Why Pezeshkian has Failed to Reshape Iranian Foreign Policy

Oct 10

Oct 10 Why Pezeshkian has Failed to Reshape Iranian Foreign Policy

Asia, Conflict & Peacekeeping, International Diplomacy

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 24th September, Masoud Pezeshkian spoke about his vision for Iran’s ‘constructive engagement with the world’. While this is a significant shift in dialogue from previous Iranian foreign policymakers, the possibility of Iran’s reintegration into global diplomatic and economic systems seems unlikely amid escalating tensions between Israel, its allies, and the isolated regime in Tehran. Looking forward, the new Iranian president risks losing credibility as his country’s chief negotiator if Iran’s political and military acts continue to be at odds with his rhetoric.

In July, Masoud Pezeshekian was sworn in as the ninth president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He was elected on a reformist agenda which promised to improve the economy, and he has hinted at reengagement in nuclear deals with the West. ‘National Empathy’ – as set out in the Qur’an – was central to his campaign strategy, along with his vision of greater inclusivity for ethnic and religious groups.

Pezeshkian has called for a removal of sanctions on Iran which have had a detrimental effect on the welfare and prosperity of the Iranian people. Previously a cardiac surgeon, he spoke at the General Assembly of critical shortages in medicines and his openness ‘to foster meaningful economic, social, political, and security partnerships with global powers’.

This is all tempered with absolute loyalty to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and his ultra-conservative government which tightly restricts the press and expression in the country. The current stance of Pezeshkian, therefore, appears to be a moderate one – attempting to unite religious and military hardliners with those on the progressive side of Iranian politics.

The legitimacy of this approach is contentious, especially in relation to Israel. During his speech to the General Assembly, Pezeshkian called out ‘the crimes and colonialism of the Israeli regime’. He reiterated demands for a ceasefire in Gaza, labelling the Israeli incursion as a ‘genocide’. Referring to the coordinated detonation of electronic pagers of Hezbollah members and associates (which many believe was carried out by Israel) he condemned the ‘desperate barbarism of Israel in Lebanon’.

Though powerful and emotionally charged, this rhetoric is particularly significant in that it focuses on an end to hostilities and peace in the region, rather than discussing military escalation between Iran and Israel. In fact, Pezeshkian told reporters at the General Assembly that ‘we are willing to put our weapons to one side, so long as Israel is willing to do the same’, implying that Iran does not wish to destabilise the Middle East, while Israel is attempting to drag Iran into the conflict.

These statements appear to be notable step-down in tone when compared to those of Pezeshkian’s predecessor Ebrahim Raisi. The former president, who died in a sudden helicopter crash in May, had previously described Israel as a ‘false regime’ and referred to any Arab nation signatories of the Abraham Accords (a normalisation pact with Israel) as ‘an accomplice in their [Israeli] crimes’. A month before his death, Raisi threatened a ‘massive and harsh’ response to any further escalation by the Israelis. This was in the wake Iran’s large-scale and unprecedented drone and missile attack on Israel on 13th April which followed a suspected Israeli strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus.

In his short and turbulent time in office, Pezeshkian’s moderation of tone has been notable. He is has tried to avoid being baited into further escalation with Israel, knowing that an increase in conflict is extremely harmful to Iran’s economy and the wellbeing of its citizens. Just the day after Pezeshkian’s inauguration at the end of July, Hamas’ leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran, after which it is reported that Pezeshkian appealed to Supreme Leader Khamenei, asking him to refrain from a large military response. Amid external diplomatic pressure on Iran to show restraint, no significant retaliation was issued on this occasion, suggesting Pezeshkian’s more conciliatory approach was having some effect on Iranian military decisionmakers.

But the killing of Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut on 27th September was a step too far for more hawkish factions of the Iranian regime, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (the dominant paramilitary force of Iran). The Israeli airstrike not only eliminated the Hezbollah leader but also killed Abbas Nilforushan – an IRGC general – exhibiting another crucial failure of security for Iran’s chief military force and its proxy in Lebanon. Hezbollah commanders demanded greater support from Iran in their escalating conflict with Israel, while Pezeshkian showed reluctance to respond militarily. In response, Supreme Leader Khamenei gave authorisation for the IRGC to carry out a dramatic retaliation on Israel, launching approximately 200 ballistic missiles in an attack of unprecedented scale.

Reports suggest that Iran’s president was not informed about the strikes until ‘shortly’ before they took place and was not involved in the decision-making process. It is likely he was not in favour of an extreme military operation, though he later announced his retrospective support, saying: ‘Let Netanyahu know that Iran is not a belligerent, but it stands firmly against any threat’. This statement contradicts his calls for de-escalation in the conflict and indicates that Pezeshkian has been forced to somewhat amend his position in the face of the decision by Khamenei and the IRGC.

This incident reflects the president’s fundamentally limited influence within the Iranian regime – where censorship is rife and power rests finally in the hands of the Supreme Leader, as counselled by the more belligerent IRGC. It is this branch of the military who support Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, as well as other groups in Iraq, Syria, the Occupied West Bank and Gaza. These proxy organisations form part of the ‘Axis of Resistance’, Iran’s strategy of deterrence against foreign threats such as Israel.

While Iran’s president wishes to depict Iran as a non-aggressor in the region, strikes by the Houthis, Hezbollah and Iran itself on Israeli targets undermine the legitimacy of his words, and the consequential Israeli retaliation is expected to be formidable. Accusations that Iran has supplied short-range ballistic missiles to Russia for use in their war against Ukraine are also contrary to Pezeshkian’s vision of Iran’s ‘constructive’ foreign policy.

As a spokesperson, Pezeshkian has offered a marked position shift towards global reintegration – seemingly a cause for optimism for those in the West. Yet his rhetoric has been repeatedly contradicted by the material actions of the Iranian military. Events have consequently spiralled out of his control and, as a ground invasion by Israel continues in Southern Lebanon, a wider conflict has now clearly developed under his presidency. He will have to reconcile this reality with his stated aims of pursuing normalisation with Western powers. Looking ahead, if Pezeshkian sticks with his reformist political inclinations, he is at risk of further delegitimising his fragile authority within the Iranian, and regional, system.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.