A secret badly kept: Ukrainian migration to the EU
Cover Image Source: Source: Flickr, Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0), author: Go Travel Krakivets crossing, Polish-Ukrainian border
Though the upsurge in the EU’s migrants and refugees intake from the Middle East and Africa has earned itself the title of ‘migration crisis’ in media coverage, few know that in fact higher numbers have been coming from the Ukraine. Europe slams its southern doors, yet fills its labour deficit with newcomers it likes more when no-one is looking. Two millions are already in Poland, whilst Germany’s new regulations of non-EU citizens employment after January 1st target workforce inflow from Ukraine.
War has been one of the more common driving forces of large-scale population movement, as has poverty. Both have driven Ukrainians out of their homeland, lured away by the promises of better and, most importantly, safer lives. The lately booming 2008-crisis-survivor has provided both for a gateway and a destination on its own, with incentives of domestic stability and higher wages, thereby filling its workforce gap.
What encourages Ukrainians to choose Poland is proximity: both in terms of physical distance, and of cultural proximity. Ignoring linguistic differences, Ukrainians seem indistinguishable from the local population. Ukrainian is even close enough to Polish as to allow speakers of each to communicate relatively easily.
An attentive observer of continental politics may wonder how the Polish government reconciled fierce anti-immigrant rhetoric with issuing the highest amount of foreign work permits in the EU. By promising a firm crackdown on immigration, they effectively played into nationalist sentiments; while the electorate turned blind eye to what was demanded by the market in reality: an urgent need of manpower.
If an outside observer asks why Poland has managed to evade the asylum-seekers quota demanded by other member-states in the aftermath of the ‘migration crisis’, the observer can be no closer to an explanation. The inflow from Ukraine proved a perfect compromise: given that Poland needs to sustain an ever-high inflow of refugees from there, as major politicians have argued ever since, it cannot afford to take in more newcomers.
Ceaselessly practising identity politics and proclaiming a vision of homogenous society, Law and Justice have been stirring up nationalistic sentiments and convincing the voters that they are the ones who can make it materialise. Youth radical organisations march through Poland’s cities, chanting ‘Poland only for the Poles!’ (Polska tylko dla Polaków!), unaware that the ones they chose to support in delivering this dismaying vision have in fact been employing foreigners to build the state’s economic prosperity.
The party’s electoral success stems from its ability to keep the secret and ably reconcile two realities: one of the national-pride-driven campaign and the other of labour shortage. Law and Justice take advantage of the economic opportunities population inflow gives and of the bargaining power in regard to quotas negotiations. Nonetheless, what they fail to do is to ensure a safe environment for the ones who have just fled danger. With the leader Jarosław Kaczyński warned against refugees ‘bringing in all kinds of parasites […] which could prove dangerous for the local populations’, the norms of what is acceptable in the discourse are changing, alarmingly and facing a dangerous direction.
Nevertheless, the importance of Poland as a destination country is not to be overestimated. Its physical proximity makes it an ideal transit state for workers who, following the millions of Poles who have moved West themselves, seek better life in Germany. According to a recently published study casting uncertainty upon Polish job market’s sustainability, 20-30% of Ukrainians currently employed in the country may soon relocate to Germany.
From January 1st, German regulations of employment of non-EU professionals will liberalise. Often regarded as targeting mainly workers from Ukraine, the new Law on the Immigration of the Professional Workforce passed earlier this year allows foreigners to stay and seek employment for as long as 6 months, with yet one restriction: communicative knowledge of German. Whereas Ukrainian youths under 25 will be allowed to stay for longer to obtain education or qualifications.
Ukrainian diaspora in Germany amounts only to 140,000 according to official statistics, though is forecast to rise significantly, giving its economy hit by workforce shortage a major boost. Whether German salaries outdo Poland’s seems beyond doubt. Yet, with soaring xenophobia and stigmatisation of migrants as ones who jeopardise the pre-existing order, Ukrainians can no longer be certain of their safety.
Criticised for supineness during the Crimean Crisis, European states quietly patch up their labour market holes with refugees and impoverished hailing from Ukraine. Overshadowed by the ‘migration crisis’ debate, newcomers from Ukraine give power to the ones who have built their political careers on assertive nationalism, and enter the agenda only if a quota of asylum-seekers is to be avoided.
