Nord Stream 2: The Effects of Russia’s Invasion

Mar 10

Mar 10 Nord Stream 2: The Effects of Russia’s Invasion

On the morning of 24th February, the world woke to the news that Russia had launched an invasion of neighbouring Ukraine. It was sadly unsurprising. All signs had indicated that something of this sort was in the pipeline. Western leaders like President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Boris Johnson had stated that this is what they believed President Vladimir Putin’s intention to be. While unsurprising, given the announcements in the run up to the events, it is no less shocking. This is the first overt full-scale invasion on European soil since Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia in 1939. These are the comparisons and references being made on news channels all over the western world.

Meanwhile on the Hungarian border there are cars queueing for three to five kilometres and by 10 am on 24th the roads out of Kyiv were completely gridlocked with people hoping to get to the border with Poland. Around 50,000 people have managed to cross the border to escape their country and the Russian advance. Cash machines in the capital have been emptied, though reports have suggested that the Ukrainian currency hryvnia is next to useless for those lucky to enough to have crossed the border. Fuel has run out on major roads to the borders, forcing some to walk in the snow to reach Poland and now inhabitants of Kyiv are being given guns by the Ukrainian government as the Russian forces draw ever nearer.

How might we have reached this point? How might we have avoided it? Many have answers; leaders should have been tougher; international organisations should have been sterner. All the while there is the spectre of Russia’s nuclear capability which goes unmentioned. Others would argue instead that the unavoidable fact of the matter is the West has been distracted – Russia’s squabbles with Ukraine were not high on many international priority lists. No one truly believed that an invasion like this would happen in Europe in the 21st Century. Well, Putin’s certainly the centre of international attention now.

For instance, distracted by the perpetually evolving covid situation and the installation of a new premier, Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Germany has been busy forging a new path for the country in their post-Merkel reality. It had been hoped that part of that future would be continued collaboration with Russia over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, which runs under the Baltic Sea. Amongst a flurry of condemnation over international sanctions which were considered too weak, one unavoidable action was taken on Germany’s part: putting a halt to Nord Stream 2.

This decisive action is going to have a major effect on Germany’s economy and Europe in general. We are entering a cost-of-living crisis throughout the EU and the UK, spurred on mainly through an energy crisis, the pressures of which it was hoped the much-needed gas from Nord Stream 2 would ease. 40% of Europe’s natural gas supplies come through a complicated pipeline system from Russia to Germany and from there on to the rest of the continent. This is in comparison to the UK, who receive only roughly 5% of their natural gas from Russia. Now, however, Europeans will have to struggle onwards as prices, which were already set to double as 2022 progressed, continue to rise. Nord Stream 2 was intended to lower the rising prices of gas and oil by meeting the demand in Europe and increasing the supply. The pipeline would have doubled the natural gas flowing into Germany, and thus to the EU, from Russia. Though controversial, it was viewed as key to the whole of Europe and has cost billions to build. For now, however, all that is going to waste. Not only will the billion-euro project lie unused, but the price of oil, a major factor in the Russian economy, has now risen to a seven year high at $105 per barrel, squeezing a sector already under immense pressure.

This action had to be taken, however, not only as a form of economic sanction on Russia but also for diplomatic reasons. Had Germany gone ahead with the project, their actions could have easily been manipulated to drive a wedge between the NATO allies. It is no longer possible for Germany, and by extension the EU, to accept such a valuable and vital commodity as natural gas from Russia. To do so would put Germany’s national integrity and sovereignty under immense scrutiny, leaving them beholden to Putin’s Russia for energy. Not only was it diplomatically necessary to halt the progress of the project but it was necessary for the sake of Germany’s international credibility.

The impact will be felt for a long time to come as the crisis in Ukraine continues. Now Germany, along with all those in the West and all around the world will be awaiting further developments as the alarming footage and reports continue to reach our screens.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.