China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Economic Prosperity at What Cost?
In the last decade, infrastructure projects have increasingly emerged, sprawling over Asia, Africa, and Europe. This is a result of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a plan which aims to achieve greater connectivity through investment and trade. The BRI is a broad plan that encompasses many stakeholders, significant capital flows, and some intriguing political implications. Essentially, the BRI is a blueprint that consists of a ‘belt’ of land corridors and a ‘road’ of maritime shipping lanes. The initiative aims to enhance regional financial cooperation through developing infrastructure projects, strengthening transport links, and gaining access to resources. With promises of economic growth, many countries have expressed a willingness to join the BRI. So, what kinds of global implications can we expect from such a grand design?
Firstly, the infrastructure projects underpinning the BRI have enabled improvements in international cooperation with China; advances in transportation and energy links; and developments in global financing mechanisms, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund. The results of these infrastructure projects are particularly important for African countries: due to the West’s preference for working with transparent democracies—favouring value-based investment—, African nations have found it difficult to acquire money from Western countries . A key example of this struggle is evident in the ‘Structural Adjustment Programs’ (SAPs) led by the Western-dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF). SAPs were loans given to African nations by the IMF under the condition that democratic and liberalist reforms were to be made. However, forced investments into monocrops, controlled exports, and the manipulation of prices that were imposed by the IMF under the guise of ‘liberalism’ led to the failure of these programs. Thus, these soured relations provided China with a unique opportunity to step in. The BRI enables China to access African markets and become less resource-dependent while allowing Africa to access necessary infrastructure development. Although it can be argued that African nations lack political stability and effective economic reforms, China does not dispute this, and believes that human security comes second place to addressing infrastructure deficiencies. Should the BRI be successful in Africa, it would send the message to countries worldwide that there is an alternative approach to development without democratic hurdles or coercive stipulations. By partaking in the BRI, neglected economies stand to gain critical infrastructure development, a newfound economic partner, and greater autonomy than they would receive when working with their Western counterparts.
Secondly, while the BRI delivers economic promise in Africa, not all regions share the same experience. Within the initiative, there is an element of geopolitical security that has grown in significance over the years. The maritime ‘road’ that is constructed not only creates diversified maritime trade routes but has the strategic benefit of securing vulnerable sea lanes where most Chinese trade takes place. Additionally, the ‘road’ has formal military implications: if China’s maritime Silk Road can be used for shipping cargo, it can also be used to ship weapons and troops. This idea is not baseless: looking at President Xi Jinping’s military aspirations to shift from a traditionally land-based power to a ‘nation of both sea and land’ (hail jiabei guojia), the ports constructed under the BRI have been observed to have potential ‘dual purposes’. Consequently, heavy scepticism has been raised towards the BRI’s maritime function from impacted coastal countries and China’s geopolitical competitors. For the US, which has a strong presence in the surrounding waters of the South China Sea (SCS), it dilutes their regional maritime dominance and lessens China’s reliance on them for trading. Chinese naval expansion within the SCS also inevitably interferes with the US’s commitment to the issue of Taiwan. In South Asia, the string of proposed and constructed ports in neighbouring countries raises security issues for India. India fears that their closest geopolitical competitor garners the capability to convert these ports into military bases and form naval blockades that could cripple trade. A prelude to this possibility can be seen through the example of the Hambantota port in neighbouring Sri Lanka. After Sri Lanka failed to pay its debt on the Chinese-funded port, the government had to lease it to China for 99 years. In August, China took advantage of this ownership, sending a ‘research and survey’ vessel to dock at the port, concerning Indian intelligence. Therefore, China’s strategic implementation of the BRI enables a strategic foothold in South Asia, creating opportunities for espionage and the possibility of a naval base in the coveted Asia-Europe shipping lane.
Finally, apart from region-specific possibilities for Africa and South Asia, the BRI may lead to cultural exchange and diffusion. This idea is found in China’s renewed ‘Charm Offensive’: drawing influence from former President Hu Jintao, China’s ‘Charm Offensive’ was developed to portray a ‘peaceful rise’ of the country as an international superpower. Through commerce and close economic relations with the international community, China aims to demonstrate a peaceful rise and ‘tell a good story about China’ (Jiangnan zhongguo gushi) to reshape its global image from its past of isolation and ambiguity. As most BRI construction projects worldwide are given to Chinese contractors, and as infrastructure projects are a long-term development, it is safe to assume that these contractors lay semi-permanent roots in the host countries and gain the opportunity to integrate with the local culture while also sharing their own values and beliefs. Moreover, Chinese contractors use labourers that come from working-class families in China who were raised in the local education system, thus also making them effective agents of soft-form propaganda. This viewpoint is unsurprising given that President Xi Jinping outlines ‘jianzhi zhongguo gushi’ to be an appealing story about China’s development and ideals that attracts countries to China. While development underpins the BRI, these workers whose upbringing and livelihoods have been shaped by Chinese prosperity tell a good and personal story. In today’s globalised world, major political powers have a strong incentive to uphold a certain public image—China is simply upfront about it. Hence, it would be narrow-minded to label China’s attempts at furthering its cultural influence as more than a characteristic inherent in the conduct of international politics.
A potential pitfall of China’s ‘Charm Offensive’ is the critique of unfairness stemming from the unequal distribution of contracts. However, this issue can be argued as a matter of cultural differences: although China holds a ‘good neighbour’ policy that seeks inclusion and shared benefits, China believes this commitment to ‘making friends’ is achieved through filling infrastructure deficits and aiding under-developed economies rather than handing out contracts and cash. This approach could be inspired by the Confucian belief that China holds the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ that gives legitimacy to the Chinese government. To maintain said legitimacy is to commit to the duty of bringing peace, building infrastructure, and fostering unity. By placing themselves at the center of a ‘geopolitical cosmos’, this responsibility extends past China’s national borders, informing the decision for the BRI to be a Chinese-led effort. To summarise, the goal of China’s soft power approach is to tell a story that is complimentary to their foreign policies. If successful, public trust in Chinese propaganda would make their foreign policy more appealing. In addition, a plurality of narratives being accepted would hinder the ability for countries to contain China through their own propaganda. The political hold that the West has on the world would loosen, and countries would gain the ability to decide for themselves which ideologies and values matter, and which do not.
As the BRI is still in its early stages, the global implications of the initiative have yet to be made clear. While it is imperative not to overlook the possibilities and opportunities this initiative may grant participating countries, it is equally imperative to maintain a healthy amount of scepticism towards the initiative and question if the BRI may be guised as a purely economic move from China. These observations are not made to demonise nor glorify China’s actions, but rather to scrutinise the strategic foreign policy of a major player in the international arena.
Image courtesy of Limes via Wikimedia, ©2017, some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
