What does the end of Operation Barkhane mean for France in the Sahel?

Mar 13

Mar 13 What does the end of Operation Barkhane mean for France in the Sahel?

When French President Emmanuel Macron announced that the seven year-long Operation Barkhane would be ending in the coming year, there was an air of hope in the Sahel. Maybe foreign forces were no longer necessary towards stopping insurgent forces, and the departure of a former colonial power would mean that states like Mali and Niger could finally wield control and autonomy over their own counterterrorism strategies. Yet this has not turned out to be the case, with no end in sight for regional terrorism and no clear road map of how to continue.

Operation Barkhane, headed by the French military, was born out of a steep rise in Islamist terrorism in Africa’s Sahel region in the early 2010s. Taking the shape of thousands of French troops stationed in various bases scattered throughout Sahelian countries, Barkhane started after French military deployment in Mali, which was left unstable after a civil war and coup d’état occurring in 2012. It is headquartered in N’Djamena, the capital of Chad. Years later, it still maintains a notable presence to combat rising insurgencies throughout the Sahel, conducting operations against individuals and groups attached to Boko Haram and AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), amongst others, and French soldiers have even been the victim of attacks.

Miring the interventionist operations were years of cross-continental disapproval. In France, a slight majority of people disapproved of military action, and within the Sahel there was widespread discontentment, with years of popular protests against French presence. In Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, protestors tried to block a French convoy headed for Niger, and in Mali, thousands flocked to the streets angrily calling for the departure of French troops. An anti-French sentiment escalated throughout the Sahel and culminated in Emmanuel Macron making his declaration that the end to the counterterrorism operation was nigh. Stating that it would be impossible to continue an operation where local state leaders negotiated with terrorists, Macron stressed that he was not classifying the years-long operation as a failure, and emphasised the hope to transition Operation Barkhane towards a more broad international mission, but has not yet clarified specific details.

This comes at a strategic loss for France. Since the 1960 independence of Sahelian states from France, it has held a steady sphere of influence over its former African territories, which has been historically dubbed as Françafrique. Although more explicit linkages have declined since the end of the Cold War, the concept of Françafrique can now be found in informal networks between the countries, and most blatantly in Operation Barkhane, which remains one of the last clear vestiges of colonial linkages. Detractors of the concept of Francafrique critique it as a neocolonial project that perpetuates the history of French colonialism in Africa, and rightfully so. Françafrique is based on the idea that the colonising power will maintain influence in its former colonial territories, and although Operation Barkhane’s recent intentions towards stopping rising rates of jihadism are not harmful per se, it is perpetuating an occupying force. It has failed to address governance concerns in the states, and has lacked meaningful cooperation with local governments. By not addressing any systemic weaknesses in the Sahel, it cannot be possibly classified as a success, nor can it be divorced from the neocolonial elements of French presence throughout Africa.

Whilst Barkhane did provide a cushion for Mali, Niger, and the other Sahelian states in their fight against rising rates of jihadism in the form of surgical strikes against terrorist members, like the recent killing of senior AQIM member Yahia Djouadi just last week, its impending withdrawal will leave countries without tools to give the states the power to fend for themselves. After depriving much autonomy from the states to deal with the problem of rising terrorism in the past seven years, the withdrawal will not herald in any new era of stability. There is even the concerning prospect now that the power vacuum when France exits, leaves a spot open for Russia to come in. Experts say that although Russian foreign policy focus is currently obviously on Ukraine, its international presence is already felt through Kremlin-linked mercenaries in Mali, and is only expected to rise.

There are also comparisons to be drawn from Operation Barkhane and the twenty-year American occupation of the United States War in Afghanistan. In both cases, Western forces entered and occupied a country with the pretence of tackling legitimate security threats, but ended up failing to engage citizens and local leaders in any effective manner. In August 2021, when American forces pulled out of Afghanistan, what little power structures American forces wanted to erect crumbled in a matter of days, leading to the quick Taliban takeover of the country. It is probable that the French withdrawal will have a similar effect. Although terrorist groups will not overthrow the governments, as happened in Afghanistan, their impact is likely to grow in areas where they gain support from locals and gain more regional traction.

We do not know what exactly will happen in the coming year, but what we can understand is that a major neocolonial project, Operation Barkhane, will be ending, leaving Sahelian states in a weak position to tackle terrorism. Ending the operation was the right thing to do, but we must question if starting it was even the right thing. With Western foreign intervention so often failing to address the most pressing and systemic issues, it is not surprising that Barkhane failed to achieve the goals it originally had envisioned. Leaving the Sahel without any guide on how to move forwards is an egregious externality. With no quell in attacks and an estimated 27 Malian soldiers murdered by jihadists just last week, the hope that local governments can engage terrorist activity to some degree of success has not been realised yet. Even if well-intentioned, foreign intervention is not likely to be the saviour it thinks it is.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.