader range of social and political aims. Indeed, the mission was highly successful, helping to repel Islamist fighters and liberate the cities of Gao and Timbuktu. Despite these initial successes, however, French forces in Mali have since become engaged in protracted and costly conflict with armed groups. Follow-up mission Operation Barkhane has seen French forces as the victims of suicide attacks, roadside bombs and even a helicopter collision which killed thirteen soldiers, the heaviest loss of French military since 1983. This relentless resistance combined with the recent outbreaks of civilian violence were undoubtedly factors influencing French Defence Minister Florence Parly’s decision to announce the deployment a further 600 soldiers to Mali in 2020, bolstering the 4500 currently there. To complicate French involvement further, this announcement was met by large protests in Bamako, as civilians criticised French economic interests and perceived colonial attitudes towards the region. These protests point to a more pervasive problem with French military operations than hostile militants alone. Without the support of the Malian people they claim to protect, France stands to lose much of its mandate in Mali, jeopardising its already precarious position.
The UN and France have adopted very different peacekeeping approaches in Mali. While the UN took on a range of social and political objectives, focusing on supporting police, national dialogue and human rights, France took on a narrower militaristic role, prioritising driving back and ultimately defeating Islamist and Tuareg militias. Although these approaches are not necessarily opposing, they nonetheless shed light on two different conceptions of how peacekeeping operations should be conducted in complex conflict situations. However, neither France nor the UN have been able to successfully maintain the peace in Mali. MINUSMA’s ambitious and well-funded program has failed to provide reliable security for Malian civilians or deliver on meaningful institutional improvements. Now, the UN is faced with the unattractive prospect of endless investment and involvement with no immediate solution to the conflict in sight. One the other hand, France’s targeted military operations have fared little better, causing significant casualties and even losing support of the very people who justify their involvement. Thus, both approaches to peacekeeping have fundamentally failed to honour their objectives, and without significant breakthroughs, they are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.
If the Mali War proves anything, it is that complex conflict situations with multiple warring parties and diverging interests require more than fixed-term peacekeeping operations. Withdrawing troops and scaling back involvement has already led to tragic consequences for the Malian people. However, as casualties of MINUSMA and French forces mount, foreign actors have to ask themselves how much political and economic capital they are willing to invest in Mali. Tactical victories have been undermined by continued factional animosities, and even large-scale financial investment has led to patchy and inconsistent results. Without a radical change in both the scale and type of external involvement, therefore, it is unlikely that any peacekeeping approach can deliver meaningful and lasting stabilization, regardless of whether it focuses on social, political or military objectives. As a result, the core debate surrounding peacekeeping in the world today may not be about which approach is the most effective, or what their mandates should compromise. Instead, it may simply be how much the international community should care about peacekeeping at all.
