Why was the Ukraine situation not solved diplomatically?
Vladimir Putin, president of the Russian Federation, doesn’t trust the West. As he sees it, the expansion of NATO is one long preparation for the subjugation of Russia and its people. At the same time, the West is now aware of the acute danger that Putin’s disgruntled vindication can cause, following his invasion of the Ukraine in February 2022. But why were the differences between Russia and NATO not bridged? And why could a diplomatic solution to the tension, one which could certainly have prevented the bloodshed and violence currently occuring in Ukraine, not be reached?
When the Soviet Union broke up some decades ago the United States gave Gorbachev its word that NATO would not seek expansion into Eastern Europe. Whilst this was never formalised, it was one of very few concessions granted to the fading USSR, and a promise that the new Russian state would at least be able to maintain an informal buffer zone between NATO and Moscow.
Equally important, perhaps, were the domestic consequences of this concession, which allowed successive Russian leaders to assure their citizens that the amassing of NATO troops at Russia’s borders would never happen. Until, on the 29th of March 2004, NATO welcomed, amongst many others, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to the bloc. This physically pushed the alliance to the borders of Russia, and its close ally, Belarus.
On the evening of the 21st March 2022, Russians across the country sat down in front of their televisions and radios to an hour-long rambling speech by Putin, who expressed the culmination of years of hatred for the West and NATO. This was a dramatic monologue more akin to the Stalin-years rather than 21st century Russia. Crucially, Putin referenced the historic encroachment of NATO frequently throughout his speech, consolidating current thought that it is crucial to his decisions regarding Ukraine. In this same speech, Putin announced that the Russian Federation would be recognising the two breakaway movements that Russian-backed rebels have controlled in the East of Ukraine for some years: the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic, setting the pretext for his invasion of Ukraine just a few days later.
It would be wrong though, to consider this issue of the enlargement of NATO to be the driving factor behind Vladimir Putin’s invasion, based solely on what the Russian President himself says. Indeed, NATO’s enlargement could instead be an easy diversion to legitimise the unprovoked war in the mind of the Russian people, and indeed the world. Instead, an analysis of not just what Putin says, but how he says it, is necessary. This can be seen in the stark contrast between speeches made by the Russian leader a decade ago, and those made early this year. Putin no longer monitors his tone when addressing the international audience, but instead is relentless in his aggressive and spiteful attacks on the West and the NATO alliance. If NATO enlargement really was Vladimir Putin’s main concern, many would find it hard to understand why he would change tact from slow incursions into Ukraine, to an all-out invasion, without specific provocation. This is consideration is especially significant when taking into account the devastating consequences of war on Russia’s economy. It should therefore be considered that perhaps, diplomatic mediations failed in Ukraine because Putin never entered them in good faith. His desire for the occupation of the country pervaded his attitude to negotiations from the outset.
Moreover, this would align with the ideological view that has been a key part of Putin’s approach since he first took power: that Russia had been wrong to disband the USSR, and that it could only become a superpower again by re-embracing Soviet-era policies, including the possession of specific Eastern European countries.
Vladimir Putin, the former head of the KGB, would certainly be well on his way to pursuing that goal by invading Ukraine. Under the guise of liberating the Ukrainian people from Nazification, it would be a fair evaluation to judge that ideological war, in the pursuit of a great new Russia, could indeed be Putin’s goal. Recent olive branches extended from the Kremlin to the Ukrainian government are too studded with thorns, as Putin demands that the Ukrainian army surrender, or indeed perform a coup d’état to overthrow the Zelensky government before he negotiates with them. Diplomacy at its worst, Putin’s attitude indicates to us that he has no intention to reach a diplomatic ending to the crisis in Ukraine. He uses diplomacy as a façade and is unwilling to engage with the Ukrainians on UN terms, instead choosing the path of suppression.
And so, there never was going to be a diplomatic solution to Ukraine, because as far as Vladimir Putin is concerned, Russia has passed the phase of diplomacy and negotiation. The country will settle its problems in its own ways.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
Image courtesy of Yuri Kochetkov/AFP via Getty Images, ©2022, some rights reserved.
