Uniting Syria: An Impossible Task for al-Sharaa?

True Motivations and Key Challenges for al-Sharaa as He Signs New Transitional Constitution.

On the 13th March, the interim President of the Syrian Arab Republic Ahmad al-Sharaa announced a 5-year transitional period, signing a temporary constitution which gives him executive powers. After the brutal dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad was overthrown last December, colossal challenges remain in the way of a successful state building process in Syria. Among them are the widespread armed groups and civil strife across the country; the interference of foreign states, both covert and direct; and above all the difficulty of uniting a myriad of ethnic and religious minorities. For al-Sharaa, too, many questions remain about his controversial past and perspective on Syria’s future.

Until 4th December 2024, Syrians had endured over five decades of authoritarian rule under father and son Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, as well as nigh on 14 years of civil war which has left an estimated 12 million people internally or externally displaced. Then, within just two weeks, everything changed. The anti-Assad coalition – with Islamist militant group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) at the helm – conducted a whirlwind campaign which led to a string of key cities falling into rebel hands.

To the shock of many, Damascus was surrendered without much of a fight, as Bashar al-Assad fled into exile in Russia. In the months since, the new governing forces led by HTS figurehead Ahmad al-Sharaa have taken de facto control of large swathes of Syrian territory and almost all the institutions of state with the signing of a new constitutional declaration which grants al-Sharaa full executive powers. But who is Al-Sharaa; what obstacles stand in his way; and what is his true vision for Syria?

Who is Ahmad al-Sharaa?

Ahmad Hussein al-Sharaa was born in Saudi Arabic in 1982 to a wealthy Syrian oil engineer father. Despite a fairly liberal Sunni upbringing, he became interested in more radical interpretations of Islam after the second Palestinian Intifada, and then moved to Iraq and fought for the extremist organisation al-Qaeda in his early twenties before spending over half a decade imprisoned by US forces. Upon release, he returned to Syria and led several campaigns against the Assad regime during the civil war, and has been the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham since its formation in 2017. Operating out of its stronghold province of Idlib in Syria’s north, HTS is designated a terrorist organisation by the UK, US, and others – as is its predecessor Jabhat al-Nusra which al-Sharaa founded in affiliation with al-Qaeda in 2011. He can claim much credit for the rapid advance of HTS and its coalition with various other militias which finally overthrew the authoritarian Assad regime in early December.

Al-Sharaa remains shrouded in mystery, with little information publicly available, nor divulged by him about his views. After a rare interview with the Economist, Middle-East Correspondent Nicolas Pelham commented on the guile and intellect of the extremist-turned-statesmen and how he has ‘changed organizations so many times, and convinced many people that he is something other than the man he's turned out to be.’ Over the past few years, he has attempted to transform his organisation HTS from one supportive of a new ‘Islamic Caliphate’, to a more palatable Syrian nationalist ideology reinforced by Islam. He portrays himself – particularly since signing his new constitution – as a guardian of freedom and justice for Syrians.

The new transitional government of Syria has reinstituted the original flag of Syrian independence as the official banner, replacing the previous flag used by the Assad regimes. Image courtesy of أبو بكر السوري via Wikimedia Commons, ©2013. Some rights reserved.

He is a lodestone for a fragile unity between competing groups and interests, and his ability to maintain an uneasy peace has been more impressive than his military successes to date. He has managed to bring together many of the militant groups that overturned the Assad regime under one Syrian flag, and has avowed his commitment to a ‘future that is based on freedom and dignity, without exclusion or marginalization.’ However, a raft of military, social, and economic complications must now be contended with, as both Syrians and foreign observers wait and see what al-Sharaa’s true motivations and capabilities will be as the 20th Syrian president.

What are the obstacles to rebuilding a successful Syrian state?

The reality on the ground in Syria is one of negative peace. The police and armed forces of al-Sharaa’s new regime have maintained some degree of stability, despite hotspots of violence and political disquiet.

In a country which has witnessed a brutal civil war leaving more than half a million of its inhabitants dead, and an insurgency by the extremist group Islamic State (IS) – who’s fighters committed thousands of extrajudicial killings, as well as an alleged genocide against the Yazidi minority – it is no wonder that the military structure is extremely fragmented with a multitude of locally independent armed groups with distinct tribal, religious and political agendas operating across the country.

The hotbed of internal strife has been in the north-western provinces of Latakia and Tartus, a heartland of Alawite communities that have faced brutal backlashes from fighters supporting the new government – primarily because of the Alawite connection to the previous Assad regime. These violent reprisals resulted in more than a thousand civilian deaths, and came about in response to coordinated ambushes on security forces by Assad loyalists.

In addition, the dark stain of the so-called Islamic State (IS) continues to mark the land, people, and events of Syria – years after its extremist incursion took control over a third of the country and the egregious crimes of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) that were perpetrated by its fighters. In the autonomous administration of North and East Syria (AANES), Kurdish-run prisons and camps hold tens of thousands of IS fighters, affiliates, and their families. Authorities have reported an uptick in IS activity since the fall of Assad, with fears sleeper cells will restart attacks on prisons to release their fighters within.

Map of Syria’s main cities and bordering countries. Image based on a UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) map and courtesy of Relief Web via Wikimedia Commons, ©2024. Some rights reserved.

Other domestic issues for al-Sharaa include skirmishes along the Syria-Lebanon border as well as the quandary of how to deal with the vast array of soldiers, bureaucrats, and officials who served in the previous regime. Some have criticised the new authorities for indiscriminate arrests of Assad supporters without proper transitional justice. Overall, It remains to be seen how capable al-Sharaa will be in dealing with the tumultuous forces at play, and there is significant doubt over the feasibility of creating an integrated military and police force to provide long sought-after security to Syrians.

While Sunni Islam is the predominant faith in Syria, there are also a plethora of religious and ethnic groups which al-Sharaa must integrate into his governance if he is to maintain unity. Significant numbers of the Alawis and Shi’a sects together make up 13% of the population, in addition to about a tenth of all Syrians who belong to one of the various Christian denominations. Meanwhile, a small minority of the Druze religion inhabit mostly south-western areas of Syria. Al-Sharaa has made attempts to reach out to many of these groups though deep divisions remain.

Following the precedent for an effective framework of Christian political engagement which existed during the HTS-led administration of Idlib, a nationwide dialogue with Chrisitan religious leaders has developed. Furthermore, while the initial rebel assault against the old regime caused panic amongst Shia communities, negotiations by HTS quelled major fears of persecution and multi-sect representation has since been evident in prevalent Ismaili Shia areas close to the city of Hama.

Conversely, for Alawis, resentments have deepened since the violence between pro-Assad and government forces of early March. In particular, the retaliatory collective punishment imposed on Alawite villages by state and independent fighters have been perceived as, at best, evidence of al-Sharaa’s lack of control or, at worst, a sign that he does not truly care about quashing identity-related violence. Relations with the Druze community are complex too, with deep mistrust between Druze leaders and al-Sharaa’s Sunni Islamic authority, because of the perception that little effort has been made to involve them in political processes. Controversy has also been ignited by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who vowed to protect Syrian Druze communities on behalf of the Israeli Druze demographic.

The biggest coup for al-Sharaa’s regime since taking power has come in negotiations with the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a US-backed faction which was instrumental in defeating IS in Syria. A deal reached between Damascus and the SDF pledged full military and civilian integration of the autonomous north-eastern regions into the new Syrian state. The Kurds form the biggest non-Arab ethnic group in Syria, numbering some 2-2.5 million, meaning this agreement is of consequential impact not only to al-Sharaa’s ambition to reclaim Syrian territory, but also for a union of its demographic plurality. Despite this, questions remain over the plausibility of the merger, and the SDF has since issued criticism of the regime’s new constitution.

*The deal with the SDF represents a significant step in uniting Syria. Image courtesy of the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) via Wikimedia Commons, ©2025. Some rights reserved.*

The internal dilemmas facing al-Sharaa overlap greatly with his foreign policy strategy, given the multitude of countries with large stakes – and direct involvements – in Syria’s fortunes. Under President Trump, the US has rolled back previous interventionist strategies looking to expedite its planned military withdrawal from north-eastern Syria and favouring uniting governance there.

Meanwhile the old guard of Russia and Iran – who propped up the Assad regime for so many years – cannot rely on al-Sharaa’s cooperation to the same extent as they did with Bashar al-Assad. Putin has declared his support for al-Sharaa’s new regime, and in March provided two large shipments of Russian oil – perhaps part of a bargaining ploy to maintain possession of its two military bases in western Syria. As for Iran, its sphere of influence has been severely reduced by the Israeli assaults on Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is unlikely to play a significant role in Syria’s reconstruction, opening the door for other regional powers to involve themselves.

The two main players who have sought to dominate the formative Syrian leadership in Damascus are Turkey and Israel. Both have launched arial and ground assaults in Syria: Turkey extending their direct and by-proxy intervention in the north against Kurdish elements; Israel with numerous airstrikes in the south-western provinces of Deraa and Quneitra and territorial advances into demilitarised zones. Yet while Ankara sees an opportunity to engage in cooperative and potentially lucrative defence talks with al-Sharaa, the Israeli military has launched missile strikes on the T4 and Hama airbases in the heart of Syria in order to reduce Syrian capabilities and deter what it sees as Turkish hostility and aggression. With tensions rising between the two states, al-Sharaa has minimal agency as he tries to mark out Syria’s sovereignty in spite of major territorial and military subversions.

The Arab states have also been the targets of al-Sharaa’s international relationship-building – particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Strong ties with these economic hubs will be necessary if Syria is to climb out of the state of destitution it currently finds itself in. The situation is drastic, with an estimated one-quarter of Syrians living in extreme poverty. This is exacerbated by continuing harsh economic sanctions and the US cutting aid contributions, while China appears to have reservations over the new Syrian leadership due to reports of several Uyghur Muslims holding prominent positions in its newly formed armed forces. European humanitarian and diplomatic efforts constitute some source of hope for Syrians, as the UK pledges £160 million and Germany €300 million as part of a major donor drive hosted by the EU.

Transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa hosts Hadja Lahbib, European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid, Crisis Preparedness and Management, Civil Protection, and Equality. Image courtesy of the European Commission via Wikimedia Commons, ©2025. Some rights reserved.

International support will be imperative for a Syrian economic recovery, and to reclaim sovereignty al-Sharaa will need to tread carefully while developing some defensive capabilities. As for what a successful Syrian state ought to look like, well it would have to necessitate the integration of numerous armed factions across Syria, many of whom are yet to give up their weapons. Harsh grievances are still fomenting across Syria, and al-Sharaa’s government will have to find some way to unite distinct groups and reduce these tensions going forward.

What is al-Sharaa’s true vision for a united Syria?

The temporary constitutional declaration issued by the Syrian Presidency in March commits to a separation of powers and enshrines judicial independence – with Islamic jurisprudence the main source of legislation. It further protects freedom of press and expression, as well as the rights of women and enshrines racial and religious equality.

The constitution was drafted by a seven-member committee appointed by al-Sharaa, one of whom described their envisioned state as creating ‘a balance between security and rights and freedoms.’ This interpretation, and the constitutional document itself, seem for the most part fair, moderate, and reflective of the reality of the situation in Syria. Whether it is true to al-Sharaa’s motivations, or simply a bid to keep parties on side while he consolidates political authority, is up for debate.

Certainly, some of the appointments to his first cabinet seem a cause for optimism – among them are female Christian political activist Hind Kabawat appointed as minister for social and labour affairs, in addition to one Alawi and one Druze who were put in charge of transport and agriculture respectively. These would indicate some limited delegation away from the male-dominated and socially conservative leadership. However, critics have pointed out the retention of al-Sharaa’s long term associates from the HTS administration in key positions such as the ministers for finance, defence, and foreign affairs. Moreover, the appointment of the President’s brother Maher al-Sharaa to the post of Secretary General suggests that power is being withheld by a tight circle of command – especially concerning amid reports that his marriage to a Russian businesswoman might exhibit a conflict of interest. Further controversy has been sparked by the new head of women’s affairs Aisha al-Dibs, who has encouraged female engagement in rebuilding Syria while cautioning women not to exceed ‘the priorities of their God-given nature’ and ‘their educational role in the family.’

Looking ahead to a future democratic process, President al-Sharaa has suggested up to five years before elections are to be held, pointing out the need for nationwide redevelopment of infrastructure as the cause for delay. In the short term, success for al-Sharaa currently seems as much a practical endeavour for the consolidation of personal power as it is a mission to rebuild a broken state and the threat of backsliding into autocracy once more is far from inconceivable. Conversely, in the eyes of observers, success would entail first establishing peace and stability before attaining a representative, and democratic, sovereign state. These efforts rely on principles of localised civil-political engagement; a plurality of religious, ethnic, and female perspectives; and strategies for the de-radicalisation of extremist groups.

In the past decade and a half, Syrians have overcome untold tragedy and tribulation – natural disasters, totalitarian rule, civil war, rampant persecution, Islamist extremism, and chemical weapon attacks. Despite all the challenges and divisions, Ahmad al-Sharaa may well be able to foster the entwined hopefulness and determination of the Syrian spirit into a bond of cohesive national identity. That in itself would be a striking success.

*The downfall of the Assad regime was widely celebrated in Syria, and many now hope for a future of peace and prosperity. Image courtesy of Omar Ramadan via Unsplash, ©2024. Some rights reserved.*

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.