Unrest in Baghdad
Over the course of the last two weeks, Baghdad has faced, among many other things, a disconcerting level of civil unrest. The protests that began at the start of the month in the north-eastern suburb of Sadr City have increased both in number and intensity to be potentially the most dangerous demonstrations that the current Iraqi government has yet to face since taking office a little over a year ago.
Fuelled by popular exhaustion at the continuously high levels of corruption and inconsequential attempts to alleviate the pervasive rate of unemployment, Iraqis have continued to take to the streets to express their dissatisfaction.
The massive political turmoil that has plagued Iraq over the last decades has unsurprisingly affected levels of economic growth however, for a country for whom 95% of the economy rests on oil, it is not unrealistic to expect marginally greater development since a resemblance of stability returned. The reality is, the Iraqi government has found itself riddled with corruption that has become institutionalised on many levels.
The government is the biggest employment provider in Iraq and continues to expand its workforce. In stark contrast to this, there is little evidence of output in terms of the public service that these employees are providing. Some of the motivation for the current protests comes from the anger that the lack of essential infrastructure and public services are massively inflating the levels of poverty. Although investments are being made and private contracts are being awarded to create further jobs and stimulate economic growth, this money is in fact squandered by officials and laundered away through giving these infrastructure contracts to affiliates of party leaders. This leaves Iraq without structural resources and a severe blackhole in national finances.
Notwithstanding other reasons, the lack of employment is the key contributor for the crippling poverty levels in the country. For a population who’s population is 60% youth, to have unemployment rates of 17% for men and 27% for women is inevitably going to be a source of discontent, especially when not even those with degree-level education have promising job prospects.
Unfortunately, Iraq’s situation cannot be taken in isolation. Similarly, motivated protests have been seen across the region. Beirut has witnessed disaffection caused by controversial Labour Law changes and failing currency and in North Africa, the weekly protests seen in Algeria began to be forcefully prevented for the first time this week since they began back in February. In addition to this, Egypt saw a massive crackdown against government opposition at the end of September. Actions that include the detaining of an Edinburgh University student. The closure of the Tahrir Square area and limitation of access to notable protest sites are reminiscent of a pre-Sisi, nascent Arab Spring era when similar anti-government and dissatisfied protesters flocked to these areas. These actions, undoubtedly to limit repeated escalation of dissent, are accompanied by limitations to internet and social media access- preventative measures against tools that enabled such a rapid coordination and spread of ideas eight years ago.
Comprising of majority young men, these fortnight long protests began in Sadr and have progressively made their way across Baghdad and southern Iraq. With their roots in economic dissatisfaction and belief that the government no longer represents the masses, these demonstrations are not motivated across political divides. Because of this, the government is able to take much firmer action that they otherwise might as there is less risk of being accused of sectarian motivated violence. That being said, the disproportionately aggressive response of the government and military at the first outbreak of unrest cannot be overlooked.
Employing crowd clearing tactics in response to unauthorised protest is one thing but the immediate use of tear gas, water cannons and escalation to using live rounds has only served to enflame the youthful protesters further. Their disenfranchisement was initially fuelled by the government refusal to back down despite the strong encouragement of US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, to be measured in their response and then again by the rising death toll as the violence continued. Over 110 protestors have died and at least 6,000 injured because of this surprising government response.
The current ruling Presidential-Prime Ministerial pairing took office just over a year ago in October 2018 with Barham Salih as President and Adil Abdul-Mahdi as head of the government. These provocative protests are the first popularised challenge to the face the leadership since election. As such, the disproportionate response that has attracted international attention might be able to be perceived as an attempt to limit a politically destabilising movement by a government that already has innumerable vulnerabilities. The ability of the protests to not only delay but stop parliamentary session and to block access to the Green Zone indicated a lack of control of the situation. Their willingness to eventually concede to reforms and Abdul-Mahdi’s subsequent calls for an inquest into the handling of the matter suggests that this reaction comes from a place of fear.
Given the events simultaneously taking place on the Syrian-Turkish border and on both of Iraq’s geographical flanks, it is clear that much graver and consequential external threats are breathing down the throats of the Iraqi leadership that require strategic focus. These come in the form of the potential resurgent rise of the Islamic State after the withdrawal of the US from Syria left Kurdish forces exposed, and the precarious state of play between ideologically opposed Saudi Arabia and Iran. All of which leaves Iraq unenviably surrounded on all fronts by political situations that are precariously hanging in the balance.
Commentators are, disappointingly, left unsurprised that the common denominator in all these unfolding discussions is the United States. With the Middle East on the precipice of regional turmoil, it is far from shocking to see the US once again strategically offering support and comment to remind actors in the region of its continued interests and deep-rooted capacity for influence in their affairs.
The region now finds itself in a situation where internal disputes and issues are subjected to pulls from both religious and political camps, not only internally but from greater powers too. These powers, Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’a Iran, have a vested interest that feeds the even more flammable dilemma concerning oil facilities and tankers which puts the whole world on edge. The pertinent question here therefore is: how much longer will the aggressive actions of not just Iraqi but other regional governments be tolerated before these flying sparks ignite violence with much greater consequence?
