Russian Conscription: Security Dilemma

In Soviet times, draftees from different parts of the Union were sent to far away republics to complete their military service. In the past few years it appears that, in an attempt to boost conscription, draftees from the North Caucasus are now able to serve in their home regions. While this change in policy might help to reduce the widespread problem of draft dodging and fill a manpower quota in a time of shortage, it could also have a number of negative implications for state security. 

The Soviets shipped their conscripts away from their homeland for an important reason. The practice discouraged desertion and functioned as a way to Russify and assimilate the state’s large multi-ethnic and multi-national population. Today’s policy of allowing conscripts to serve in their home territories could have the opposite effect: strengthening regional identities. Furthermore in the outbreak of a regional conflict how reliable might a national brigade be when ordered to put down a demonstration in their home region? Would their loyalty lie with the state or with their ethno-national communities? Past Soviet use of national units would suggest the latter. To better understand the reasoning behind this change in policy we need to look at the history of conscription in Russia. 

Historical Background

The use of obligatory short term military service creates a large pool of military reservists that can be more easily mobilised in the event of war. Resource mobilisation is a key component of state security, and in countries like Russia, universal conscription emerged out of such a need. 

From its implementation during the Tsarist regime to its current use in the Russian Federation, Russian conscription policies have continually dealt with the problem of how to minimise the risk of using politically unreliable manpower. The security dilemma is clear: conscription is needed to defend the state against foreign invasion, but mobilising and training politically unreliable elements could undermine state stability. Russian state leaders have generally dealt with this problem like this: 

In Times of Peace

Unreliable elements were either excluded from conscript cohorts or assigned to non-combat battalions. Here they completed tasks such as construction, railway maintenance, and supply transport. Soviet conscription policies were used as a way to assimilate rather than integrate ethnic minority groups. Poor treatment, hazing by Slavic soldiers, and harassment often had the opposite effect - further solidifying national and ethnic identities. 

In Times of War 

State officials begin to conscript politically unreliable elements of society starting with the most to the least reliable. Once conflicts ceased these units were quickly disbanded.

The Ethnic Factor 

The Soviet and Tsarist states were dominated by Russians and other ethnic Slavs (Belorussians and Ukrainians). These state elite constructed their respective militaries through conscription and promotion policies which ensured that politically reliable co-ethnics staffed the officer corps and made up the bulk of combat personnel. History and ethnicity were used as indicators of political reliability. In this way, communities that shared common ethno-national identities and a history of conflict with the Russian state were considered to be politically unreliable. This was the case with the various groups that inhabited the republics of Soviet Central Asia and the North Caucasus region.

The Soviet leadership’s belief about the relationship between history, ethnicity, and political reliability wasn’t completely unfounded. In WWII there are numerous case studies that suggest that national brigades were less reliable than units composed of a majority of Slavic recruits. Jason Lyall in his book Divided Armies: Inequality and Battlefield Performance in Modern explores this topic with a discussion of an instance of mass desertion by an Uzbek unit during the Battle of Stalingrad. In Afghanistan, following widespread cases of fraternization, defection, desertion, and insubordination, Central Asian Soldiers that were deployed during the invasion were withdrawn six months into the conflict. Some scholars suggest that Soviet military performance in Afghanistan did not significantly improve until the Central Asian soldiers were withdrawn.

If Soviet history is littered with examples which suggest that national units are unreliable and perform poorly in combat, why would the Russian state allow conscripts to serve in their own regions with others from similar ethnic and national backgrounds? Perhaps history could provide an answer.

In the Russian Civil War, the Bolsheviks were able to win the military support of a majority of the nationalist groups that inhabited the borders of the former Tsarist state. They allowed troops that shared common ethnic ties and nationalistic ambitions to serve together in national units. The Bolsheviks promised them regional autonomy and the national units helped the Red Army win the war. Not everyone wanted to become part of the Soviet state. North Caucasus and Central Asia were the loci of the longest-lasting and most difficult- to-suppress movements for complete national freedom. The inclusion of national units into the Red army’s forces assisted the Bolshevik drive into these areas and provided a convenient legitimization for it. Here, Soviet military power was masked by the inclusion of units composed of local nationalities. 

The Bolsheviks lacked the military might to maintain the borders of the former Tsarist state. This led to the use of national units and the nationality’s policy of Korenizatsiya which allowed various ethnic and nationalist groups a degree of regional autonomy. 

Back to today’s conscription policy. The change in policy was the result of a series of talks between Moscow and the leaders of the North Caucasus republics. Russian state leaders sought to restart the draft in the region because of Slavic demographic constraints. In the end, as a concession, Moscow agreed that draftees from the North Caucasus Republics could complete their military service in their home region. Perhaps, like with the Bolsheviks, these concessions indicate a lack of military strength on the part of the Russian state.

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