How Does Poor Cybersecurity Lead to Human Trafficking? Transnational Crimes in Southeast Asia
Talk about cybersecurity in Southeast Asia reached international attention when the UN estimated that around 200,000 victims were trafficked and trapped in Southeast Asia’s scam compounds in 2023. Such numbers only continued to rise in the following two years.
These so-called scam compounds are physically enclosed regions for the purposes of committing mass fraud, functioning as literal business corporations. Common types of fraud have evolved from kidnapping calls to romance frauds on dating apps, investment frauds through cryptocurrency scams, border-security scams by masquerading as law enforcement personnels, just to name a few examples.
Currently, these criminals have popularized labour scams, attracting victims with the promise of lucrative job opportunities. Once they land in Bangkok, supposed arrangements are made for them to be taken to their jobs by company transport. Instead they are unknowingly trafficked to scam compounds in Laos, Myanmar or Cambodia, secured by barbed wire and armed patrol guards. Victims are then routinely trained to commit fraud. If
they prove unwilling or inefficient, female victims are often sold to sex slavery while male victims are at risk of being harvested for their organs. Initially focused in Southeast Asia, victim demographics have expanded to Central Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and America, though the effects of this have yet to mature.
The story begins with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), where special economic zones (SEZs) are formed in coastal areas along regional borders in Southeast Asia. SEZs are unique for their exclusive sovereignty over economic laws and trade regulations, despite otherwise largely remaining under state jurisdiction. After China’s crackdown on online gambling, many of these businesses moved their operations to SEZs along Chinese borders, so as to continue attracting the wealthy pockets of Chinese gamblers without having to comply with Chinese jurisdictions. The “legal grey area” business of gambling and lax law enforcement framework meant certain SEZs became hotbeds for criminal activity. Although most countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam started to restrict gambling prior to the pandemic, countries lacking the political resources to do so, such as those rifled with corrupted officials (Cambodia) or long-term political instability (Myanmar), allowed criminal businesses to take root during the pandemic. Since the rapid economic development of these countries depended so heavily on the tourism brought about by gambling, travel and border regulations during the pandemic caused operational cessation of multiple casinos, hotels and retail services. Mass scam operations moved into these empty lots and became the first perpetrators of the fraud industry.
The scale of these operations begs the questions of whether governments are responding and why are these measures are proving ineffective. As with most international affairs, it is not the lack of capacity for countries to act, but the lack of incentive.
Why don’t countries want to act?
First, the countries that are most impacted are those that lack political resources to act against criminals. Myanmar’s ongoing civil war already renders them incapable of any coordinated effort against criminal activities, not to mention the inaction that follows multifaceted collusion between political groups and criminals behind the scenes. Cambodia is historically riddled with corruption, with officials lining their pockets with wealth trickling from these scam factories. The state has resorted to denying trafficking allegations made in the UNODC report in 2023, condemning US sanctions against the country and restricting media coverage such as banning the Chinese film “No More Bets” that portrayed the dangers of these scams.
Second, regional actors often do not feel the need to devote political resources for issues that do not affect them directly. As ASEAN has an underlying non-interference principle in members’ internal affairs, the framework against transnational crime remains unclear and action will only be taken with universal consensus. Members with the most resources at their disposal, such as Malaysia and Singapore, were able to act preventively, acting quickly to detach themselves from relations with these states. Multiple Singaporean businesses and large banks quickly cut off ties with Myanmar businesses once sanctioned by the US, while Malaysia implemented legal frameworks, including task forces and financial regulations, in line with international recommendations. Both were, however, largely inactive in pushing for collective action to tackle the issue. As criminal networks continued to expand in the next two years, these measures simply shifted where criminals source victims.
Third, allegations exist suggesting that China’s inaction may stem from political purposes. Some argue that China is delegating criminal activities to outside her border, since she is politically tied to some wealthy business conglomerates that are “allegedly involved”. The Chinese have been the dominant victim demographic of these scams, yet are also the dominant perpetrators. It was discovered that the owners of cryptocurrency wallets involved in these scams have strong ties to Hong Men, China’s largest underground organized crime groups. China has done no more than condemn these actors and engage in intergovernmental dialogues, despite having the capacity and obligation to do much more.
Additionally, some argue that China is opportunistic in her vocality to advance her security agenda. China has already used her veto power in UNSC decisions on the crackdown in Myanmar to leverage her relations with the military group in 2023, either leveraging crackdowns to ensure relations with those in power or increasing her security presence under the guise of tackling transnational crime. This is due to concerns regarding the broader security network in Southeast Asia; controlling Myanmar would provide her access to the Bay of Bengal through trade and energy routes, and power projection to the Indian Ocean. Increased security control over Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos would expand China’s power projection further South, which is already a point of particular contention in South China Seas conflicts. However, it should be noted that these allegations are largely made by US academia, and thus a factor of potential propaganda should not be discounted. Nevertheless, it remains simply factual that as the country with most victims, most perpetrators and most resources, China has not done much outside of intergovernmental dialogues and condemnation. That said, she was quick to send out multiple flights to Myawaddy, Myanmar’s largest scam compound, and assume recognition when the Thai government finally pulled the trigger on Myanmar.
What is effective?
Recent events provide changes to narratives of regional inaction. The abduction of Chinese actor Wang Xing attracted massive media attention and resulted in massive damage to Thailand’s reputation and tourism industry. In early February, Thailand announced sudden utility cuts to five regions in Myanmar. In early March, the Thai government then announced consideration of building a wall along Thai-Cambodia borders. The former measure was incredibly effective, though unsustainable. The Thai government stood strong despite pleas from the Myanmar government, and within a week over 260 Thai nationals were released. To date, 7000 victims are already awaiting repatriation in Myawaddy.
This is however, unsustainable. Without the shock factor, large-scale compounds will soon evolve to store generators; some have already been seen transporting generators through Myanmar’s borders with China and Laos. It will asymmetrically impact locals over criminals. Additionally, Myanmar could develop her own generators, as did Cambodia, rendering utility cuts much less effective in the future. The latter measure possibly aims to create some signaling effect in the region and a final resort without much leverage against Cambodia.
There are three methods which countries have acted in recent years: release of reports and policy recommendations by international organizations, unilateral efforts to rescue trafficked nationals, and intergovernmental dialogues for cooperation. Pressures by national governments are most effective, resulting in the release of hundreds of nationals within a few days. Most measures are preventive, such as having border forces requiring visitation purposes and issuing warnings to potential victims, or increasing public education on cybersecurity. It is possibly effective in preventing some physical trafficking, regarding financial loss as “bygones”.
However, many victims, although prevented from entering the first time, are quite likely to fall for another type of scam and trafficked through a different border. It is important to keep in mind that many are victims of labour scams, especially in developing nations and rural areas in China. These are people desperate in their financial situation, or simply wishing to find better employment. The scammers are well-trained and extremely deceptive, and those lacking cyber education or internet familiarity are deserving of empathy. Measures aimed to be punitive, such as Interpol operations or Cambodia’s crackdown in Sikhanouville in 2022 fail to destroy crucial criminal linkages. Sikhanouville is currently the largest scam compound in Southeast Asia, and despite Interpol’s Operation HAECHI V arresting 5000 suspects, the scam industry continued to grow.
It is evident that national governments could “hand over” victims under pressure. Although political pressure might be crucial leverage governments could use to deal with criminals, the chip criminals are dealt with is the fear of national crackdown should they refuse compliance. National governments maintain a stake in these operations and criminals are aware that until crucial ties with business conglomerates are broken or there is some kind of black swan event that leads to large-scale intervention or a genuine national crackdown, these criminal operations will continue, with or without international attention.
Image courtesy of Reuters, ©2025. Some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
