The AUKUS Trilateral Partnership: A Rising Power in a New and Uncertain World?
Donald Trump’s new administration offers both opportunities and challenges to British and Australian relations with the US.
While President Trump tears up international agreements and looks to project a more transactional American foreign policy, the governments of the UK and Australia have a unique opportunity to develop their close tripartite relationship with the US, after Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth confirmed Trump’s support for the AUKUS security partnership.
To its partners, the AUKUS pact extends beyond maritime and defence cooperation. It represents a shared history of military and technology collaboration; common values and culture; and a shared understanding of the perceived threat China poses in the Indo-Pacific. With both Australia and the UK in promising positions to avoid major tariffs on trade with the US, Prime Ministers Anthony Albanese and Keir Starmer will likely prioritise locking in the trilateral relationship and bolstering their interdependence on trade and defence.
A generated image of the new SSN-AUKUS class submarine. Image courtesy of BAE Systems via Wikimedia Commons, ©2023. Some rights reserved
The weeks ahead are pivotal, as Starmer travels to Washington to discuss a range of issues which will set the tone of the UK-US ‘Special Relationship’ for the next four years. In Australia, with the economy a central issue of the upcoming election, and recent Chinese aggression in the Tasman Sea, Albanese will be analysing the future stability of the AUKUS relationship. These two moderate, democratic leaders have the chance to deepen their economic and strategic ties to the American military powerhouse, yet they must tread carefully: evading Trump’s disfavour, while compromising on their internationalistic principles without angering their more progressive support bases.
What is AUKUS?
Announced in September 2021, the AUKUS trilateral partnership between Australia, the UK, and the US claims to ensure a ‘peaceful, secure and stable’ Indo-Pacific. The agreement is of mutual benefit to the three partners, providing numerous economic, military, industrial, and strategic benefits, as they aim to counterbalance the expansionist ambitions of China in the region.
AUKUS entails two pillars of cooperation. The first is a pledge to provide Australia with nuclear-propelled and conventionally armed submarines by the early 2030s as well as routine deployments of US Virginia-class and UK Astute-class submarines in the Indo-Pacific from 2027. The new SSN-AUKUS class of submarines will be manufactured in the UK and Australia, with the US providing design, technology, and operational support for this levelled-up model.
The second arm of AUKUS focuses on collaboratively advancing capabilities in a wide range of areas: submarine and hypersonic engineering, cyber and quantum technologies, and artificial intelligence. Information sharing also plays a part, increasing the interdependence of the three states above ‘Five Eyes’ and other international cooperation agreements.
AUKUS is an alliance directly aimed at countering the expansionist Chinese foreign policy in the region. With its ‘nine-dash line’ maritime claim, its dispute over Taiwanese sovereignty, and its ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, China has endeavoured to widen its sphere of influence within the Indo-Pacific. By enlisting Australia as an active partner in regional security through AUKUS, the Biden administration has sought to promote Western interests and deter this perceived Chinese belligerence.
Despite widespread uncertainty about the future of AUKUS cooperation under Trump’s leadership, Pete Hegseth met with Australian Deputy PM Richard Marles earlier this month to underline Trump’s ‘very aware, supportive’ stance on AUKUS, as Australia made its first payment of USD$500 million in the submarine deal. Beijing has shown its displeasure through multiple live-fire naval manoeuvres within a few hundred miles of the Australian coastline.
Australia
In the last decade, driven by strained relations and trade restrictions imposed by Beijing, successive administrations under Australian PMs Scott Morrison and Albanese have chosen to align their interests much more closely with those of the US. Australia is now set to become one of the only seven nations to have nuclear-powered submarine capability (meaning faster subs that can put to sea for longer). This positions Australia at the heart of the Indo-Pacific security. Its government will hope to stabilise relations with China, work on more equal footing with neighbouring middle power India, and develop a unique influence as a reliable security partner to the US.
China’s force projections so close to Australian territory reveals the gravity of Australia’s strategic position within the Indo-Pacific, while the effectiveness of AUKUS is hotly contested. The defence partnership is not a treaty, but merely a cooperation deal on technology and strategy in a pre-war environment. This is no NATO – there is no implicit collective defence agreement. Some suggest that China may seek to exploit situations where military engagement serves the interests of one but not all, and Albanese will hope to assuage these fears by staying in close cooperation with its powerful ally.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia. Image courtesy of Number 10 via Wikimedia Commons, ©2024. Some rights reserved.
The strategic and economic heft of the US in its negotiations with Australia is further underscored by the shear cost of the AUKUS pact – approximately USD$200 billion. This sum demonstrates the Australian commitment to security in a fraught global landscape – unless it collapses under its own economic weight. Should the regular payments to the US and UK become unsavoury to Australian voters, future leadership in Canberra might be tempted to reduce or renege on the arrangement altogether.
Albanese will also be hopeful that the close relationship with the US fostered by AUKUS will help him to sidestep American tariffs on steel and aluminium. Trade restrictions on such important exports would prove extremely costly to Australian industry, and Albanese will want to avoid talk of economic issues in the lead-up to a federal election, which looks to be sliding out of the incumbent Labour party’s favour.
Meanwhile, UK-Australian relations appear to be in good health. Australian investment from AUKUS in the British defence sector will be well received in London. Both centre-left Labour governments share similar identities and policies, whereas an election win for opposition candidate Peter Dutton would be unlikely to shake up trade and security arrangements with the UK in any major capacity.
The AUKUS pact reflects Australia’s move away from an era of US-China hedging, a strategy which had become untenable in the developing great power competition between the two superpowers. Whoever is victorious in the upcoming election, AUKUS is sure to remain a cornerstone of Australian defence strategy as long as the economy can bear it, and the next Prime Minister would be wise to initiate further talks on close cooperation with its two key allies on a range of issues.
UK Perspective
This week’s negotiations between Starmer and Trump will have great implications for the next four years of transatlantic cooperation. Security will no doubt dominate the discussion: Eastern Europe and the Middle East, NATO military expenditure, and British strategic commitments.
UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer. Image courtesy of Number 10 via Wikimedia Commons, ©2024. Some rights reserved.
AUKUS represents a key facet of British defence strategy. It symbolises the influence of the UK as a nuclear power. Starmer would do well to highlight this significance to reinforce the UK as a credible and robust ally to the US, both in the North Atlantic and Indo-Pacific. Having already committed to putting British troops on the ground in Ukraine to reinforce a lasting peace agreement, as well as significantly increasing defence spending to 2.5% by 2027, Starmer will want to build on this image of the UK as a proactive player in geopolitics.
Whether Trump sees this as demonstration of strategic intention or ‘just talk’ remains unclear. Starmer will hope to talk Trump down from his contentious plan for Gaza, while pressing for Ukrainian and European seats at the negotiating table over a peace deal with Russia. Additionally, by utilising the UK’s intermediary position between the US and European bloc , as provided by Brexit and the so called ‘special relationship’ , Starmer could have an influential role in healing the fractures that are beginning to appear in NATO cooperation.
A key challenge for Starmer is the planned return of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, which would see the UK pay for a 99-year lease on Diego-Garcia – an island military base shared by the US and UK. This has drawn substantial criticism from top Republican figures in the US , including the new Secretary of State Marco Rubio, stemming from concerns over Chinese threats toward the base in the heart of the Indian Ocean. While Starmer may try to clarify the reasoning behind the plan and reemphasise the UK’s ongoing commitments to AUKUS cooperation in the wider region, he may be forced into a U-turn on the deal, in exchange for trade-offs in other negotiations with Trump.
The US President has imposed sanctions on ICC officials and holds the ‘international rules-based order’ in great contempt. In comparison, Starmer, a human rights lawyer by trade, will have to decide whether to carry through with the 2019 ICJ ruling on Chagos, or yield to US pressure , potentially tarnishing his reputation as an adherent to the liberal global order.
On trade, it is imperative for the UK economy that Starmer evades harsh Trumpian tariffs on export goods, as have been imposed on the EU and other large trading partners of the US. Thanks to the slight US trade surplus with the UK, this is achievable. Starmer may also seek to purchase greater supplies of American Liquified Natural Gas, a ploy to work pragmatically with Trump’s mercantilism.
Meanwhile, AUKUS is of profound importance to the British defence industry. Australian investment in both BAE and Rolls-Royce will be a boon to a Labour government that places economic growth as its utmost priority. As Starmer feels the pressure to expand defence expenditure, domestic economic issues may be exacerbated, while siphoning money from his international aid and development budget will see the UK transition its soft power influence for a harder approach.
Will Starmer hold fast to his principles, adhere to international law, and stay close to Europe? Or will he succumb to economic and political pressure, aligning with Trump’s mafia style of leadership to promote growth and deliver pragmatically for Britain?
US Perspective
In his first weeks in office, Trump’s raft of executive orders , which have pulled the US out of international organisations on health and the environment and ignited multiple trade disputes , evidence his isolationist views. Despite this, he appears to be fully supportive of the AUKUS trilateral, indicating his shift in geostrategic focus from Europe and the North Atlantic to China and the Indo-Pacific.
US President Donald Trump. Image courtesy of Gage Skidmore via Wikimedia Commons, ©2014. Some rights reserved.
Trump has seemed far more lenient towards the Russian autocratic leader, taking a gloomier stance towards Volodymyr Zelensky’s Ukraine, which he sees to have been a prolonged drain on American defence spending. Putin and Zelensky have both offered deals on rare earth minerals with the US. Whoever Trump favours in these proposals, an end to the war in Ukraine seems to be fast approaching, and with it, Russia may emerge from the geopolitical wilderness in cooperation with the US.
A swift cessation of conflict in Europe would suit Trump, who could turn to what he and many hawkish Republicans see as the real threat to American economic, military, and diplomatic interests: the rise of China. With Taiwan-Beijing tensions increasingly tense, and tariffs being exchanged by Trump and Xi across the Pacific, the new US administration may look to expand its defence strategy in the Indo-Pacific. For the time being then, AUKUS remains a lucrative arrangement which promotes US interests in the region and curbs Chinese expansion. Hegseth’s commitment to the AUKUS scheme locks its three partners on a path to close military, industrial, and strategic cooperation going forward, providing some supranational structure on an increasingly fragmented global stage.
Trump may, however, be tempted to look to alternative partners to pursue his goals. Known to be amiable towards other strongman leaders, he may choose to work more closely with India, counterbalancing Chinese diplomatic efforts. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in one of Trump’s first diplomatic exchanges in his second term, praised the US-India ‘mega partnership’ and may push to expand on the INDUS defence relationship. Another threat to AUKUS continued viability lies at home in the US. If the distribution of American-made undersea capability to foreign parties becomes unpopular to the US audience, Trump may change his mind on the merit of AUKUS for American interests.
Despite these concerns, the cultural and strategic ties between Australia, the US, and UK will remain pertinent. As such, Starmer and Albanese should do all they can to capitalise on their position of influence to strengthen ties and promote their trilateral cooperation, treading a fine line of compromise between their principles and their policies.
Cover image generated using Image FX from the prompt ‘blend the US, UK, and Australian flags’.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
