Your Country Needs You: The Return of Conscription to Europe
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, European militaries relied heavily on military conscription. Popularised by Napoleon in the early nineteenth century during the Napoleonic wars and the policy of levée en masse, conscription became a cornerstone of European military efforts; it was used not only as a tool for growing military might and manpower, but also as a means of fostering a shared national identity and civic duty that transcended traditional socio-economic, religious, and ethnic boundaries.
This is not to say it was always welcomed with open arms. Britain, for example, knowing how unpopular it would be, famously did not introduce mandatory conscription until 1916, 2 years into World War I. Even then, this was only once the 1914 “Your country needs you!” wave of patriotic volunteerism had dried up and they simply needed more boots on the ground. There is valid justification for this reluctance towards a universal form of military conscription, even in war time. Aside from the very real effects on those drafted and, by extension, those closest to them, conscription can have negative economic implications for a state by eating into its human capital, reducing its economically productive workforce.
As such, the aftermath of the Cold War, when the perceived threat of conflict had diminished and an assumption that the era of large-scale conflict in Europe had ended, marked a shift in European states moving towards significant downsizing of their militaries and defence spending. A move away from conscription, in the form of mandatory national service or military training for all, towards a focus on smaller but more efficient, trained, and skilled professional militaries seemed like the natural step. This was especially the case in a context where asymmetric warfare has become more common, rather than just the traditional state-on-state war that characterised pre-Cold War conflict. Between 1990 and 2013, 24 countries abandoned conscription in the form of mandatory national service, including the UK, France, Germany, Spain, and Belgium.
However, with the third anniversary of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine now coming up – and no sign of the conflict ending any time soon – the security implications of Russia’s war on Ukraine, not only for Ukraine itself but also for wider Europe’s readiness and ability to respond to security threats, are coming to be better understood.
Varying types of conscription service, whether that be civil, military, lottery-driven, or selective compulsory, still exist in many European states today. Notably, countries like Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Estonia Cyprus, and Greece have never officially got rid of it. However, the return of large-scale war on Europe’s doorstep has put discussions about military conscription back on the agenda in many states that previously abandoned or suspended it. Ukraine has been a wakeup call to reassess the changed geopolitical landscape they find themselves in. Shrinking defence budgets and a tangible lack of military manpower to adequately serve increasingly tenuous security needs has forced states to consider alternative paths to strengthen military capability.
Unsurprisingly given their geographical proximity to Russia, this trend is particularly salient in the Baltic states. Latvia is the latest country to reintroduce conscription, imposing mandatory military service for all men between the ages 18-27 for a period of 11 months in January of this year, 18 years after its abolition in 2006- a decision which was no doubt sped up by Russia’s repeated invasion of Latvian airspace. This mirrors the path taken by Lithuania in 2015 to reintroduce lottery-based mandatory military service for a period of 9 months for 18-23 year old men, in the wake of Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in the 2014 annexation of Crimea. As of June this year, the Lithuanian parliament has passed reforms to tighten this model by extending the duration of alternative service from 10 to 12 months, and making service a prerequisite for those who wish to study at university. Similarly, Estonia, which never got rid of conscription, expanded the scope of those eligible for call-up. In the case of all three, mandatory conscription does not apply to women, though they are welcome to volunteer.
The same trend can be seen in the Nordic states, as Finland and Norway have continued to widen the scope of those applicable for military conscription. Most notably Norway, in 2015 became the first NATO country to extend mandatory military service to women, and by 2020, one-third of new conscripts were women.
Joining its Nordic neighbours, Sweden, which had previously suspended conscription in 2010, reintroduced a form of ‘selective compulsory’ conscription in 2018, similar to that of Norway. According to this model, everyone within the eligible cohort (including men and women) is required to register for military service at 18. Out of this cohort, only a select few are required to serve based on a variety of criteria assessed such as physical, and mental health, education, personality, skills, and attitude towards serving. Those who fail to answer can face fines, or jail. Not stopping at this, Sweden set out plans to expand the scope of conscription further in January of this year – where previously it brought in 4,000 new conscripts every year (out of an eligible cohort of 40,000), it will now aim to draw in 10,000.
This particular model has been praised for striking a balance between compulsory and voluntary, in that while remaining universal, its element of selectivity aims to comb out the most suitable candidates. The model used by Sweden has gained particular admiration from Western Europe, in particular Germany, which alongside Italy, has seen a resurgence of discussions about conscription.
While Germany declared a ‘Zeitenwende’ (a turning point) regarding its defence policy in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the project is somewhat falling short of expectations. These pledges included setting up a 100-billion euro special fund to finance the modernisation of Germany’s military, as well as an increase of more than 2% of GDP per year in defence spending. Germany’s defence minister Boris Pistorius, who took over from Christine Lambrecht earlier this year, has emphasised a need to prepare for Russian attacks and set out plans to ‘revamp’ Germany’s military. He has voiced his aspiration for Germany to take the front seat in military leadership in Europe as its “largest and most populous economy”. Part of this vision includes the reintroduction of compulsory national service in Germany, which Pistorius has signalled would not only be confined to men. During a visit to Tegeluddsvägen, one of Sweden’s conscription testing centres, he told reporters “I heard a lot about the Swedish approach and I appreciate it — your approach includes a strong reserve force and we have seen in Ukraine that this is important.”
Germany is not the only Western European country turning its eye to mandatory national service. The Deputy Prime Minister of Italy Matteo Salvini's League party submitted a bill in May of this year proposing 6 months of mandatory civil service for young people aged 18-26, though there is much contestation about this amongst Italian parties. Even the UK, where conscription has always been a debated issue, the then Prime Minister Rishi Sunak proposed a new scheme on behalf of the Conservative party during the 2024 General Election campaign that would require all 18-year olds to take part in a form of national service by law, with the option of 12-months of community volunteering, or military training. While there has been talk of senior Labour figures in favour of a similar scheme, the current government has shown no signs that they are seriously considering a reintroduction of national service.
Whether or not these countries go ahead with these plans or aspirations is still to be seen, but what cannot be denied is conscription, in its various types and forms, has resurfaced in European security discourse. The continued threat to European security posed by Russia, more specifically the potential fear Putin may not stop at Ukraine, has raised serious questions as to whether now is the time for European states to reassess and adapt to this changed geo-political landscape.
Looming ever large over this question, and the fate of Ukraine, is of course the key month of November, which will see the election of either Vice President Kamala Harris or former President Donald Trump. The election of the latter could have serious implications for Ukraine and its war effort, based on past statements given by both Trump and his Vice-Presidential pick J.D Vance. In such a scenario, his isolationist sentiments, fuelled by a perception of inadequate European defence contributions to NATO, could further strain transatlantic relations, and Europe could very well expect to see reduced American commitment to support Ukraine.
The recent suggestions of re-opening this issue are a timely reminder of how quickly international events can upend domestic assumptions.
Image courtesy of Alfred Leete via Wikimedia, ©1914. Some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
