Why Netanyahu Doesn’t Want a Hostage Deal
It has been more than a year since Hamas fighters stormed over the poorly defended border of southern Israel and killed 1,200 Israeli civilians and security forces, taking 251 hostages back to Gaza. Oct. 7 was the worst terrorist attack in Israel’s history and the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. Though Israel received widespread international sympathy after the attack, the destructiveness of its campaign in Gaza and the stagnation of the conflict has led to fierce international criticism and condemnation of Israel, with heightened calls for an immediate hostages-for-ceasefire deal. To date, the Israel-Hamas War has claimed the lives of over 40,000 Palestinian civilians, according to the Gaza Health Ministry, and displaced almost two million others. While the long-term effectiveness of the military campaign is unclear, pressure within Israel has mounted on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to strike a hostages-for-ceasefire deal, especially since 10 September, when six hostages were executed by Hamas the night before Israeli forces arrived. The United States and allied countries have been attempting to negotiate a deal for months but have made little progress. Israel launched the war with the dual aims of destroying Hamas and freeing the hostages. Over the past year, these objectives have not always aligned with each other.
Much remains up to Netanyahu, a deeply divisive figure in Israel and abroad. Currently under investigation for corruption, he has been in power for 16 of the last 28 years. In July 2024, Netanyahu addressed the United States Congress where he asked for additional military aid and spoke of the plight of the hostages while wearing the yellow ribbon which has become a symbol of support for the safe return of the hostages. Still, some families have accused Netanyahu of abandoning the hostages in Gaza. It is possible that Netanyahu, despite public and international pressure, does not want to make a hostage deal. This is based on his own personal history with hostage situations, his political survival, and the long-term goals of Israeli security.
Netanyahu was born in Jerusalem and spent part of his childhood in suburban Philadelphia, attending an American high school. He returned to Israel to fight in the Israel Defense Force (IDF) and later served in Sayeret Matkal (Israel’s Navy SEALs). In 1972, Netanyahu took part in the rescue of Sabena Flight 571, which was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists. In the operation, Israeli officials feigned caving to the hijacker’s demands in exchange for the lives of the passengers. They then sent a company of ‘mechanics’ on board, who were really disguised Sayeret Matkal fighters. Sayeret Matkal successfully stormed the plane and rescued all but one of the 101 captive passengers and crew.
Netanyahu, nicknamed ‘Bibi’, was raised in the shadow of his protegee older brother, Yonatan ‘Yoni’ Netanyahu, who was the unit commander of Sayeret Matkal. Four years after the Sabena hijacking, Israel attempted an even more daring skyjacking rescue when 106 passengers were taken captive by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and taken to Entebbe Airport, Uganda. The hijackers threatened to kill the hostages if Israel did not release imprisoned Palestinian militants. Israel faced extreme international pressure to capitulate, but instead secretly planned a nigh-impossible rescue mission. On July 4, 1976, the same date as the American bicentennial, Israeli commandos flew over 2,500 miles and raided Entebbe rescuing all but 4 of 106 hostages. However, Yoni Netanyahu, who was the commander of the ground forces was killed by Ugandan gunmen, the only IDF causality of the mission. Yoni Netanyahu became an international hero and was buried on Jerusalem’s sacred Mt. Herzl. Within a year, three action films had been made about Entebbe with Yoni as the hero: Victory at Entebbe (1976), Raid on Entebbe (1977), and Operational Yonatan (1977).
At the time of Entebbe, Benjamin Netanyahu was living and working back the United States. After the death of his brother, Netanyahu returned to Israel permanently, where he and his family were quick to capitalize on Yoni Netanyahu’s fame. In 1980, they complied and published Self Portrait of a Hero: The Letters of Yonatan. A few years later, Benjamin Netanyahu launched ‘the Jonathan Institute’, a counter-terrorism centre named for his late brother, and edited a book called Terrorism: How the West Can Win (1986). In it, he wrote his personal stance on hostage negotiation and counter-terrorism:
All citizens in a democracy threatened by terrorism must see themselves, in a certain sense, as soldiers in a common battle. They must not pressure their government to capitulate or to surrender to terrorism. This is especially true of public pressure on government by families of hostages. Such pressure can only be called a dereliction of civic duty. If we seriously want to win the war against terrorism, people must be prepared to endure sacrifice and even, should there be the loss of loved ones, immeasurable pain.
Decades later Netanyahu’s words have an eerie resonance. As a matter of principle, Netanyahu, based on his personal experience and the idealised legacy of his brother, does not believe in hostage negotiations with terrorists.
But Netanyahu has not always lived up to his own convictions. In 2011, Netanyahu’s government agreed to a hostage deal with Hamas. Israel traded over 1,000 convicted Palestinian militants for a single captured Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, in a move doomed to backfire. One of prisoners, Hamas leader, Yahya Sinwar, would go on to become the mastermind of the Oct. 7 attack. Netanyahu also agreed to a temporary ceasefire and prisoner release deal on 22 November 2023 in exchange for the release of around 50 hostages. In addition, eight hostages have been rescued by the IDF since the war began.
Netanyahu’s stance is also key to his political survival. Oct. 7 took place during a time of unprecedent political division within Israel. After winning the 2022 Israeli elections, Netanyahu formed a ruling coalition with extremist religious and nationalist parties, creating the most right-wing government is Israel’s history. Netanyahu and his coalition partners attempted to pass a ‘judicial reform’ bill that would strip Israel’s supreme court, the only check on its 120-member legislature body, the Knesset, of judicial review powers. Israel had mass protests for nine months that only ended with Oct. 7 and the start of the war in Gaza. Netanyahu’s approval rating plummeted after Oct. 7, but has recovered. The war has allowed Netanyahu to put the protests behind him and instead portray himself as the protector of Israel.
But, most of all, the lack of a deal is due to the reality of the price it would ask. Israel fundamentally seeks to destroy Hamas for the purposes of justice for Oct. 7 and sending a deterrent to Iran and its other proxies, and the sake of its the long-term security. A hostage deal now, especially if it comes at the cost of an Israeli military withdraw from Gaza, could lead to a resurgence of Hamas and negate what some see as the gains of the war. As former IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz told US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, a ceasefire before Hamas is defeated is like ‘sending a firefighter to put out 80% of a fire’. With Israel’s international standing already battered enough, Netanyahu believes his best choice is to continue the war despite public opinion, international pressure, and the mounting death toll in Gaza. The recent death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in Gaza though, may be the game-changer. With Sinwar dead, Netanyahu may now believe it strategically and politically viable for hostage-for-ceasefire. Still, the situation of the hostages and the civilians in Gaza is bleak and the hope of an end to the conflict now may be false hope.
Further Reading:
Benjamin Netanyahu, "Terrorism: How the West Can Win."
Benjamin Netanyahu. Bibi: My Story.
Jonathan Netanyahu. The Letters of Jonathan Netanyahu: Commander of the Entebbe Rescue Force.
Image courtesy of Office of Speaker Mike Johnson via Wikimedia Commons, ©2024. Some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
