Crime and Punishment: The Bukele Doctrine
For decades El Salvador was the homicide capital of the world – now it is a case study in crime reduction. But at what cost? Upon election in 2019 at the age of just 37, Nayib Bukele promised to eradicate the crime which had been crippling the nation for more than three decades. Nationwide crackdowns, mass arrests, and mega-jails followed, resulting in a near negligible homicide rate and near-universal approval for the self-proclaimed ‘world’s coolest dictator’. Is this a blueprint for national security or should this dismantling of democracy serve as a warning?
El Salvador’s widespread gang crime stemmed from the civil conflict which engulfed the nation during the 1980s and 1990s, killing at least 75,000 and displacing more than a million. In the absence of effective national government, gangs and crime syndicates accumulated power, and in 2015, there were 106 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants – the highest rate in the world. Since his election, Bukele has implemented his phased ‘Territorial Control Plan’, which resulted in the government declaring a ‘state of exception’ (i.e., emergency) in 2022, a period of extreme martial law meant to last only 30 days. This has been extended 35 times. The policy essentially involves sending soldiers and police into deprived and gang-affected areas to arrest and incarcerate suspected gang members. In the first weeks of the scheme, police had daily quotas, and arrests were often made without evidence or solely through perception. Young people, and those with tattoos, for example, were ‘by definition viewed as potential gang members’ and rounded up indiscriminately. As a result, more than 84,000 thousand people have been imprisoned, amounting to more than one percent of the population. In a striking show of his long-term commitment to the policy, Bukele unveiled the ‘Terrorism Confinement Centre’, one of the largest prisons in the world with the capacity for more than 40,000 inmates.
El Salvador’s ‘Terrorism Confinement Centre’ can hold more than 40,000 inmates.
Unsurprisingly, the crackdown has achieved its chief aim. El Salvador is now the safest country in the Western hemisphere with a homicide rate of just 1.9 deaths per thousand inhabitants. Additionally, despite international criticism, the policy is said to be supported by 93% of the population, and Bukele himself has higher approval ratings than any other world leader, including the pope. Equally, the economic implications of Bukele’s experiment have often been overlooked. In 2016, The Economist estimated that the total cost of gang violence (encompassing extortion payments, and the loss of income from those deterred from working or investing) amounted to a loss of 16% of GDP. The substantial spending related to the prison policy has however resulted in national debt skyrocketing to 76% of GDP, amid currency issues and rising borrowing costs. Perhaps more importantly, the suppression has also raised significant humanitarian, ethical, and political questions about its long-term feasibility and efficacy.
Firstly, it must be noted that this hardline policy of mass arrests was also a practice under previous governments, though Bukele has formalised and extended its scope. This mano dura approach accelerated a decline in homicide rates that the country had been experiencing since around 2015. In fact, before the ‘state of exception’ began, homicide rates stood at 18 per thousand inhabitants, already lower than that of Colombia or Brazil, though this was perhaps distorted by their far larger populations. The prisons themselves are said to be ‘experiments in brutality and sadism’, defined by their inhumane treatment – more than 250 prisoners are said to have died in custody since 2022. That is to say nothing of the more than 8,000 suspected gang members who were subsequently released after their innocence was proved.
Furthermore, the President’s incredible popularity as a result of the scheme has allowed him to accumulate greater political and legislative power largely unchecked. Along with dubious electoral reform, Bukele has acted decisively to quell dissent on the rare occasions he is opposed. For example, in 2020, when spending plans for the next phase of his security plan were blocked, he stormed Congress with a gang of heavily armed police and soldiers. Similarly, several months later he forcibly retired a third of the country’s judges and disregarded constitutional courts in order to secure legal immunity and obeisance.
The overwhelming success of the policy and the popularity of the man who implemented it should be a lesson to leaders around the world about the importance of truly being tough on crime. Similar prison reforms have already been adopted in Guatemala and Jamaica (with similar results), though it remains to be seen whether larger countries with a similar prevalence of gang violence such as Mexico or Colombia will follow suit. Politically, it also offers a blueprint for dismantling a democracy whilst simultaneously surging in popularity. The clampdown on free speech and journalism, with new prison sentences of up to 15 years for those seen to be reporting unfavourably towards the government, is a troubling further restriction on personal and ideological freedoms. The subsequent challenge for liberal leaders is to find another, more ethical way to achieve such drastic reductions in crime, or Bukele-esque figures will inevitably appeal more to the electorate. What El Salvador’s experience has shown international onlookers is the importance of curbing crime and maintaining security, otherwise there may be serious threats to democracy.
While there is not yet a panacea for the problem of gang violence, Nayib Bukele’s draconian policies have produced far greater safety, and the vast majority of the country is grateful to live in a more secure environment than they did previously. However, though the restoration of normalcy to a violence-fatigued society is admirable, should he not soon declare victory and re-evaluate, establishing more just rules surrounding detention?
Cover image courtesy of AFP via FreeMalaysiaToday, ©2024. Some rights reserved.
In-text image courtesy of the Office of the President of El Salvador via Getty Images, ©2023. Some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
