Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un 2.0: Continuity or Change?
As the global political environment continues to become unpredictable, the centrality of the United States in the international order sustains itself because it can leverage its power to act as a negotiator. A topic that was largely sidelined during the Biden administration is that of North Korea and the nuclear risk that Kim Jong Un continues to pose. It seems to be an apt point to resurface Kim - Donald Trump is back, who remains as the only sitting American President to meet a North Korean leader in person. The US President, upon re-election, had mentioned that he planned to communicate with Kim when asked about him- “I will (reach out to him), yeah. He liked me”.
A lot has changed with Kim and North Korea since Trump took office for the first time. Kim Jong Un in 2017 could be arguably considered as relatively inexperienced, only five years into his regime. However, Donald Trump back then convinced Kim to meet him not only once, but on three separate occasions. Around the same time, relations with South Korea also appeared to be warming up - both Kim and then President Moon met on many occasions and signed the Comprehensive Military Agreement. Despite considerable progress that was made in the Singapore talks, both countries were back to the starting point in Hanoi when Trump demanded more than what could have been asked of - that North Korea abandon its complete nuclear program in exchange for a few US sanctions being uplifted.
Since a leadership change in Washington D.C., much has changed between the US and North Korea. North Korea has diversified its military capabilities, with an arsenal of cyberweapons at its disposal. It has conducted more than 90 missile tests in 2022 and 2023 combined, more than 55% of the total tests that took place during the first Trump administration. Most importantly, North Korea also sent 10,000 troops to fight for Russia against Ukraine. North Korea has become closer to Russia, with Kim and Putin signing a new defence treaty into force that establishes both countries’ mutual support in case of an attack on either country. Coming back to the Korean Peninsula, Kim has put the painstakingly achieved CMA into jeopardy by arguing that South Korea is North Korea’s biggest enemy.
Despite these alarming developments, the United States has not done enough to contain the threats that the North Korean nuclear regime poses to global stability. While it played a key role in leading discussions at the UN Human Rights Council and in tabling resolutions condemning North Korean involvement in Ukraine in the UN Security Council, the Biden administration’s engagement with North Korea remained minimal with Pyongyang ignoring Washington’s efforts to reach out. Come to 2025, US behaviour with UN institutions has been erratic, with the global power withdrawing itself from the UNHRC and rejecting a UNGA Resolution that condemned Russian troops’ presence in Ukraine. The current administration must learn from its past failures to effectively bring back North Korea to the negotiating table.
But is Trump’s ‘special bond’ that he claims to share with authoritarian leaders like Kim well enough to mend relations with North Korea and confirm his claim to be a ‘peacemaker’? Not quite - North Korean public sentiment has not been influenced by Trump’s bonhomie with Kim, with people believing that Trump did not bring about a substantial positive change to relations with Pyongyang. Even Trump’s success in getting Kim to shut down the North’s Yongbyon nuclear testing facility was short-lived since the facility reopened in 2021 and has restarted nuclear research. Despite these hurdles, the Trump administration must agree to strategically engage with North Korea to find a middle ground and avoid the shortcomings of the Hanoi summit.
For Kim Jong Un to come to the table, the United States must keep in mind that with his image as a stronger leader, his demands have also grown. The United States would not be able to convince Kim to give up his nuclear arsenal by merely lifting ‘some’ sanctions. The Kim of 2025 is not the Kim of 2019 - he now has much greater support from Russia and China. The US will have to offer much more in a way that exceeds the fruits of the Russia-North Korea defence partnership. Despite Kim’s recent proximity with Putin, Donald Trump’s warmth towards Putin in recent times and America’s sharp turn towards the conflict in Ukraine would be interesting to observe. It will be important to observe whether Trump will leverage his relative closeness to the Russian president to try to break into Kim’s nuclear-rich regime, and a possible path towards peace on the Korean Peninsula.
While Trump’s closeness to Putin might be unfolding through shifting American narratives about the conflict in Ukraine, that alone might not be sufficient to reach a favourable outcome with Kim. Despite North Korea’s move to consider South Korea as its principal enemy, it could be argued that North Korea’s pursuit of a well-stocked nuclear arsenal is not South Korea but America’s pledge to provide military support to South Korea. Kim Jong Un has not made hollow threats to American allies like the European Union or Japan - at least not singularly. He has traditionally criticised American allies when the US partners with them. The US-South Korean joint military exercises are one such instance and has been a major irritant for Kim and would also be a plausible demand in exchange for the closure of the nuclear program. This demand, if accepted, would ring alarm bells in Seoul - an American withdrawal on the guarantee that Kim will stop his nuclear program would appear to South Korea as to be based on fragile foundations. Seoul would need to really convince Trump for American presence on the Peninsula given that Trump has repeatedly called for the suspension of these joint military exercises.
For Trump, American participation in geopolitics are like business deals – very transactional, with a “you get something if you give me something” mindset. Such appears to be the case with his approach towards Kim. In order for Kim to budge, he suggested suspending American joint military exercises with the South. This pattern seems to align with his rhetoric on allies since he feels that allies are not giving anything but only ‘taking advantage’ of the US. In simpler terms, Trump does not see the point of continuing an alliance if he does not get back something and would not mind taking a step back with South Korea if he has a real chance to normalise North Korea’s role in the international order.
While the ideal goal for US foreign policy would be North Korea’s complete denuclearisation, at the moment, that seems like a tough ask. America’s stiff stance would need to soften slightly for Kim to feel comfortable enough to come back on the table after the failures in the Hanoi summit. For instance, working towards a coherent plan of gradually making North Korea’s nuclear facilities into white elephants. Regardless of what approach the US pursues, it is imperative that North Korea is not continuously in the orbit of isolationism yet defence cooperation with Russia.
The Trump administration must restart dialogue with Kim but with reasonable demands to be in a position to bargain. It would be interesting whether Trump’s unpredictability in his foreign policy might witness the United States officially acknowledging North Korea as a nuclear power or not. People who worked closely with the North Korean higher ups argue that Kim is happy that Trump is back in office. America must be able to convince North Korea that solely depending on China and Russia will not cure their economic crisis. It must make a commitment towards slowly destabilising North Korea’s nuclear program in place for lifting heft sanctions in a manner that encourages North Korea to integrate into the process of globalisation. This integration would make it increasingly difficult for Kim to continue his nuclear ambitions at the rate he is currently pursuing it at. The risks will be greater once North Korea witnesses the fruits of global trade, just like China did after opening up in 1978. For this to happen, America must appear to be cooperative than hostile.
Image courtesy of Shealah Craighead via Flickr, ©2019. Some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
