On China’s 'Global Community of Shared Future': A Vision or A Dream?
On the 26th of September, Beijing released its white paper titled “A Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions” in which it introduces the foundational ideas, basic framework, and steps forward in what is essentially the ‘Chinese’ vision for the future of human development. Although the fine details and substantive measures are rudimentary, the theoretical ambitions that it poses hold a significant weight particularly for the non-Western, ‘lesser developed’ nations or the ‘majority world.’ Properly scrutinising the documents content bring about some insights into how Beijing reached these position and understandings.
Firstly, the document proposes that “[t]o build a global community of shared future is to pursue openness, inclusiveness, mutual benefit, equity and justice.” To note, these terms are not equated to the Western political understandings, but Beijing’s interpretation of what they ought to mean. The explicit claim is that the status quo system is derived from and influenced by a post-Cold War mentality that “deepens division and antagonism and stokes confrontation between blocs.” The implicit message within is that the Western, US-led neoliberal capitalist system is in fact, closed off, exclusive, unfair, and unjust.
Moreover, it underscores a paradox within liberal thinking, presenting the idea that in becoming ‘globalists’ and building international coalitions, our system fosters alliances and blocs, with institutional designs and exclusionary practices that favour some countries at the expense of others. European and US history has demonstrated to a large extent that these claims do hold a degree of truth. Regional power contestation and international histories of colonialism paint a stark picture that many of our cooperative efforts stem from adversarial or discriminatory motives. So, where does China fit into this?
The white paper explicitly states that “the goal is not to replace one system or civilization with another… [but] it is about countries with different social systems, ideologies, histories, cultures and levels of development coming together to promote shared interests, shared rights, and shared responsibilities in global affairs.” From this, the fundamental position asserted clearly by Beijing is that it does not seek the status of a hegemon or in other words it does not desire to be the sole, ultimate power in the international system. The aspiration is rather to achieve a status of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between multiple, and importantly diverse powers. This is another divergence from traditional interpretations of rising Great powers.
In Western history when a Great power rises, it is messy and done with violence, where the goal is domination through direct territorial expansion or international engagements, to rigidly ‘legitimise’ their new position in the geopolitical landscape. In many instances, to mobilise the resources for such behaviour, these differences are emboldened, exploited by political actors to justify the abusive use of force from Great powers onto others. Interestingly, Beijing in this white paper, emphasises a “global community” that embraces a conciliatory approach to identifying shared objectives in spite of these differences, and wants to avoid repeating Great power history, but is there any evidence (i.e., diplomatic weight) behind this vision?
From a historical-cultural perspective, there are some influences that may help explore how Beijing will behave or conduct itself. In ancient times, the Chinese philosopher Xunzi (the last of the five Great Sages of Confucianism) distinguishes different levels of rulers. The lowest ruler is one who relies excessively on military power to expand his territory, taxes without regard for if his people can sustain themselves, and overuses laws and punishments to keep them in line. Conversely, the highest level is given to a “true king who wins the hearts of the people through his rule by ritual principles.” Chinese tradition has long since rejected the ethical and moral claims of the Western image of a Great power. The ideological imperative is placed on social cohesion and ‘harmony’ instead of realist ideals of military power and material security.
In contemporary times, this traditional influence can be witnessed in Chinese political continuity from the 1970’s to the present. In a 1974 speech to the UN, Former Chairman Deng Xiaoping stated: "China is not a superpower, nor will she ever seek to be one… if she too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression and exploitation, the people of the world should identify her as social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it." This speech made clear Beijing’s definition of a ‘superpower’ or Great power as one of an international ‘tyrant.’ Furthermore, this speech would mark the start of China’s new commitment to ‘never seeking hegemony’ (NSH)- a phrase which has been reiterated by Chinese leaders since.
In 2005, during the 60th anniversary of the UN, former President Hu Jintao made a speech titled “Making Great Efforts to Build a Harmonious World [hexie shijie] with Long-lasting Peace and Common Prosperity.” In this speech, he expanded on the NSH commitment by making suggestions like the “security concept of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and collaboration” and appealing to the “the right of each country to independently choosing its social system and development road.” These concepts have notably become codified in the white paper on ‘shared future’ and demonstrate the continuity within China’s foreign policy. Hu concluded by transforming NSH into a concept of ‘peaceful development,’ linking peace, development, and cooperation to Beijing’s main foreign policy, stating that “China’s development, instead of hurting or threatening anyone, can only serve peace, stability and common prosperity in the world.” This theoretical growth within Hu’s ‘Harmonious World” framework stresses the influence from inherited ideas on Great powers, peace, and China’s role in the world, informing the decision to include principles such as ‘mutual benefit,’ ‘equity’ and ‘justice’ in the white paper.
These historical-cultural influences culminate within President Xi Jinping’s administration, shaping his vision for a “Community of Shared Future.” In Xi’s 2014 speech at an academic research conference, he states: “The ideology and culture of today’s China is also the continuation and sublimation of traditional Chinese ideology and culture.” This influence is made real when observing Xi’s grand project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which converges five pillars of connectivity, trade, infrastructure, finance, and most notably, policy and cultural and educational exchanges. Thus, the construction of the BRI is not only an economic endeavour of Beijing, but an inherently political and ideologically driven project.
The final outcome of the BRI will either become a ‘proof of concept’ or a failure of implementation for the 2023 white paper’s proposed framework. Regardless, it ultimately shows Beijing’s commitments being translated into action. With Beijing’s political will evident, a developed plan drawing on cultural-historical lessons, and significant resources, whether a ‘global community of shared future’ is an attainable vision or simply a paper dream is yet to be seen.
Image courtesy of Ron Cogswell via Wikimedia, ©2017. Some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
